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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
FIRST SITTING 
Monday, 1st June 1987 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Opening of the thirty-third ordinary session of the 
Assembly. 
2. Election of the President of the Assembly. 
3. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
4. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
5. Adoption of the draft order of business of the first part of 
the thirty-third ordinary session (Doe. I 091 ). 
6. Action by the Presidential Committee (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, Doe. 
1102). 
7. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU. 
8. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance - Part II: 
Political activities of the Council (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, 
Doe. 1099). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Edwards, Provisional President, in the Chair. 
1. Opening of the session 
In accordance with Article Ill (a) of the 
Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, the Provisional President declared open 
the thirty-third ordinary session of the Assembly 
of Western European Union. 
2. Attendance register 
The names of representatives and substitutes 
who signed the register of attendance are given in 
the appendix. 
3. Address by the Provisional President 
The Provisional President addressed the 
Assembly. 
4. Election of the President of the Assembly 
Only one candidate was proposed for the post 
of President, namely Mr. Goerens. 
In accordance with Rule 10 (4) ofthe Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly decided unanimously 
not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Pres-
ident by acclamation. 
Mr. Goerens was elected President by accla-
mation. 
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At the invitation of the Provisional President, 
Mr. Goerens took the Chair. 
5. Election of three Vice-Presidents 
of the Assembly 
Three candidates had been proposed for posts 
of Vice-President, namely, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, 
Mr. Pecriaux and Mr. Soell. 
The Assembly decided unanimously not to 
have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-
Presidents by acclamation. 
Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Mr. Pecriaux and Mr. 
Soell were elected Vice-Presidents by accla-
mation. 
6. Adoption of the draft order 
of business for the first part of the session 
(Doe. 1091) 
The Assembly adopted the draft order of 
business for the first part of the session. 
7. Observers 
The President welcomed the observers from 
Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal and 
Turkey. 
MINUTES 
8. Action by the Presidential Committee 
(Presentation of the report of the Presidential Committee, 
Doe. 1102) 
The report of the Presidential Committee was 
presented by Mr. van der Werff, Rapporteur. 
The Assembly took note of the report of the 
Presidential Committee. 
9. Address by Mr. Cahen, 
Secretary-General of WEU 
Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, 
addressed the Assembly. 
Mr. Cahen answered questions put by MM. De 
Decker, Close, Declercq, Tummers, Caro, van 
der Werff, Rumpf, Soell, Valleix and Inan 
(Observer from Turkey). 
10. The European pillar 
of the Atlantic Alliance - Part II: 
Political activities of the Council 
(Presentation of the report 
of the General Affairs Committee, Doe. 1099) 
The report of the General Affairs Committee 
was presented by Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur. 
11. Election of three Vice-Presidents 
of the Assembly 
Three candidates had been proposed for the 
three remaining posts of Vice-President, namely: 
Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Valleix and Mr. van 
der Werff. 
The Assembly decided unanimously not to 
have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-
Presidents by acclamation. 
Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Valleix and Mr. van 
der Werff were elected Vice-Presidents by accla-
mation. 
The President informed the Assembly that the 
order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents 
according to age was as follows: Mr. Ferrari 
Aggradi, Mr. van der Werff, Sir Frederic Bennett, 
Mr. Valleix, Mr. Soell and Mr. Pecriaux. 
12. The European pillar 
of the Atlantic Alliance - Part II: 
Political activities of the Council 
(Debate on the report 
of the General Affairs Committee, Doe. 1099) 
The debate was opened. 
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FIRST SITTING 
Speakers: MM. Antretter, Soell and Close. 
Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took 
the Chair. 
Speaker: Mr. van den Bergh. 
The debate was adjourned. 
- I 
13. Changes in the membership of committees 
In accordance with Rule 38 (6) ofthe Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following 
changes in the membership of committees pro-
posed by the Delegations of Belgium and 
France: 
Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments 
Belgium 
- Mr. Bogaerts as a titular member in place of 
Mr. Dejardin. 
General Affairs Committee 
Belgium 
- Mr. Dejardin as a titular member in place of 
Mr. Bogaerts; 
France 
- Mr. Bassinet as a titular member in place of 
Mr. Mermaz; 
- Mr. Pontillon as a titular member to fill a 
vacant seat. 
Committee on Rules 
of Procedure and Privileges 
France 
- Mr. Mermaz as an alternate member in place 
of Mr. Bassinet. 
14. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The orders of the day for the next sitting were 
agreed to. 
The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 2nd 
June, at 10 a.m. 
The sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m. 
APPENDIX FIRST SITTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance 1: 
Belgium Mrs. Fischer (Antretter) Luxembourg 
MM. Bohm 
MM. Adriaensens Steiner (Buchner) MM. Burger 
Bogaerts Holtz Hengel 
Declercq Irmer 
Close (Dejardin) Kittelmann 
Pecriaux Mrs. Luuk 
Mrs. Staels-Do m pas MM. Mechtersheimer Netherlands 
Mr. Steverlynck Muller 
Niegel MM. Aarts 
Reddemann van den Bergh 
France Rumpf Eisma (de 
Scheer K waadsteniet) 
MM. Bassinet Mrs. Pack (Schmitz) Stoffelen 
Baumel MM. Buhler (von Schmude) Tummers 
Caro So ell Eysink (Mrs. van der 
Prat (Collette) Unland W erf-Terpstra) 
Fourre (Galley) van der Werff 
Bordu (Gremetz) 
Jeambrun 
Jung 
Chenard (Koehl) United Kingdom 
Mrs. Lalumiere 
MM. Matraja Italy Sir Frederic Bennett 
Pontillon (Mermaz) Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
Oehler MM. Antoni MM. Edwards (Garrett) 
Valleix Bianco Wooda/1 (Hardy) 
Ferrari Aggradi Sir Paul Hawkins 
Giust Lord Hughes 
Federal Republic of Germany Milani Dr. Miller 
Mitterdorfer (Sarti) Sir John Osborn 
Mr. Ahrens Colajanni (Vecchietti) Mr. Murphy (Wilkinson) 
The following representatives apologised for their absence: 
France MM. Cavaliere United Kingdom 
Cifarelli 
MM. de Chambrun Fiandrotti Mr. Coleman 
Croze Frasca Sir Anthony Grant 
Portier Gianotti MM. Hill 
Seitlinger Mezzapesa Jessel 
Pecchioli Earl of Kinnoull 
Rauti Lady Jill Knight 
Italy Rubbi Sir John Page 
Sinesio Mr. Ross 
Mr. Amadei Sir Dudley Smith 
l. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names ofthe latter being given in brackets. 
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SECOND SilTING 
Tuesday, 2nd June 1987 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance - Part 11: 
Political activities of the Council (Resumed debate on the 
report of the General Affairs Committee, Doe. 1 099). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 10 a. m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Attendance register 
The names of representatives and substitutes 
who signed the register of attendance are given in 
the appendix. 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
3. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance 
Part II: Political activities of the Council 
(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs 
Committee, Doe. 1099) 
The debate was resumed. 
Speakers: MM. van der Sanden, Irmer, Eisma, 
Baumel, Muller, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Caro 
and De Decker. 
Mr. Pecriaux, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair. 
Speaker: Mr. Valleix. 
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Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, 
resumed the Chair. 
Speakers: MM. du Monceau and Burger. 
The debate was adjourned. 
4. Change in the membership' of a committee 
In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following 
change in the membership of the Committee for 
Parliamentary and Public Relations proposed by 
the Luxembourg Delegation: Mr. Burger as a 
titular member in place of Mr. Goerens. 
5. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sittiRg 
The orders of the day for the next sitting were 
agreed to. 
The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 
3 p.m. 
The sitting was closed at 12.35 p.m. 
APPENDIX SECOND SITIING 
APPENDIX 
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance 1: 
Belgium 
MM. Noerens (Adriaensens) 
Bogaerts 
De Bondt (Declercq) 
Close (Dejardin) 
Pecriaux 
Mrs. Staels-Do m pas 
Mr. De Decker (Steverlynck) 
France 
MM. Bassinet 
Baumel 
Caro 
Prat (Jeambrun) 
Koehl 
Pontillon (Mermaz) 
Oehler 
Valleix 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Ahrens 
Zierer (Bohm) 
MM. lrmer 
Kittelmann 
Mrs. Luuk 
MM. Muller 
Niegel 
Reddemann 
Rumpf 
Mrs. Blunck (Scheer) 
Mrs. Pack (Schmitz) 
Mr. Soell 
Italy 
MM. Amadei 
Antoni 
Bianco 
Gorla (Cifarelli) 
Giust 
Milani 
Pollidoro (Pecchioli) 
Mitterdorfer (Sarti) 
Sinesio 
The following representatives apologised for their absence: 
France 
MM. de Chambrun 
Collette 
Croze 
Galley 
Gremetz 
Jung 
Mrs. Lalumiere 
MM. Matraja 
Portier 
Seitlinger 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Antretter 
Buchner 
MM. Holtz 
Mechtersheimer 
von Schmude 
Unland 
Italy 
MM. Cavaliere 
Ferrari Aggradi 
Fiandrotti 
Frasca 
Gianotti 
Mezzapesa 
Rauti 
Rubbi 
Vecchietti 
Luxembourg 
Mr. Burger 
Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges 
(Goerens) 
Mr. Hengel 
Netherlands 
MM. van der Sanden (Aarts) 
Eisma (de 
K waadsteniet) 
Stoffelen 
Eysink (Mrs. van der 
W erf-Terpstra) 
van der Werff 
United Kingdom 
Sir Frederic Bennett 
MM. Edwards (Garrett) 
W oodall (Hardy) 
Sir Paul Hawkins 
Lord Hughes 
Lord Newall 
(Earl of Kinnoull) 
Dr. Miller 
Sir John Osborn 
Sir John Page 
Mr. Murphy (Wilkinson) 
Netherlands 
MM. van den Bergh 
Tummers 
United Kingdom 
Mr. Coleman 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
Sir Anthony Grant 
MM. Hill 
Jessel 
Lady Jill Knight 
Mr. Ross 
Sir Dudley Smith 
1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets. 
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THIRD SITTING 
Tuesday, 2nd June 1987 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
2. Second part of the thirty-second annual report of the 
Council (PresentatiOn by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-m-Office of the Council, 
Doe. 1093). 
3. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance - Part 11: 
Political activities of the Council (Resumed debate on the 
report of the General Affairs Committee and votes on the 
draft recommendation and draft order, Doe. 1099). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Attendance register 
The names of representatives and substitutes 
who signed the register of attendance are given in 
the appendix. 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
3. Address by the President of the Assembly 
The President addressed the Assembly. 
4. Second part of the thirty-second 
annual report of the Council 
(Presentation by Mr. Poos, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doe. 1093) 
The second part of the thirty-second annual 
report of the Council to the Assembly was pre-
sented by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council. 
Mr. Poos answered questions put by Mr. 
Valleix, Sir John Osborn, MM. Caro, Machete 
(Observer from Portugal), Burger, Elmquist 
(Observer from Denmark) and Caro. 
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5. Changes in the membership of committees 
In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following 
changes in the membership of committees pro-
posed by the French Delegation: 
Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments 
- Mr. Fourre as a titular member in place of Mr. 
Galley; 
- Mr. Galley as an alternate member in place of 
Mr. Fourre. 
Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions 
- Mr. Galley as a titular member in place of Mr. 
Fourre; 
- Mr. Fourre as an alternate member in place of 
Mr. Galley. 
6. Change in the order of business 
On the proposal of Mr. De Decker, the 
Assembly agreed to add at the end of the orders 
of the day for the afternoon sitting on 
Wednesday, 3rd June, the report of the Com-
mittee on Parliamentary and Public Relations on 
the voice of Europe after Reykjavik - debates in 
national parliaments, Document 1097, previ-
ously intended for the following day. 
Speaker: Sir Paul Hawkins. 
MINUTES 
7. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance -
Part II: Political activities of the Council 
(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs 
Committee and votes on the draft recommendation 
and draft order, Doe. 1099) 
The debate was resumed. 
Speaker: Sir John Osborn. 
Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair. 
Speakers: MM. Inan (Observer from Turkey), 
Katsaros (Observer from Greece) and Bayiilken 
(Observer from Turkey). 
Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, 
resumed the Chair. 
Speaker: Mr. Elmquist (Observer from 
Denmark). 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur, replied to the 
speakers. 
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THIRD SITTING 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
recommendation. 
The draft recommendation was agreed to 
unanimously. (This recommendation will be 
published as No. 446) 1• 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
order. 
The draft order was agreed to unanimously. 
(This order will be published as No. 68) 2• 
8. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The orders of the day for the next sitting were 
agreed to. 
The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 3rd 
June, at 10 a.m. 
The sitting was closed at 5.35 p.m. 
l. See page 20. 
2. See page 21. 
APPENDIX THIRD SITTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance1: 
Belgium 
MM. Noerens Adriaensens) 
Bogaerts 
Declercq 
Dejardin 
Pecriaux 
Mrs. Staels-Dompas 
Mr. Steverlynck 
France 
MM. Pontillon (Bassinet) 
Caro 
Bordu (Gremetz) 
Lacour (Jeambrun) 
Matraja 
Fourre (Mermaz) 
Valleix 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Ahrens 
Steiner (Antretter) 
Kittelmann 
Reddemann 
Mrs. Blunck (Scheer) 
Mrs. Pack (Schmitz) 
Mr. Buhler (von Schmude) 
Italy 
MM. Giust 
Pollidoro (Pecchioli) 
Mitterdorfer (Sarti) 
Luxembourg 
MM. Burger 
Hengel 
The following representatives apologised for their absence: 
France 
MM. Baumel 
de Chambrun 
Collette 
Croze 
Galley 
Jung 
Koehl 
Mrs. Lalumiere 
MM. Oehler 
Portier 
Seitlinger 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Bohm 
Buchner 
Holtz 
Irmer 
Mrs. Luuk 
MM. Mechtersheimer 
Muller 
Niegel 
Rumpf 
Soell 
Unland 
Italy 
MM. Amadei 
Antoni 
Bianco 
Cavaliere 
Cifarelli 
Ferrari Aggradi 
Fiandrotti 
Frasca 
Gianotti 
Mezzapesa 
Milani 
Netherlands 
MM. van der Sanden (Aarts) 
de K waadsteniet 
Stoffelen 
Tummers 
Eysink (Mrs. van der 
W erf-Terpstra) 
de Beer (van der Werfl) 
United Kingdom 
Sir Frederic Bennett 
MM. Edwards (Garrett) 
Wooda/1 (Hardy) 
Sir Paul Hawkins 
Lord Hughes 
Lord Newa/1 
(Earl of Kinnoull) 
Dr. Miller 
Sir John Os born 
Sir John Page 
MM. Rauti 
Rubbi 
Sinesio 
Vecchietti 
Netherlands 
Mr. van den Bergh 
United Kingdom 
Mr. Coleman 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
Sir Anthony Grant 
MM. Hill 
Jessel 
Lady Jill Knight 
Mr. Ross 
Sir Dudley Smith 
Mr. Wilkinson 
I. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets. 
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TEXTS ADOPTED 
The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 446 
on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance -
Part II: Political activities of the Council 
THIRD SITTING 
(i) Protesting against the fact that the thirty-second annual report of the Council reached it only on 
27th April 1987; 
(ii) Noting that at the ministerial meeting on 28th April no action was taken on the proposal to draw 
up a European security charter; 
(iii) Noting and regretting that no effective decision has yet been taken on the Assembly's budgetary 
requests and that the words used by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council need clarification; 
(iv) Noting that the Council has taken no practical action on its intentions to reorganise the WEU 
services; 
(v) Noting and regretting that the Council has given no answer to the countries which have applied 
for membership of WEU and Portugal in particular; 
(vi) Noting that the absence of effective and adequate information given to the public on the Council's 
activities leaves considerable doubt about its intention to set up a European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance, 
REcoMMENDs THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Convene as swiftly as practicable a conference of heads of state and of government of the 
signatory countries of the modified Brussels Treaty and of countries effectively determined to take part 
in a European security organisation in the context of the Atlantic Alliance in order to define jointly 
security requirements for the next ten years and the role to be attributed to WEU to this end; 
2. Respond favourably to Portugal's application before the end of the year. 
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TEXTS ADOPTED 
The Assembly, 
ORDER 68 
on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance -
Part II: Political activities of the Council 
THIRD SITTING 
Anxious to play a useful part in preparing a conference of European heads of state and of 
government on security, 
INSTRUCTS ITS GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE to organise as early as possible, and not later than 
spring 1988, a colloquy which would be open to the public and bring together a number of prominent 
Europeans not at present exercising governmental duties to draw up specific proposals: 
(a) for defining the matters that the conference of heads of state and of govemment on security 
should include in its agenda; 
(b) for directing the reactivation of WEU 
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FOURTH SITTING 
Wednesday, 3rd June 1987 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of 
Western European Union for the financial years 1986 
(revised) and 1987 (Presentation of and debate on the 
reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admi-
nistration and vote on the draft recommendation, Does. 
1088 and 1105). 
2. European space policy until 2000 (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Tech-
nological and Aerospace Questions, Doe. 1098). 
3. Address by Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of Luxem-
bourg. 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 10 a. m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Attendance register 
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are 
given in the appendix. 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
3. Opinion on the budgets of 
the ministerial organs of 
Western European Union for the financial years 
1986 (revised) and 1987 
(Presentation of and debate on the reports of the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the 
draft recommendation, Does. 1088 and 1105) 
The reports of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration were presented by 
Mr. Linster, Rapporteur. 
The debate was opened. 
Speaker: Mr. Giust. 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. Linster, Rapporteur, replied to the 
speaker. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
recommendation in Document 1105. 
The draft recommendation was agreed to 
unanimously. (This recommendation will be 
published as No. 447) 1• 
I. See page 24. 
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4. European space policy until 2000 
(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee 
on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, 
Doe. 1098) 
The report of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions was pre-
sented by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur. 
The debate was opened. 
Speakers: Sir John Osbom and Mr. Fourre. 
Mr. van der Wer.IJ, Vice-President of the 
Assembly, took the Chair. 
Speaker: Sir Paul Hawkins. 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur, replied to the 
speakers. 
Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, 
resumed the Chair. 
5. Address by Mr. Fischbach, 
Minister of Defence of Luxembourg 
Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of Luxem-
bourg, addressed the Assembly. 
Mr. Fischbach answered questions put by Sir 
John Os born, MM. Valleix, Bayiilken (Observer 
from Turkey), Elmquist (Observer from 
Denmark) and Valleix. 
6. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The orders of the day for the next sitting were 
agreed to. 
The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 
3 p.m. 
The sitting was closed at 12.55 p. m. 
MINUTES FOURTH SITTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance 1: 
Belgium Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Adriaensens MM. Ahrens 
Bogaerts Antretter 
Declercq Mrs. Luuk 
Dejardin MM. Muller 
Pecriaux Niegel 
du Monceau (Mrs. Staels- Reddemann 
Do m pas) Buhler (von Schmude) 
Steverlynck Schmidt (Soell) 
France Italy 
MM. Bassinet MM. Antoni 
Pontillon (Jeambrun) Giust 
Bohl (Jung) Milani 
Prat (Mrs. Lalumiere) Pollidoro (Pecchioli) 
Fourre (Matraja) 
Chenard (Mermaz) 
Oehler Luxembourg 
Portier 
Seitlinger MM. Burger 
Valleix Linster (Hengel) 
The following representatives apologised for their absence: 
France 
MM. Baumel 
Caro 
de Chambrun 
Collette 
Croze 
Galley 
Gremetz 
Koehl 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Bohm 
Buchner 
Holtz 
Irmer 
Kittelmann 
Mechtersheimer 
MM. Rumpf 
Scheer 
Schmitz 
Unland 
Italy 
MM. Amadei 
Bianco 
Cavaliere 
Cifarelli 
Ferrari Aggradi 
Fiandrotti 
Frasca 
Gianotti 
Mezzapesa 
Rauti 
Rubbi 
Sarti 
Netherlands 
MM. van der Sanden 
(Aarts) 
de K waadsteniet 
Stoffelen 
Tummers 
Eysink (Mrs. van 
der Werf-Terpstra) 
van der Werff 
United Kingdom 
MM. Edwards (Garrett) 
Woodall (Hardy) 
Sir Paul Hawkins 
Lord Hughes 
Lord Newall (Jessel) 
Dr. Miller 
Sir John Os born 
Mr. Murphy (Wilkinson) 
MM. Sinesio 
Vecchietti 
Netherlands 
Mr. van den Bergh 
United Kingdom 
Sir Frederic Bennett 
Mr. Coleman 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
Sir Anthony Grant 
Mr. Hill 
Earl of Kinnoull 
Lady Jill Knight 
Sir John Page 
Mr. Ross 
Sir Dudley Smith 
l. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter bemg given in brackets. 
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TEXT ADOPTED 
RECOMMENDATION 447 
on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union 
for the financial years 1986 (revised) and 1987 
The Assembly, 
FOURTH SITTING 
(i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1986 (revised) and 
1987, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter; 
(ii) Considering that: 
(a) the presentation of the budgets for 1986 (revised) and 1987 has been simplified by reducing 
the number of sub-heads and grouping all social charges under one sub-head and all expend-
iture on staff under one head but that ordinary expenditure has not been separated from 
extraordinary expenditure as recommended by the Assembly in Recommendation 433; 
(b) consequently, because of the effect of extraordinary expenditure, the growth rate of these 
budgets cannot be accurately compared with the rate of inflation fixed for applying the zero 
growth criterion; 
(c) furthermore, the evolution of budgets since 1985 shows an increase above the zero growth rate 
since the requirements of reactivating WEU - including the restructuring of the ministerial 
organs - have been taken into account in this budget; 
(d) in addition, the payment of pensions to newly-retired officials could no longer be included in 
the operating budget without jeopardising the activities of the various organs; 
(e) the zero growth rate obviously no longer being of any value, the Council should establish a 
more objective and effective criterion for preparing WEU budgets; 
(f) analysis of the various categories of expenditure in the budgets of the ministerial organs of 
WEU shows that expenditure on staff alone represents about 90% of total operating expend-
iture; 
(g) this percentage could be improved considerably and amounts under Head I "Permanent 
staff" could be used for other operating expenditure if the two seats in London and Paris were 
combined to allow their now separate services to be merged; 
(iii) Regretting that: 
(a) three posts assigned to the Secretariat-General remained vacant throughout 1986 whereas the 
Council refused the creation of new posts in the WEU Assembly; 
(b) the Council has given a new interpretation of criteria for dual grading which entirely ignores 
the wishes of the staff to achieve career prospects subject to certain conditions of seniority; 
(iv) Welcoming the fact that at the close of the ministerial meeting on 28th April 1987 Mr. Poos, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, informed the Assembly that the Council of Ministers had decided to 
agree to a separate budget for pensions and to recognise the Assembly's budgetary independence within 
the limits of agreed appropriations, this decision to take effect immediately, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Apply the same criterion for increasing WEU budgets as is applied by the EEC in establishing its 
budget; 
2. Apply to the operating budget ofthe Assembly for 1987 the growth rate of2.79% agreed upon for 
its budget as a whole, including pensions, i.e. an increase ofF 379 983; 
3. Examine the possibility of: 
(a) uniting the ministerial organs of WEU in a single seat and preparing one table of estab-
lishment integrating the services now divided between the two seats; 
(b) establishing dual grading at every level of the hierarchy to improve the staff's career possibil-
ities. 
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FIFTH SITTING 
Wednesday, 3rd June 1987 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. European space policy until 2000 (Vote on the draft recom-
mendation, Doe. 1098). 
2. The voice of Europe after Reykjavik- debates in national 
parliaments (Presentation of and debate on the report of the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and 
vote on the draft resolution, Doe. 1097). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 3.10 p.rn. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Attendance register 
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are 
given in the appendix. 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
3. European space policy until 2000 
(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doe. 1098) 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
recommendation in Document 1098. 
The draft recommendation was agreed to 
unanimously. (This recommendation will be 
published as No. 448) 1• 
4. The voice of Europe after Reykjavik -
debates in national parliaments 
(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for 
Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote 
on the draft resolution, Doe. 1 097) 
The report of the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations was presented by 
1. See page 27. 
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Mr. Burger, Rapporteur in place of Mr. 
Goerens. 
The debate was opened. 
Speaker: Mr. Bordu. 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. Burger, Rapporteur, and Mr. Tummers, 
Vice-Chairman of the committee, replied to the 
speaker. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
resolution. 
The draft resolution was agreed to. (This reso-
lution will be published as No. 76) 1• 
5. Adjournment of tlte session 
The President adjourned the thirty-third 
ordinary session of the Assembly. 
The sitting was closed at 3.40 p.rn. 
1. See page 28. 
APPENDIX FIITH SITTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance 1: 
Belgium 
MM. Adriaensens 
Bogaerts 
Declercq 
Dejardin 
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France 
MM. Bordu (Gremetz) 
Pontillon (Mermaz) 
Portier 
Valleix 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Mr. Ahrens 
Italy 
MM. Amadei 
Giust 
Luxembourg 
MM. Burger 
Linster (Hengel) 
The following representatives apologised for their absence: 
Belgium MM. Buchner 
Holtz 
Mr. Pecriaux Irmer 
Kittelmann 
Mrs. Luuk 
France MM. Mechtersheimer Muller 
MM. Bassinet Niegel Reddemann Baumel Rumpf Caro Scheer de Chambrun Schmitz Collette 
van Schmude Craze So ell Galley Unland Jeambrun 
Jung 
Koehl 
Mrs. Lalumiere Italy 
MM. Matraja MM. Antoni Oehler Bianco Seitlinger Cavaliere 
Cifarelli 
Ferrari Aggradi 
Federal Republic of Germany Fiandrotti 
Frasca 
MM. Antretter Gianotti 
Bohm Mezzapesa 
Netherlands 
MM. van der Sanden (Aarts) 
de K waadsteniet 
Stoffelen 
Tummers 
Eysink (Mrs. van der 
Werf-Terpstra) 
van der W erff 
United Kingdom 
Sir Frederic Bennett 
Mr. Woodall (Hardy) 
Sir Paul Hawkins 
Lord Hughes 
Lord Newall (Jessel) 
Sir John Osbom 
MM. Milani 
Pecchioli 
Rauti 
Rubbi 
Sarti 
Sinesio 
Vecchietti 
Netherlands 
Mr. van den Bergh 
United Kingdom 
Mr. Coleman 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
Mr. Garrett 
Sir Anthony Grant 
Mr. Hill 
Earl of Kinnoull 
Lady Jill Knight 
Dr. Miller 
Sir John Page 
Mr. Ross 
Sir Dudley Smith 
Mr. Wilkinson 
1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets. 
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TEXTS ADOPTED FIITH SITTING 
RECOMMENDATION 448 
on European space policy until 2000 
The Assembly, 
(i) Aware that a resolute space policy helps the development of pioneering technology by fostering 
progress in advanced industrial sectors and intellectual, cultural and human resources in Western 
Europe; 
(ii) Convinced that such a space policy can, in the long run, provide solutions to problems of energy 
and raw material supplies, the pollution of the biosphere and also famine, poverty and illiteracy in the 
third world, while fostering day-to-day progress and a better standard ofliving for the populations of our 
own countries; 
(iii) Determined that Western Europe, through ESA, should be fully independent in space matters 
before the end of the twentieth century; 
(iv) Considering that to enhance scientific capability and make optimum use of relatively limited 
intellectual and financial resources every possibility of European co-operation in both civil and military 
space research must be exploited; 
(v) Anxious to back up the already considerable results achieved by ESA's Ariane programme and 
confirmed by Arianespace in the commercial market; 
(vi) Stressing the urgency of establishing space co-operation for the security of the Western European 
countries, particularly in activities recognised to be stabilising, such as monitoring and communica-
tions, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Support the aim of the European Space Agency (ESA) to make Europe independent in space 
before the end of the century by ensuring that it has all the means necessary, which may mean doubling 
the present budget in the next decade; 
2. Encourage the establishment of liaison between ESA and the authorities responsible for space 
policy in each country of the agency to ensure that all European bodies handling space research are kept 
mutually informed of current or planned civil and military programmes in order to avoid any pointless 
waste of intellectual and financial resources and better prepare for the difficult choices which will inevi-
tably have to be made in the future; 
3. Facilitate as far as possible operations by the European Ariane launcher to ensure that it has at 
least a half share of the market for commercial launches, inter alia by: 
- concluding without delay an agreement with the United States Government defining principles 
according to which the cost of commercial launches should take account of the costs borne by 
governments, particularly those relating to launching sites; 
- making arrangements to avoid having western satellites placed in orbit by Soviet launchers pro-
posed in the world market if such offers continue to be made without reciprocity and at a cost 
which does not respect commercial principles; 
4. Endeavour to conclude as early as possible an intergovernmental agreement with the United 
States on the space station in order to bring it into being more quickly while consolidating western 
co-operation, this being an opportunity for Europe, with its partners, to take part in technological 
progress linked with this programme and to advance towards independence; 
5. With the assistance of the WEU agencies for security questions, examine the repercussions of 
establishing a European military programme for communications, navigation, observation and recon-
naissance satellites; 
6. Systematically strengthen European space co-operation which has already made Europe the third 
space power in the world and encourage the space dialogue with the United States each time it may lead 
to balanced solutions for the future. 
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The Assembly, 
RESOLUTION 76 
on the voice of Europe after Reykjavik -
debates in national parliaments 
FIFTH SITTING 
(i) Considering that many proposals and ideas have been put forward in the parliaments of member 
countries for achieving closer European co-operation in security matters; 
(ii) Gratified that the governments of most member countries have shown their determination to 
hold closer consultations in WEU, which they consider to be the appropriate framework for strength-
ening co-operation; 
(iii) Gratified that, thanks to many initiatives taken by members in certain national parliaments, a 
true dialogue on the various aspects ofWEU's activities has been developed with the respective govern-
ments, which led one delegation to conclude its information report by noting that the reactivation of 
WEU had stopped being a subject of discussion and had become a fact; 
(iv) Regretting nevertheless that the answers given by governments on their activities in keeping the 
public informed are not yet satisfactory, 
INVITES parliaments and governments 
To maintain and deepen a fruitful, continuing dialogue on the basis of recommendations adopted 
in order to: 
1. Contribute to the success of jointly-prepared concepts of European security matters; 
2. Make a joint European position on security matters carry greater weight in the Atlantic concert 
and in the East-West dialogue; 
3. Give useful impetus to the successful reorganisation of WEU; 
4. Ensure that the public is clearly and more meaningfully informed. 
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OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
FIRST SITTING 
Monday, 1st June 1987 
SUMMARY 
I. Opening of the session. 
2. Attendance register. 
3. Address by the Provisional President. 
4. Election of the President of the Assembly. 
5. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
6. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part 
of the session (Doe. 1091). 
7. Observers. 
8. Action by the Presidential Committee (Presentation of 
the report of the Presidential Committee, Doe. 11 02). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. van der Werff 
(Rapporteur). 
9. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU. 
Repltes by Mr. Cahen to questions put by: Mr. De Decker, 
Mr. Close, Mr. Declercq, Mr. Tummers, Mr. Caro, Mr. 
van der Werff, Mr. Rumpf, Mr. Soell, Mr. Valleix, Mr. 
Inan (Observer from Turkey). 
10. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance - Part II: 
Political activities of the Council (Presentation of the 
report of the General Affairs Committee, Doe. 1099). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Ahrens (Rapporteur). 
11. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
12. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance - Part II: 
Political activities of the Council (Debate on the report of 
the General Affairs Committee, Doe. 1099). 
Speakers: Mr. Antretter, Mr. Soell, Mr. Close, Mr. van 
den Bergh. 
13. Changes in the membership of committees. 
14. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. 
The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Edwards, Provisional President, in the Chair. 
1. Opening of the session 
The PRESIDENT. - The sitting is open. 
In accordance with Article Ill (a) of the 
Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, I declare open the thirty-third ordinary 
session of the Assembly of Western European 
Union. 
2. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT.- The names ofthe substi-
tutes attending this sitting which have been 
notified to the President will be published with 
the list of representatives appended to the 
minutes of proceedings 1• 
3. Address by the Provisional President 
The PRESIDENT. - I shall not be standing for 
the British Parliament again, although I have 
been a member of parliament for thirty-two 
years. This will therefore be the last occasion 
1. See page 14. 
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when I shall have the honour of presiding over 
the opening sitting of this important Assembly. 
Off and on, I have been a delegate to this 
Assembly for thirty years, apart from three years 
that I spent in the European Parliament and two 
with the North Atlantic Assembly. Twenty years 
ago I was Chairman of the Defence Committee 
and was the Rapporteur of that committee on 
three occasions. I have therefore had reasonable 
experience of the work and the developments of 
this important European organisation, and I 
wish it well in the future. 
During the past few years, the right of this 
Assembly has been extended considerably, and 
we have been fortunate to have had at our 
service a very energetic President, who accepted 
new responsibilities as the President of this 
Assembly. It is thus very sad for me to say that 
this is the last occasion when I shall meet my 
good friends, the members of seven different par-
liaments, friends from across parliamentary and 
political frontiers with whom I meet and work in 
committee. 
I have learnt much from our work and have 
developed friendships that will last me for ever. 
I thank you, good folk, for the co-operation that I 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
The President (continued) 
have received from you during these years, and I 
say goodbye to this Assembly as an official repre-
sentative. 
4. Election of the President of the Assembly 
The PRESIDENT. - The next order ofthe day 
is the election of the President of the 
Assembly. 
Under Rules 7(2), 10(2) and 10(10), only a rep-
resentative, who may not be a member of his 
national government, may stand as a candidate 
for the office of President, and his candidature 
must be sponsored by three or more representa-
tives. 
I have received only one nomination, that of 
Mr. Goerens. The nomination has been properly 
made and is in the form prescribed by the rules. 
If there is no objection, I may declare Mr. 
Goerens elected by acclamation in accordance 
with Rule 10(4). 
Is there any opposition to the sole 
. ? nommee .... 
I believe that the Assembly is unanimous. 
I proclaim Mr. Goerens President of the 
Assembly of Western European Union. I con-
gratulate him and invite him to take the 
Chair. 
(Mr. Goerens then took the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ladies and 
gentlemen, thank you most sincerely for your 
confidence in me. You may be sure, of course, 
that I will be the President of the whole 
Assembly whose wishes I feel I reflect in paying 
tribute to the work done by Mr. Jean-Marie Caro 
as President over the last three years. 
You will, I am sure, understand my post-
poning the address that is usual in these circum-
stances to the next sitting. I would, however, like 
to extend today our sincere thanks to our old 
friend and colleague, Bob Edwards, for whom 
this is the last time he will be Provisional Pres-
ident of the Assembly. Like some other members 
of the British Delegation he is not standing again 
at this month's general election. He has had a 
long and remarkable parliamentary and political 
career and, as he told this Assembly when pre-
siding at the opening of our June 1984 session, 
he has always been a committed and unrepentant 
European. · 
We salute him for his efforts in favour of the 
European ideal. We wish him a long and happy 
retirement and we extend the same wishes to all 
our other colleagues for whom this will be their 
last session in this Assembly. 
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5. Election of three Vice-Presidents 
of the Assembly 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the election of Vice-Presidents 
of the Assembly. 
Rule 7(2) of the Rules of Procedure lays down 
that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau 
of the Assembly. 
In addition, Rule 10(2) and (10) ofthe Rules of 
Procedure states that no representative may 
stand as a candidate for the office of Vice-
President unless a proposal for his candidature 
has been sponsored in writing by three or more 
representatives and representatives who are 
members of governments may not be members 
of the Bureau. 
Three nominations have been submitted in the 
prescribed form. 
The candidates are, in alphabetical order, Mr. 
Ferrari Aggradi, Mr. Pecriaux and Mr. Soell. 
The other seats will be filled later. 
If there are no objections, I propose that these 
three Vice-Presidents be elected by accla-
mation. 
Is there any objection? ... 
I note that the Assembly is unanimous. 
I therefore declare Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Mr. 
Pecriaux and Mr. Soell elected as Vice-Presidents 
of the Assembly, and congratulate them. 
6. Adoption of the draft order of business for the 
first part of the session 
(Doe. 1091) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the adoption of the draft order 
of business for the first part of the session, Doc-
ument 1091. 
Are there any objections to the draft order of 
business? 
The draft order of business is adopted. 
7. Observers 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ladies and 
gentlemen, with your permission I would like to 
welcome the observers from Denmark, Norway, 
Portugal and Turkey who pay us the honour of 
attending our proceedings. 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
8. Action by the Presidential Committee 
(Presentation of the report of the Presidential Committee, 
Doe. 1102) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of the report 
of the Presidential Committee on action by the 
Presidential Committee, Document 1102. 
I call Mr. van der Werff, Rapporteur of the 
Presidential Committee. 
Mr. van der WERFF (Netherlands) (Trans-
lation). - Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I 
have the following comments to make in my pre-
sentation of Document 1102. Two tasks, one 
requested by the Assembly and the other sug-
gested by Mr. Caro, have occupied the Presi-
dential Committee in the first half of 1987. They 
were the budgetary negotiations with the Council 
of Ministers and the organisation of an extraor-
dinary session. In addition to this there were, of 
course, the committee's normal activities and 
what followed on from them. First of all there 
was the Luxembourg session at the end of April. 
The date was cleverly chosen by the President to 
enable the Assembly to state its views before the 
Council of Ministers met. As the home country 
of the President of the Council, Luxembourg was 
also a very suitable venue for the meeting. 
There were, however, some difficulties in the 
Presidential Committee's political activities 
between the sessions. The reduction of the 
budget meant that very careful account had to be 
taken of the opportunities open to the Presi-
dential Committee and the Assembly. 
Then the Presidential Committee received the 
invitation from the Supreme Soviet to visit 
Moscow. Mr. President, this was an event, in the 
sense that the Soviet Union had previously been 
inclined to call Western European Union the 
false serpent of NATO. Now we were being 
recognised via an official invitation. The Presi-
dential Committee then considered its proper 
course of action. It concluded that this recog-
nition by the eastern bloc should certainly be 
accepted, and that means must therefore be 
found to implement this. The Presidential Com-
mittee consequently decided to allow the Bureau 
to visit Moscow, provided that all political 
groups were represented. 
After the visit, the Presidential Committee set 
out in a memorandum by President Caro what it 
had sought to achieve and what it had not sought 
to achieve in Moscow. Its aims included making 
contacts and opening up a dialogue that might 
provide opportunities in the future. What the 
delegation could not do, of course, was negotiate. 
As parliamentarians we are not authorised to do 
that and moreover the Assembly has no exec-
utive power. We did take this opportunity to 
make Western Europe's wishes with regard to the 
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zero and zero-zero options perfectly clear. We 
were happy to hear on the last day of our visit 
that Mr. Gorbachev had made a speech in 
Prague which in part corresponded to the points 
we had emphasised in Moscow. If the Assembly 
is to continue to perform its task, it must obvi-
ously provide stimulus for this aspect of the reac-
tivation of Western European Union, and con-
tinue to be extremely active in this respect in the 
future. 
The second point concerns the Presidential 
Committee's budgetary activities. You will recall 
that there are in fact two problems. One concerns 
the pensions of the officials who have served us 
very faithfully and are entitled to these pensions. 
However, the strange situation we faced was that 
these pensions were charged to our running 
costs, so that we were actually unable to recruit 
new officials to replace those who left. Your 
predecessor's consultations with the Chairman of 
the Council of Ministers, Mr. Poos, revealed that 
the Council is willing to exclude this portion of 
our financial obligations - because that is how 
we all see them - from the normal running costs 
and to make separate provision for them. Mr. 
President, I believe this is an extremely 
important result for the Presidential Committee 
because it again gives us scope to operate as we 
would like. 
It was also made clear to Mr. Poos that this 
Assembly felt rather handicapped because it had 
no way of managing the funds independently, 
and because everything had to be approved by so 
many governments. During the consultations in 
Luxembourg it also became apparent that the 
Council was very sympathetic to the Assembly's 
desire for some independence in the management 
of the budget and acknowledged its entitlement 
to this independence. After all, it consists of par-
liamentarians who are intelligent and conscious 
of their duties. The Council therefore recognised 
that there is a problem here and that some inde-
pendent budgetary management - subject to the 
rules of agreed directives, of course - should be 
possible. 
The last point discussed in the consultation 
between President Caro and the Chairman of the 
Council was the problem of inflation. Here again 
President Caro came to an excellent agreement 
with Mr. Poos, the Chairman of the Council. 
This applies both to inflation and to the calcu-
lation of inflation rates, for which many different 
methods exist. It was concluded that a realistic 
approach should be adopted and that the activ-
ities of the Office of the Clerk and of our 
Assembly should not be restricted. 
These matters will, of course, require further 
study and evaluation. Consultations with the 
Council will, of course, be necessary on the basis 
of the Assembly's instructions to the President. 
On the other hand, it is clear that some 
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important steps have been taken in the past six 
months towards a new approach on our part. I 
refer on the one hand to the work of the 
Assembly and its committees and on the other 
hand to the structure of the Office of the Clerk 
and what the Clerk, Mr. Moulias, has said about 
it in the memorandum on the subject. 
Mr. President, I am happy to be the first to 
speak for two reasons: firstly, because I am able 
to compliment you on your election; secondly, 
because I can be the first to say how much we 
shall miss Jean-Marie Caro, despite the fact that 
you have taken his place. Fortunately, he will 
remain with us. In addition, Dutch is not always 
used in this chamber. I am very happy to have 
been able to address the Assembly in Dutch. 
This applies not only to the Dutch representa-
tives but also to the Dutch-speaking Belgians. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. van der Werff, for your excellent report. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The Assembly therefore takes note of the 
report on action by the Presidential Com-
mittee. 
9. Address by Mr. Cahen, 
Secretary-General of WEU 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the address by Mr. Cahen, 
Secretary-General of WEU, to whom I extend a 
warm welcome. 
I will also take this opportunity to welcome 
Mr. Goebbels, representing the Chairman-in-
Office, and the ambassadors and their col-
leagues. 
Mr. Cahen, would you please come to the 
rostrum. 
Mr. CAHEN (Secretary-General of WEU) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, let me first offer 
you my warmest congratulations on becoming 
President of the Assembly. For me your election 
has a twofold significance. First it is a recog-
nition of your very great personal merit. You 
have been a particularly active, enthusiastic and 
effective member of this Assembly and in 
selecting you to direct its proceedings the 
Assembly has recognised all your qualities and 
decided to have at its head a leading figure 
ideally suited to such high office. But, as I say, 
your election has a second significance. It has 
come at a time when the Luxembourg chair-
manship of the reactivated WEU is ending. It is 
most appropriate that at that moment another 
Luxembourger should pick up the torch. 
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But I would also like to express to Mr. Caro on 
leaving office my great admiration for the work 
he has done and my full ~ppreciation, as a 
servant of Western European Union, for his 
remarkable efforts in the reactivation of our 
organisation. We all owe him a huge debt of 
gratitude. 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, members 
of the parliamentary Assembly of WEU, it is 
thanks to you and the initiative you took in 
December 1985 that it has now become tradi-
tional for the Secretary-General of the 
organisation to be invited to address you at each 
of your ordinary plenary sessions. Believe me 
when I say that I am most grateful. 
Firstly, of course, because I am fully aware that 
it is a very great honour and privilege to be 
invited to your rostrum. But also because of the 
growing importance of the dialogue between the 
parliamentary organ and the intergovernmental 
organs as the reactivation of our Western 
European Union goes forward. 
As I have said before, it is of course the leaders 
elected to represent the peoples of our Europe -
that is the members of our governments and you 
the members of our Assembly - who have to 
conduct this exchange of views when it takes on 
a political character. It is in this context that the 
two ministers, Mr. Poos and Mr. Fischbach, and 
Secretary of State Goebbels will be giving you 
an account of the remarkably active period of 
Luxembourg chairmanship which has produced 
substantial results. 
It may still be useful, however - and I am 
most grateful that it should be your wish - that 
the Secretary-General, who is ttesponsible for the 
day-to-day work ofWEU and, therefore, to some 
extent for its progress, should report to you on 
the state of the organisation, speaking for himself 
on matters for which he has responsibility. This 
seems to me to be particularly necessary because 
there appears to be some misunderstanding on 
this point between the parliamentary body and 
the intergovernmental institutions of WEU. 
I am in particular led to this view by certain 
aspects of the remarkable reports submitted to 
the present session of your Assembly - I am 
thinking in particular of Mr. Ahrens's report -
and by comments from Assembly members to 
whose views, as you know, I always pay par-
ticular attention. 
Not that I am complaining that the Assembly 
is very demanding or even critical towards the 
intergovernmental bodies and their servant, the 
Secretariat-General. Far from it. That is not only 
your role, but also your democratic duty. 
Throughout the existence of our organisation 
you have fulfilled that role and that duty even 
during the difficult years. 
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Today, I am glad to be able to say that you 
have not relaxed your vigour, determination and 
demanding attitude during the period of reacti-
vation. By your action, you must still spur it on 
to further progress. Here and now, however, I 
wonder whether the spur is always applied in the 
right place. 
Let me explain. Your aspirations and aims are 
very like mine. Our purpose is to ensure the suc-
cessful reactivation of Western European Union 
and, through it, to work out a European security 
identity in the framework of Atlantic solidarity 
without which there can be no credible defence 
for the West and therefore for Western Europe. 
Neither you nor I would be here if we did not 
believe deeply in that purpose and its 
achievement. But while I perceive perhaps more 
concern than satisfaction on your side regarding 
the progress of reactivation, I sense in the inter-
governmental bodies and I feel personally not a 
lack of concern, because much remains to be 
done, but more satisfaction than concern. There 
must, therefore, be some misunderstanding. It 
must be cleared up. 
To do so, we should perhaps go to the heart of 
the matter and ask ourselves two questions: what 
in the final analysis is this reactivated WEU? Is it 
starting to play the role it was given when the 
decision to reactivate was taken? It is clear that 
the reactivated WEU fulfils the commitments 
entered into by its members when they signed 
the Brussels Treaty and the Paris Agreements. 
It is, however, something different and some-
thing more, and this is important. It is different 
because the conditions which prevailed in March 
1948 and October 1954 no longer exist and the 
future to which the seven member states looked 
when they decided in 1984-85 to reactivate our 
Western European Union could not be exactly 
the same as that which was in their thoughts 
almost forty years ago. 
What has been added is that over and above 
the alliance created by the Brussels and Paris 
agreements - an alliance which retains all its 
value within the Atlantic context to which all our 
countries belong - our reactivated organisation 
has been given the completely new function of 
providing European political co-operation on 
security, which it has proved impossible to 
achieve between the Twelve. 
The " new WEU " is not therefore simply the 
old one aroused from somnolence by reacti-
vation, to be judged exclusively on the renewal 
of the activities of its various pre-1985 struc-
tures. On the contrary it must be judged by con-
sidering: firstly, whether it has been able to set up 
the new bodies needed for the new duties it has 
been given while adapting its existing structures; 
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next, whether having done so, it has started to 
carry out the tasks assigned to it. I think I can 
answer both questions in the affirmative - and 
here I am addressing myself in particular to Mr. 
Ahrens, the author of a remarkable report which 
I have read with great interest. 
The secret of the success of political 
co-operation between the Six and the Nine, then 
Ten and now Twelve lies in the fact that it brings 
together for regular, in-depth consultations the 
people responsible in the capitals, whether they 
be ministers, political directors or experts. That 
is what now happens in Western European 
Union also. 
Ministerial sessions - attended by foreign and 
defence ministers - and meetings of the Per-
manent Council, the co-ordinating body for the 
whole of WEU's activities, are now supple-
mented by meetings of political directors and a 
representative of equivalent rank from the min-
istry of defence, of a special working group with 
general terms of reference enabling them to 
discuss any security problem whatsoever and 
composed of assistant political directors or 
directors of politico-military services in the 
foreign ministries again with a representative of 
equivalent rank from the defence ministries and, 
lastly, of experts who come together in the same 
dual context in working sub-groups. 
All these new structures are, on the WEU 
intergovernmental level and with the Council of 
Ministers and Permanent Council, at the heart of 
the organisation and provide the focal point 
where member countries can bring their views 
on security closer together. 
These views are in fact coming closer together 
as has recently been clearly demonstrated on two 
occasions. The first was the ministerial meeting 
on 13th and 14th November held in the 
aftermath of Reykjavik. The second was the 
latest ministerial meeting held on 27th and 28th 
April, the substance of which was reported to 
you by Mr. Poos, the Chairman-in-Office, in 
Luxembourg. 
Better still, in the interval between these two 
ministerial meetings, consultations went on con-
tinuously at the other levels. In an international 
situation which is changing rapidly, particularly 
as regards East-West relations, these consulta-
tions enabled useful exchanges of information 
and ideas to take place and points of view were 
brought significantly closer together. 
It seems to me, moreover, that all this has 
been well understood by the media and through 
them by the general public. I understand and 
share your concern that the public should be 
better informed of what we do and made more 
fully aware of what the problem of European 
security is for them in the framework of Atlantic 
solidarity. You are right. This is the only way to 
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achieve a consensus among our peoples, without 
which there can be no sound and dynamic 
defence policy or a peace policy based on it. I 
have understood and shared your concern and 
your regret that the press has not taken more 
interest in the progress of our work, with the 
result that the general public is not informed. 
The Chairman and members of your Committee 
for Parliamentary and Public Relations have 
often spoken to me about this. It is now a thing 
of the past. It was my pleasure to prove this to 
you by publishing two special issues of the 
Secretariat-General's press review, one repro-
ducing the most important of the very many 
articles which appeared during the months pre-
ceding your extraordinary session and the minis-
terial Council last April, the other, articles 
appearing in the days following those meetings. 
Furthermore, the ministerial exchanges of 
view in April and November and the discussions 
held at the other levels in the interval, not only 
revealed a substantial convergence of views 
between the member states of WEU concerning 
current developments, but also showed that 
these converging views reflect common 
longer-term basic positions as regards their 
security interests. 
This being so, the competent intergovern-
mental bodies buckled down to working out 
these positions in detail and were able to submit 
a first report on the subject to the ministers in 
Luxembourg on 28th April. The ministerial 
Council took note of the report and asked for it 
to be carried further and in greater depth for 
their autumn session. A genuine in-depth 
assessment of the security interests of Western 
Europe - seen, of course, as I have already said, 
in the essential context of Atlantic solidarity - is 
therefore in progress at this moment. It meets a 
need revealed last November in the aftermath of 
Reykjavik and also responds to the appeal made 
to you on 2nd December by the French Prime 
Minister, Mr. Jacques Chirac, for a start to be 
made on defining the principles of Western 
European security. 
But work on such a project is no matter for 
improvisation. If it is not to be a mere hastily-
drafted declaration but, as must be the case, is to 
reflect a common awareness of our countries' 
security interests and similar views on the 
subject, an in-depth study is required. Through 
patient discussions between delegations, a 
common platform identifying the principles of 
European security will emerge. I can assure the 
Assembly that this work is in hand, that it is 
going well and even astonishingly quickly for 
such a vast project and that the high-ranking 
experts from the capitals, meeting under my 
chairmanship, are not idle. 
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It is not for the Secretary-General to comment 
on any possible enlargement of the organisation. 
This is above all a matter for the member states 
and Article XI of the treaty is clear on this point. 
But may I perhaps suggest to the observers 
who have honoured us by attending and to you, 
ladies and gentlemen, that the formulation by the 
Seven of this platform, which they all accept, will 
be a valuable guide to the countries which have 
expressed interest in our organisation as to their 
commitments to other than the substance of the 
treaty if they join. It is surely hard to imagine 
that they would join us if they do not share our 
basic options on our security problems. 
As the ministers stated in the communique 
they adopted on 28th April " the reactivation of 
the organisation ... is now a fact". It is now a fact, 
both as regards new structures and as regards 
substance, and it is also attracting the attention 
of the media. 
The administrative services have been 
reorganised in London and those in Paris will 
follow in order to provide the best possible 
service for the reactivated WEU. But we must 
realise that they are . not the essential element. 
What are essential are the intergovernmental 
meetings at all levels because they can produce 
convergent and common positions shared by 
member states through which a European 
security identity can be hammered out. The 
administrations for which I am responsible are 
simply there to service these meetings so that 
they can be as effective as possible. 
The misunderstanding which seems to exist 
between you and the parliamentary and inter-
governmental organs of our WEU suggests that 
the latter must keep the former better informed. I 
will work for this. Let us note, nevertheless, that 
progress has been made in this area. 
As your extraordinary session and the minis-
terial meeting coincided, the Chairman-in-Office 
was able to report to you immediately on its 
results. 
Secondly, you now receive the annual report in 
two parts, one before the first part of your 
plenary session and the other before the second 
part. 
I am well aware that the part of the Council's 
thirty-second annual report due to be examined 
first by the appropriate committees and then by 
your Assembly during this session did not reach 
the Office of the Clerk until late in April. We 
must take steps to ensure that this report reaches 
you earlier in future. I cannot, however, promise 
that you will have it by the dates you have sug-
gested, that is in August and in February respec-
tively. It would be dishonest of me to give you 
such a commitment here. It is not simply a 
matter of drafting the report. It has to be closely 
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studied, discussed and finally approved by the 
member countries. In a now reactivated Western 
European Union, each public decision becomes 
important. This means that our governments are 
concerned that the parliamentarians should only 
receive documents, and in particular the annual 
report, which reflect the views on which they are 
agreed very accurately. This can involve very 
careful consideration and lengthy negotiations 
on texts and seems to me to rule out any possi-
bility of meeting the dates you have suggested. I 
can assure you, however, that everything will be 
done to ensure that from now on you will have 
the annual report and the replies to your ques-
tions and recommendations as quickly as pos-
sible. 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, over the 
last few months, major changes have been taking 
place at growing speed in the international scene 
of which our countries are part. This is in par-
ticular true of East-West relations. These changes 
are bound to have a major impact on the stra-
tegic situation of our countries. 
For them and for our Europe, therefore, they 
involve major challenges. In particular, the chal-
lenge to be able to influence the course of events 
within the framework of essential Atlantic soli-
darity which must be reinforced, even though 
certain features of the transatlantic relationship 
may be modified by one or other of the growing 
number of international developments. The 
challenge also to safeguard the frequently del-
icate balances on which the peace of our con-
tinent has rested for more than forty years. 
In these circumstances, it is more than ever 
necessary for our countries to discuss and 
consult together about their security. That is 
certainly why in Luxembourg last November, 
Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, said:" If Western 
European Union did not exist it would have to 
be invented ". 
But fortunately it does exist, it has been 
revived and the discussions and consultations I 
just mentioned are well under way in the inter-
governmental organs and are becoming more 
intensive with every day that passes. For your 
part you, as European militants, are working vig-
orously and enthusiastically along the same lines 
in another context. 
In this way, Mr. President, ladies and gentle-
men, a European security identity is progres-
sively taking shape; it will enable our Europe to 
take up the challenges facing it and to play its full 
role in the Atlantic solidarity of which all our 
states are part. This is the Europe of which 
Claudel said: 
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" God did not forge this great work at a single 
stroke for it to stay eternally in pieces. 
Look to the new challenge, you people whose 
veins course with the blood of countless 
races! 
Look to your heritage and the sharp swell and 
fall of the carpet unfolding beneath your 
feet! 
Like an artifex blinded by the sight and per-
ception of what Europe is. " 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Secretary-General, for your address and for 
the kind things you have said about me. 
Should there be any questions from the 
members of our Assembly would you agree to 
answer them? 
Mr. CAHEN (Secretary-General of WEU) 
(Translation). - I would deem it an honour, Mr. 
President. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
De Decker. 
Mr. DE DECKER (Belgium) (Translation). - I 
listened to our Secretary-General's excellent 
address with great interest. He was perfectly right 
to quote Paul Claudel and to introduce a 
European approach and spirit in what he said. 
We all know how essential it is for the con-
struction of Europe that Europe itself should 
tackle the problems of its own security. Whilst 
we are aware that some of our governments may 
still be reluctant to take the plunge, we all feel 
that the study of the problem of Europe's 
security has become a sine qua non if the 
political construction of our continent is to go 
forward. 
Mr. Secretary-General, you said how pleased 
you were at the developments in WEU's work. 
You were right and there is no doubt that repre-
sentatives who have been attending the 
Assembly for a number of years - at least since 
before 1984 - and who knew the WEU Assembly 
over the previous five years, are in a position to 
measure how far the organisation has come and 
the difference between what it was then and what 
we know it to be today. 
The ministers for foreign affairs and national 
defence hold meetings - admittedly in London -
in the Permanent Council and the political 
directors and the representatives of the high 
commands of our different countries meet in 
your presence. This is probably the basic 
requirement for progress in the construction of a 
Europe of defence. Unfortunately, as Mr. Ahrens 
brought out so well in his report, this idea has 
not yet penetrated to public opinion in our coun-
tries. 
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There is still a long way to go for public 
opinion to realise that WEU really plays a vital 
part in the framing of Europe's security policy. 
When I raise these problems in Belgium, 
members of the public there often comment that, 
whilst it is true that our governments in the 
seven member countries are reactivating WEU, 
they are not increasing our budgetary resources 
accordingly. I can only agree with them and am 
bound, therefore, to voice my doubts about the 
credibility of the seven countries' commitments 
as regards their real wish to revitalise WEU and 
accord it the means of becoming what it ought to 
be. 
As regards budgetary aspects, Secretary-
General, I would like to raise what is a sensitive, 
perhaps even taboo, subject in this organisation: 
the problem of our agencies. I discovered only 
recently - although I have been attending for six 
years now - that 50% of the WEU budget is swal-
lowed up by its agencies. And yet we all know 
that the real core of the work is done by the 
Secretariat-General and the Assembly. The 
agencies may have a role - they ought to have 
one - particularly in the field of armaments 
standardisation. But I see that the Standing 
Armaments Committee has not met for a very 
long time. At all events it does not meet at the 
level it should, namely that of directors-general 
for armaments in our seven countries. 
Other agencies, like the Agency for the Control 
of Armaments, have a role that today has been 
completely overtaken by events in our 
organisation and in the European political 
context. I ask you, Secretary-General, and you, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers, 
whether it is not high time to try to recoup from 
the budget for the agencies the resources nec-
essary for the proper functioning of the 
Secretariat-General and the Assembly. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Secretary-General. 
Mr. CAHEN (Secretary-General of WEU) 
(Translation). - Thank you Mr. De Decker for 
raising some important questions. 
I am first of all grateful to you for agreeing 
with me that WEU is in fact reactivated. You 
rightly say that the fact is not yet sufficiently 
realised by public opinion in our various coun-
tries. At the time when I had the honour of 
taking up my present office, the press had abso-
lutely nothing to say about. We~tern Europea!l 
Union and the public had httle Idea of what It 
meant. Today WEU is talked about, probably 
not enough, but some progress has been made. 
You say that our governments are not suffi-
ciently militant in promoting WEU. They are 
37 
FIRST SITTING 
increasingly so, including those which initially 
had their reservations about reactivation, but 
our organisation, which is a European orga-
nisation, suffers to some extent from the same 
disease as the Communities and political 
co-operation: a disease I will call the intermit-
tence of the commitment to Europe in our 
member states. It is rare for all the countries 
involved in the construction of Europe, be they 
twelve or seven, to want the same thing at the 
same time and with the same intensity. It is dif-
ficult even for two people to live together in such 
conditions and it is infinitely more difficult for a 
group of seven or twelve. As far as WEU is con-
cerned, I am happy to say that this intermittence 
would seem at the moment to be on the wane 
and that everyone is working in the same 
direction. This is a considerable advance. 
You also raised the problem of the budget. As 
Secretary-General of WEU with responsibility 
for keeping the engine running and the car 
moving, I would clearly like to have more fuel in 
the tank than I have. But although budgets are 
very important, political will is more important 
still. We already have the political will and that 
is the main thing. That is what keeps the 
organisation moving forward. 
If we could have the budget as well, that would 
be magnificent, but our member states, or most 
of them, have domestic budgetary problems to 
cope with. You, Mr. De Decker, are a member of 
the Belgian Parliament and the Defence Com-
mittee so I will not dwell on our budgetary 
problems nor those of our neighbours. But there 
should be an extra effort for WEU even if only 
for the reason that when our member states had 
relatively comfortable budgets our organisation 
was dormant and no one gives food to people 
asleep. Organisations that were not asleep at the 
time had their budgets increased. When we woke 
up we were hungry but we had nothing to eat. ~o 
perhaps it would be useful to make a special 
effort for our organisation, forgotten as it was 
through its own fault, from 1973 to 1984. 
This is true, but what counts for me as Secre-
tary-General is political will. The budge~ ~s 
important but it has to come second. And If 1t 
does not come at all we still have to go 
forward. 
You rightly referred to the reorganis~tion of 
our administrative organs and the agencies. For 
me there are not agencies and a Secretary-
General, but, as I said a moment ago, an. adm~n­
istrative organisation that serves WEU, It~ mi!l-
isterial Council, its Permanent Council, 1ts 
intergovernmental structures and, though not 
wishing to take the place of the Office of the 
Clerk, the Assembly. We all form one unit and 
we are all devoted to the same cause. 
Given that the reactivated WEU is not quite 
the same thing as the old WEU - but something 
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more and different - the structures must obvi-
ously be changed including, I agree, the agencies. 
It is true that the SAC no longer has the same 
raison d'etre as before, nor is it the same as it 
was, and that we have to consider, as WEU, and 
with the Independent European Programme 
Group, the CNAD and the Eurogroup, what our 
real role is in the way of co-operation in the field 
of armaments. We had a meeting on this subject 
last week in London with the direct representa-
tives, the national armaments directors, who, 
after all, are our users. When asked whether they 
saw a role here for us they answered in the 
affirmative and when asked what that role was 
they replied that they preferred to decide on a 
case-by-case basis. 
It is up to our users to tell us what they expect 
of us, which is what we have done. But for the 
ministerial session in October, the Secretary-
General will be making some extremely precise 
proposals to the ministers for the restructuring of 
the agencies in the manner that I have 
described. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Close. 
Mr. CLOSE (Belgium) (Translation). - After 
paying tribute to the Secretary-General whose 
dynamic energy and strong faith in WEU are cer-
tainly on a par with his commitment to the 
organisation I shall go straight to the heart of the 
subject. Without wishing to minimise in the least 
the impetus that has been given to WEU since its 
reactivation or the fact that the public is now 
better acquainted with it, I have to say that I am 
still not convinced. Meetings of experts, political 
directors, ministers and so on are all very nice 
but what in practice has come out of them? 
Europe is at a crossroads. To my mind, there is 
no doubt that the Geneva negotiations will end 
in an agreement between the United States of 
America and the USSR, for totally different 
reasons but because it will be in the interests of 
both countries. In these circumstances, what is 
Europe's position? We shall see one whole part 
of the nuclear deterrent - which I call the inter-
mediate deterrent - collapse. At European level, 
without the cruise and Pershing Il missiles we 
shall have no means of reaching deep into the 
Soviet Union. So deterrence at European level 
will cease to exist. 
There is one conclusion from this that is 
obvious to all: we have to strengthen our conven-
tional forces. Whilst budgetary restraint is what 
we know it to be, and though our various 
European countries have promised a 3o/o increase 
in their budget, there are some including my own 
that have fallen short of the 3o/o and practically 
none that is in a position to fulfil its commit-
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ments. Consequently, Mr. Secretary-General, our 
Assembly must look into this problem. 
Next, without wishing to anticipate what I 
shall be saying tomorrow following on the report 
by Mr. Ahrens, we have to consider, in a realistic 
atmosphere, practical ways of strengthening our 
conventional deterrence. 
Lastly, when we no longer have a European 
deterrent and when, like it or not, the United 
States and Europe become decoupled - because 
we would be forced into nuclear escalation, as 
there has been talk of strategic submarines and 
we know what that would mean in terms of the 
ultimate retaliation - what could we think of to 
counter the conventional superiority of the 
Soviets? This will surprise you but my suggestion 
to this Assembly is that we go back to work on 
designing the neutron bomb. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Secretary-General. 
Mr. CAHEN (Secretary-General of WEU) 
(Translation). - Thank you, Mr. Close, for your 
questions. I know the Assembly has always 
wanted a political Secretary-General and with 
these questions the Senator really has me 
wearing ministerial shoes. 
I can answer his first question without too 
much difficulty. He wants to know what the min-
isters and their officials in Western Europe are 
doing in response to a swiftly-changing situation 
that is highly disturbing for our continent. In 
November and April and also in the period 
between, they considered the situation in which 
they were placed by Reykjavik, the problem of 
the ABM treaty, Mr. Gorbachev's proposals of 
28th February, the American response and the 
results of the meeting between Mr. Shultz, the 
American Secretary of State, and Mr. Gorbachev 
and Mr. Shevardnadze. Some points of conver-
gence and even shared positions have emerged. 
You will no doubt ask me why they have not 
been set out in a public statement and why we 
did not let the public and our allies know what 
we felt. 
The answer is very simple. In the present stage 
of the reactivation of Western European Union, 
which is a wholly new feature on the European 
scene, the transatlantic scene and the East-West 
scene we have both to consolidate our position 
and to avoid giving any impression of a division 
within the alliance or sending the wrong signals 
to our opposite numbers in the Warsaw Pact. For 
the moment we are not publicly taking any 
common stances. In other words we are not pub-
licly speaking with a single voice or publicly 
singing the same song. What we are doing, on the 
basis of the points of convergence that we have 
and with our seven separate voices, is to sing the 
same song to our allies, bilaterally or within the 
Atlantic Alliance. As and when it appears that we 
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are no longer a factor of division - in or outside 
the alliance - but on the contrary a strengthening 
factor we shall be able increasingly to adopt a 
public position and speak with a single voice. 
The second question is more difficult. You 
say, in so many words, that we are faced with a 
situation in which one component of the flexible 
response, i.e. the cruise and Pershing missiles, 
will disappear from the European theatre and 
that we therefore have to adjust by finding some-
thing in their place in particular by strengthening 
our conventional forces. Of course, you have my 
assurance that our ministers are taking a keen 
interest in the problem. I believe that it is in 
WEU that they will probably be best able both to 
discuss the problem and to make their decisions 
and to convince public opinion - because what is 
involved is the security of Europe. 
Thirdly, you referred to decoupling. My 
answer is that frankly, at this stage at least, I do 
not think it will happen. My real fear is that, 
aware of our concern voiced with increasing 
vigour and in particular by WEU, the Americans 
may react by striving to prove that there is no 
decoupling and that they wish, more than ever, 
to be committed to Europe. 
There is a certain change in attitude to be seen, 
not just on the part of the American adminis-
tration or even the Senate but also on that of 
certain prominent people. This change goes some 
way towards allaying our misgivings and those 
voiced by public opinion. I believe that there is 
not so much a decoupling but more what I would 
call an end to the status quo. Over the last few 
years, the Atlantic Alliance has lived in a com-
fortable status quo for many different reasons 
and strangely enough because the message 
coming to us from Soviet Russia may not have 
been very pleasant but was always predictable. It 
was easy, it was always no. Today, it seems to 
me, we are at the end of the status quo because of 
the change in the Soviet leadership, all these pro-
posals and new ideas it is showering us with and 
the impact that this must necessarily have on our 
strategy. You referred to the possible disap-
pearance of long-range missiles in Europe and 
the effect this will have on our other forces. It is 
quite clear that if the strategic defence initiative 
is completely or partly implemented there will 
have to be changes in our strategy with the 
accent on the offensive, no longer the defensive. 
So this would clearly mark the end of the status 
quo. It is a source of concern because it is a chal-
lenge to our imagination in finding new solutions 
and the will and courage to put them into effect. 
This is the situation facing our countries and 
with which, backed by public opinion through 
the agency of the Assembly, we must cope so that 
new solutions are adopted by our govern-
ments. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Declercq. 
Mr. DECLERCQ (Belgium) (Translation). -
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I apologise 
for being the third Belgian to speak in this 
debate. This is not because the Secretary-General 
is also of Belgian origin but because of the 
interest we take in this subject. 
First and foremost, I should like to congrat-
ulate the Secretary-General on the statement he 
has just made and on the enthusiastic way in 
which he expressed his belief in Europe and 
Western European Union. 
I should just like to refer again to a very prac-
tical problem that has already been mentioned 
by Mr. De Decker and to draw the Assembly's 
attention most explicitly to the following facts. 
Of the total budget for WJEU's activities, a 
quarter goes to the Secretariat-General, a quarter 
to the Assembly, and half- I repeat, half- to the 
agencies. If we look at the staff complement, the 
figures are even more revealing: sixty officials in 
the agencies, as against ninety in the Secretariat. 
If I am mistaken, the Secretary-General will no 
doubt put me right. On the subject of the activ-
ities of the agencies there is a critical question 
that must be asked: when we in the various coun-
tries call for an increase in WEU's budget, one 
question that inevitably arises is: what is hap-
pening to the agencies? To what extent is serious 
thought being given to reorganising these 
agencies? Mr. De Decker has already pointed out 
that one of them, the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments, dates back to 1949. It undoubtedly 
had its uses, but recent developments have made 
it completely obsolete. And yet it remains in 
existence. One may wonder what this agency's 
present task is, and what it adtually does. 
Secondly, I would ask the Secretary-General to 
confirm or deny the following. I understand that 
many interesting studies have been carried out 
by the agencies, but that they have never been 
published. They are stowed away in drawers 
somewhere. They are never seen by the 
Assembly. My question therefore is: ut quid 
perditio hie? 
I urge that the proposals to be drawn up for the 
reorganisation of the agencies be submitted to 
the Assembly for evaluation and possibly 
amendment. This will enable the Assembly to 
cast a critical though sympathetic eye over their 
reorganisation. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- Ladies and 
gentlemen, I would point out that several of you 
have asked to put questions to Mr. Cahen. I 
would ask you to be as brief as possible and to 
ask more questions and make fewer com-
ments. 
I call the Secretary-General. 
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(Translation). - Mr. President, would you like 
me to listen to all the speakers first and then 
answer them all at once? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you 
for your suggestion. I do feel it would be better, 
in the interest of our proceedings, if all the 
speakers first asked their questions and the 
Secretary-General then answered them all 
together. 
I call Mr. Tummers. 
Mr. TUMMERS (Netherlands) (Translation). 
- Mr. President, let me begin by congratulating 
you on your election. A good liberal is close to 
the party to which I belong, and we see a good 
Luxembourger as a kind of compatriot. 
I too shall take advantage of the Secretary-
General's enthusiasm. My question has already 
been discussed on several occasions. I put this 
question to him again, chiefly because he 
referred in such clear terms to our concerted 
approach in our work for W estem European 
Union. In 1964, when W estem European Union 
celebrated its tenth anniversary, a rather 
informal account of its first ten years was pub-
lished. This happened again ten years later. But 
in 1984 there was no hint of any such project. In 
that year a motion was tabled urging the publi-
cation of a similar historical survey on WEU's 
thirtieth anniversary for a wider public, in the 
form of a popular and scientific reference work. 
If we are going to talk about contacts with the 
public and the importance of our work, using all 
kinds of fine phrases, we should not make a 
secret of our own history. I therefore think it 
important to bring the motion and the corre-
spondence on it to light once again. It is 
important that we be told straight away in 
answer to this short question that the desired 
publication will be appearing soon. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - As Pres-
ident for the whole of the Assembly I am doing 
my best to see that everyone with a constructive 
contribution to make can be heard, which 
applies to your group, Mr. Tummers, and others. 
I just wanted you to know that. 
I call Mr. Caro. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - Mr. Pres-
ident, not previously having had an opportunity 
to do so, I first wish to congratulate you on your 
election. I want you to know that you can count 
on the support of the whole of the Assembly 
including, if you please, my own. You may be 
sure that the team we formed before will con-
tinue in the future. 
Secretary-General, may I say how much I 
appreciated your address and then make two 
comments coupled, of course, with two related 
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questions. The first concerns disarmament and 
the second the budget. 
On disarmament I note that in spite of the 
joint efforts of the Council and the Assembly, 
including the April session in Luxembourg, the 
Council has not yet come out of its shell and 
spoken with a clear European voice in the broad 
and sometimes dramatic debate on disarm-
ament. It is a pity but no surprise. Strictly 
speaking, logic might be said to argue in favour 
of this non-surprise. 
Like me, Secretary-General, you were present 
at the Council meeting in Bonn in April 1985 
whose agenda included disarmament problems 
and you will remember that, at the request of Mr. 
Richard Burt, the American Under-Secretary of 
State, the WEU Council of Ministers - in fact it 
was a group of experts - had to cancel that 
debate on disarmament problems although the 
Assembly had repeatedly requested the Council 
to hold one. 
The dilemma is familiar to everyone: how can 
you discuss disarmament without first being able 
to discuss defence and define objectively the 
minimum, indispensable conditions for the 
defence of our countries? 
Hence the repeated requests by the Assembly: 
let us define our European defence doctrine 
properly in the framework of the alliance and 
then take our part in the debate on disarmament 
on that basis. 
But between 1984 and the Luxembourg 
meeting in 1987 the Council did nothing to get 
into training, so to speak, for this collegiate 
debate. It has failed to utilise the provisions of 
the Brussels Treaty or to fulfil all its obligations 
including that - to which you yourself, Secretary-
General, have today referred with some reserve-
of producing an annual report dealing with 
current political events - we are politicians -
and not those of yesterday, so that we may form 
our judgment. 
My question, Secretary-General, is this. In the 
hope that the political role you are increasingly 
called upon to play will become decisive would it 
be possible for the Secretary-General of W estem 
European Union to tell the Council that the 
weakness of Europe's voice on the subject of dis-
armament is not solely due to differences in 
national policies but is also bound up with the 
fact that the Council, in agreement with the 
Assembly, has not had the courage - as you said 
a moment ago - to shoulder its responsibilities 
to the full? If it had done so it is probable tha( at 
Luxembourg the Council would have been able 
to respond to a greater extent than it did. 
I feel that before putting the blame on others 
we have to set our own house in order. The 
Council has not been sufficiently inspired by the 
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political will to grapple with disarmament 
problems within the framework of a European 
defence policy. That was my first question. 
My second question, which is more down to 
earth, has to do with the motor car you are so 
fond of, Secretary-General. You spoke about the 
budget, suggesting that we had to recognise the 
difficulties. That is what you said and, though 
I usually take you very seriously, I could not sup-
press a smile which I imagine might have been 
on your face, too, though perhaps a little less 
openly. To come here to the Assembly, Secre-
tary-General, and tell us that the WEU budget 
could create problems for our governments 
because of economic difficulties today is to 
expect us to have the power to perceive diffi-
culties that seem to have diminished with the 
years; one has only to look at the rates of 
inflation in the various member countries. 
The WEU budget is a pittance, a drop in the 
ocean. It is so small it is almost too shameful to 
mention. The tiny amount we need to survive in 
1987 in normal conditions is what? The price of 
one, two, three or four Citroen 2 CVs? Your car, 
you will agree, is nothing like the Rolls you often 
dream about. 
So let us not compare the incomparable. Here 
again, Secretary-General, it is a matter of 
political will. Would you please, as Secretary-
General, and with the political influence that I 
sincerely wish to be yours and in which you have 
our support, explain to the Council that this is 
not the way to speak to this Assembly nor the 
kind of argument to use. I am all the more 
certain about what I say because the Luxem-
bourg Chairman-in-Office is in no way put out 
by these views, having spoken in terms that have 
had our warmest support. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
van der W erff. 
Mr. van der WERFF (Netherlands) (Trans-
lation). - Mr. President, I too should like to 
thank the Secretary-General for another excellent 
statement on our position. But I wish to make 
three comments and ask one real question. 
In the past - last year in Bonn, for example -
we have said that the United States views the 
development of WEU with some reservation. 
The United States is, of course, a large country, 
but we are talking here specifically about the 
State Department and the Pentagon. To what 
extent has WED's position so far changed? I will 
revert to this in another context in a moment. 
Where my second comment is concerned, I 
agree with what Mr. Declercq said about the 
agencies. The task of the first agency is described 
in Document 1101, and is chiefly concerned with 
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the analysis of verification problems. Mr. Pres-
ident, the verification problems will perhaps be 
the most difficult of all to solve. Not, as is often 
assumed, because a country secretly constructs 
certain installations or begins producing certain 
systems. These problems principally arise where 
a country fails to comply with international 
arrangements despite the agreements that have 
been reached. What does the other contracting 
party then do? Mr. President, history tells us that 
the other party is particularly prone to act like an 
ostrich and see nothing. If it is willing to see what 
is going on, it puts an enormous effort into 
catching up and starts producing additional 
weapons on a large scale. In both cases, the veri-
fication proposals are in fact the most important 
aspect of the negotiations. The most serious 
problem in this respect has been not secret but 
overt violations. I am now thinking of Versailles 
in this context, but this will continue to be the 
most serious problem in the future. How does 
the agency intend to address itself to this specific 
problem? I agree with Mr. Declercq that the 
studies should be made available. 
As for the second agency, we are told that it is 
important to analyse public opinion in the 
Western European member countries on the stra-
tegic relationships. Mr. President, I am sorry to 
say that as a politician I am less interested in the 
views the public holds than in the views it ought 
to hold. The real problem is not the analysis of 
public opinion; as responsible parliamentarians 
and executives, we should be able to explain to 
the public what dangers may threaten our demo-
cratic institutions in the future. 
The question I really want to ask is this: when 
the cost of WEU is discus$ed, the ministers 
always ask how savings can be effected. As we all 
know, the government in The Hague is very keen 
on savings and has suggested that if all WED's 
activities were concentrated in one place, it 
might be a little more economical. The gov-
ernment was not referring to its own seat, but to 
Brussels as WED's possible location. I want to 
ask the Secretary-General whether this has 
political consequences. Would a seat in Brussels 
lend an extra dimension to liaison with the 
European NATO partners and bodies such as the 
IEPG? Is that the intention? I have heard - but it 
is difficult to know if this is true - that London 
appreciates the arguments. But this is a problem 
on which I should like to h~ar the Secretary-
General's comments. 
Mr. President, by way of reassurance, let me 
say in connection with the Dutch economy drive 
that in its deliberations on public spending - a 
kind of holy cow in the Netherlands- the Dutch 
Government is prepared to set aside funds for 
WEU above the zero growth rate in real terms. 
This can be seen in Answer 27 of Parliamentary 
Document 16 625, No. 89. This position came as 
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a complete surprise to all the parliamentarians in 
The Hague. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Rumpf. 
Mr. RUMPF (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - I have three questions to put to 
the Secretary-General. 
First, the Secretary-General said, rightly in my 
opinion, that the closer the superpowers come to 
agreement on aspects of disarmament, the more 
WEU will assume its true role. My question is 
this: is there a special need for him and for us to 
decide on an enlargement of WEU, to which he 
has also referred today? 
Second, the Secretary-General quoted German 
Foreign Minister Genscher as saying that if 
WEU did not exist, it would have to be invented. 
I could ask my Foreign Minister himself, but I 
will ask the Secretary-General: in what form 
should WEU be invented in that case: in the 
form in which it now exists, or in an elarged 
form; in a form in which the Council of Min-
isters more or less says what goes, or in the form 
of a parliamentary assembly in which the demo-
cratically elected representatives from the parlia-
ments of the member countries take a decision 
and the Council acts accordingly? In what form, I 
ask, should WEU be invented? I feel this is of 
interest in terms both of general and of budgetary 
policy. Mr. van der Werff has made this clear, 
and it is a point that others have raised too. 
My third and last question. The talk is always 
of Mr. Gorbachev's proposals. I do not really 
know of any Gorbachev proposals. The only 
ones I know of are our own proposals, those 
associated with the NATO twofold decision, for 
the zero option, and those connected with the 
slogan "make peace with fewer and fewer 
weapons". Mr. Secretary-General, do you also 
believe that what we are discussing and deciding 
on today - we shall be discussing Mr. Ahrens's 
report later - is our own future? By this I mean, 
if we come out unequivocally in favour of the 
double zero option here, shall we not also be 
strengthening and supporting the European pillar 
of NATO in WEU? If the Council is always so 
active in WEU, where is its spectacular response 
to Mr. Gorbachev's spectacular proposals ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Soell. 
Mr. SOELL (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. Secretary-General, I would 
like to refer to a problem that concerns both the 
Assembly itself and relations between the 
Assembly, the Council and the Secretariat. I have 
now been a member of this Assembly for two-
and-a-half years and a Vice-President for a year. 
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In discussions with colleagues I have the 
impression, as they have, that the debates on the 
links between defence and disarmament policy 
often fail to achieve the level and precision that 
we have frequently achieved in the committees 
and subcommittees of the national parliaments. 
For the past six years I have been a member of 
the Subcommittee on Disarmament and Disarm-
ament Control, a subcommittee of the German 
Bundestag's Foreign Affairs Committee. Various 
experts in this field - not only in the German 
Parliament but in many other national parlia-
ments too - complain that the process of con-
stant debate between the representatives of the 
ministries and the parliamentarians does not 
take place here as it does in the corresponding 
committees of the national parliaments. In the 
national parliaments there is a constant exchange 
of experience. The parliamentarians have wide-
ranging contacts, of course, and so often gather 
more information more quickly than the repre-
sentatives of the ministries. During this process 
of constant debate proposals emerge that can be 
amended as necessary during the debate itself. 
When I look at our organisation here in WEU, 
it seems to me that there is really no body with 
sufficient time to provide for this process of con-
stant debate. Mr. Secretary-General, I would ear-
nestly request you to state quite frankly if you 
believe that, with the institutions available to it, 
the Assembly of Western European Union is 
adequately equipped to achieve the process of 
constant debate I have described. The question I 
am raising now has already been put by Mr. 
Caro, Mr. Rumpf and many others, and I look 
forward to receiving a reply to it. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Valleix. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, ladies and gentlemen, I congratulate 
the Secretary-General on his dynamic and lively 
address. It is true that we are used to this; 
everybody knows he is a first-class debater and 
we are glad that that should be so. Everything 
else that needed saying has already been said. 
He quoted Claudel. Long live Claudel. He 
could very well have written " the annunciation 
to Europe". The quotation was justified. 
Secretary-General, I want to ask you a 
question on the basis that the present period of 
intensive diplomatic relations on defence and 
disarmament is either a terrible risk - and we 
would bear the gravest responsibility if we suc-
cumbed to it- or an opportunity to be seized if 
we are capable of doing so. 
WEU cannot be neutral or indifferent to this 
issue. 
Luckily Mr. Gorbachev waited, so to speak, 
for the reactivation of WEU to make his pro-
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posals and President Caro has carried the flag of 
European defence proudly aloft in the name of 
the Assembly. President Goerens can only have 
our best wishes for the continued performance of 
that mission in close accord with an active 
Secretariat-General and you, Secretary-General, 
at its head. 
That brings me to my first question. To what 
extent do these discussions strengthen the role of 
our agencies - since they could make an active 
contribution given the urgency that these negoti-
ations sometimes have? Or are the agencies, on 
the contrary, trailing behind on these vital 
issues? 
For my part I prefer to believe that the 
agencies are strengthened rather than left 
behind. 
My second question is of a similar kind, but 
still connected with the great issues now being 
debated. 
In what way will budgetary problems help us 
- the Secretariat-General and Assembly together 
- to shoulder our task properly in the essential 
dialogue between Europe and America and com-
munist Soviet Russia? 
The question is all the more topical in that it is 
on our order of business for Wednesday. Are you 
already able, Secretary-General, to give us some 
answer? In fact the question has already been put 
and we seemed, during these last few weeks, to 
have moved slightly backward by comparison 
with Luxembourg. Can you reassure us? 
One last comment. With the urgent problems 
of the moment and given the role of a WEU that 
is now heard and listened to, for which we have 
the Secretariat-General and our Assembly to 
thank, is it advisable to complicate our action 
with problems that, to me, seem very secondary 
at present? 
WEU meets in Paris. The Secretariat-General 
has its offices in London. In the present state 
of affairs let us work with the tools we have and 
strengthen them but without complicating their 
use by problems of environment and geo-
graphy. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Inan, Observer from Turkey. 
Mr. INAN (Observer from Turkey) (Trans-
lation). - Mr. President, allow me as a faithful 
observer to congratulate you on behalf of all the 
observers on your election as President of this 
Assembly. 
There are so many observers in the chamber 
they are almost enough for a quorum. 
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Mr. President, in the Secretary-General's long 
speech only one small paragraph, unfortunately, 
was devoted to enlargement. It is an almost dis-
couraging, not to say saddening, indicator of the 
interest there is in enlargement. I remember that 
last year, in December, in the same chamber, the 
Chairman-in-Office said that 1986 would be a 
year of consolidation and revival - which has 
never ended - and that the principles of 
enlargement would be formulated in 1987. What 
principles are contained in this paragraph, which 
I would not permit myself to describe as empty 
but which is both discouraging and contra-
dictory? 
The Secretary-General said that the countries 
concerned should state their positions clearly 
and agree on a document in line with our defence 
objectives. But governments and states are not 
children. When they apply to join an 
organisation they accept its rules. Unless the 
principles of the organisation are changed for 
everybody. We have the impression that the 
more interest the non-member European coun-
tries take in the organisation the less interest the 
member countries take in them. Mr. President, it 
is not good to keep people and still less govern-
ments in the waiting room too long. This should 
never be the case for states. But it has been for 
Portugal, in spite ofthe fact three other countries 
- Spain, Greece and Turkey - have now shown 
their interest. Yet there is still no answer. 
You will not always find the same climate at 
national and international level. You will not 
find the same elan or the same enthusiasm. If 
these countries and nations are left in uncer-
tainty they will grow weary of waiting. The day 
will come when nobody will knock on your door 
any more. 
The world is changing quickly. I quite agree 
with Mr. Rumpf that Mr. Genscher is certainly 
not thirty-three years behind the times. If he 
wanted to recreate Western European Union it 
would not be in its 1954 form but in that which 
present circumstances necessitate and dictate. 
We have to be realistic. 
Every time I go away from this Assembly I 
wonder what message I can take back to my 
country's parliament and government on the 
enlargement question. There is nothing much in 
my suitcase and I wish I had more, Secretary-
General. Would you please convey my message 
to the government? I would like to have an 
encouraging response. As observers, we are tired 
of hearing vague and hollow phrases every time 
and nothing else. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Secretary-General. 
Mr. CAHEN (Secretary-General of WEU) 
(Translation). - I thank all the speakers for the 
interest they have shown in my address and for 
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the many important questions they have asked. I 
would also like to express my gratitude for their 
kind words about me. 
Putting the questions into groups, five relate to 
the agencies, what they cost, what they produce 
and secondarily what is done with the results of 
their work. 
Yes, the agencies do, it is true, represent 
approximately 50% of the organisation's budget. 
It is also true that the situation could be 
improved by their rationalisation. This will be 
the object of proposals that I shall be presenting 
to the Council, with the agreement of the 
agencies, next October. ·They could have more 
importance, be more adtive, cost less and have 
fewer staff. We could have a major research 
centre consisting of a few high-level experts with 
the right to call on tempbrary consultants, as the 
need arises, which would cost less and give you 
more satisfaction. But I' feel that the role of the 
agencies or such a research centre is still 
important for our organisation. 
What do these agencies do? For the moment, 
they produce studies. I believe the work assigned 
to them needs to be reviewed. We should stop 
giving them precise job$ over a long period and 
focus them instead on what I could call centres of 
interest within which tlie Council of Ministers, 
the Permanent Council, the other governmental 
organs and, why not, the Assembly, could ask for 
detailed studies. 
As far as the communication oftheir studies to 
the Assembly and the public is concerned, the 
truth is - and I plead guilty - that the member 
states have not yet managed to define and 
approve conditions for the transmission of 
revised and corrected versions because there 
could well be highly confidential data in the 
reports supplied to the agencies by the national 
military or civil administrations. So it would 
always be as interesting a version as possible but 
one from which any content that would be dan-
gerous to pass on the Assembly and, through the 
Assembly, to the public will be deleted. 
As far as the budget is concerned, Mr. Caro, it 
is true that the increase needed by WEU - the 
Assembly and why not the Secretariat-General as 
well? - is not much in absolute terms, but our 
member states have budgetary problems and are 
afraid that if they give us a particular increase 
they will be asked to do the same for other 
organisations. Mind you, they should make an 
exception for us because we have been starved 
for ten years. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - The 
others get more than we do. 
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Mr. CAHEN (Secretary-General of Western 
European Union) (Translation). - I know, but we 
chose the wrong time to wake up. Now we have 
to get the member states to realise this. We have 
had no appreciable increase for ten years so we 
deserve to be made an exception: Assembly and 
Secretariat-General too if you do not mind. 
That brings me to the limitation of armaments 
control. It is true that when reactivation was 
launched in 1985 some people in Washington 
were concerned about the revival of WEU 
because they saw it as a possible divisive element 
in the alliance and above all because, in their 
eyes, the institution might, as it woke up, send 
the wrong signals to the other side of the iron 
curtain. This is exactly what prompted the letter 
from Richard Burt - which I knew about, having 
been a political director at the time: it was I, inci-
dentally, who drafted Belgium's proposed reply-
that did not ask us not to discuss disarmament 
but said: for God's sake do it but keep a low 
profile because otherwise the people on the other 
side are going to imagine there is a disagreement 
within the alliance and try to drive a wedge 
between us. 
Since then we have been very busy on 
problems of the control, limitation and reduction 
of armaments, particularly in Luxembourg last 
November and thereafter. It is true, as I have 
already said, that we have not taken any public 
stance, again because of the same concern not to 
appear divided. But our positions, which were 
convergent, have each time been communicated 
to our allies either bilaterally by our different 
governments or within the alliance. I believe that 
due account has been taken of them and that 
they are the origin of the efforts in Washington to 
move in our direction because of our fears of 
decoupling to which Senator Close referred a 
moment ago. So we have to raise this same 
problem. We have a fairly low profile and, for 
the moment, to act otherwise would perhaps be 
premature. We have to assert ourselves as what 
we ought to be - the European pillar of the 
alliance. When we have done this then, yes, we 
can change the profile because it will reinforce 
the alliance and that is what we want. In the 
meantime, however, we should perhaps not have 
too high a profile for the rest of the world but 
keep a useful profile, internally, for our allies. 
It has rightly been said that we ought to have a 
security doctrine so that we can speak out loud 
on questions of the control, limitation and 
reduction of armaments. I wholly agree. I would 
not say a defence doctrine because defence is 
NJ\~0, t~e alliance. WEU equals security, the 
pohtlcal stde of the alliance, enabling us to exert 
our influence as we should. A security doctrine is 
exactly what we are trying to produce. 
It is fairly easy, as I said when I spoke, to bring 
out a paper on European security problems. On 
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that point I owe you a confession. I teach in 
Brussels University and one day I gave my stu-
dents studying for their degree an exercise which 
required each of them to produce a document on 
European security principles. 
The result was not uninteresting and, all in all, 
could have been accepted by all our member 
states. But of course it was only a superficial and 
rather rhetorical document. What is needed is 
that our countries should compare their views on 
security because the fact is that there are major 
differences if not of substance then at least of 
emphasis. These differences have to ?e studied 
in order to see why they converge or diverge and 
whether a given divergence cannot be converted 
into convergence. Then we would have a doc-
trine that would not be just a declaration but a 
very substantial consensus of ideas on security -
a real European doctrine. I ~ope - because w_e 
are working on it - that we Will be able to submit 
such a doctrine to the ministers in October and 
thereafter produce a real and substantive decla-
ration of principles. 
Much has been said about public opinion. This 
is a vital issue and the Assembly has a vital role 
in that regard. It is important for the public in 
our countries to be informed about what we are 
doing and to know that. European secu~t~, the 
shield in which our natiOns are to participate, 
depends on what the European governments do 
in this field. We shall never, therefore, be able to 
do enough to make WEU known th~oughout the 
media and above all to create a pubhc awareness 
of WEU. Considerable progress has been made 
in this direction in the last few years. When I 
became Secretary-General it was difficult to find 
a single article in the p~ess about WEU,_ its activ-
ities or European secunty. The only articles pub-
lished were those that you and I wrote. Now-
adays, journalists and reporters have taken over 
and that is a considerable step forward. 
As regards the centralisation oft~e institutiOJ?-S 
the question asked was whether this should be m 
Brussels or elsewhere although perhaps the vital 
need, before that, is to reorganise and be ac~ive. 
The question is on the agenda of the Council ?f 
Ministers but I am not at all sure the answer Will 
come in the near future. As Secretary-General, of 
course my answer must be that good man-ageme~t calls for concentration in one and the 
same place rather than dispersal. For the 
moment, concentration is not planned for the 
immediate future. 
With regard to the possibility of enlargement: I 
have also been asked questions under two mam 
headings. First I was asked whether, if I had to 
set WEU up afresh, I would keep to its I?resent 
membership or whether I would enlarge It. The 
other question was why I did not say more about 
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enlargement in my speech. I made it clear that 
this was not a proper subject for the Secretary-
General to speak on because it is a perfect 
example of the issues that are the preserve of the 
member states. Moreover, Article XI of the 
treaty is very clear on this poi~t. As I already 
said the efforts we are making to have a 
com'mon security platform will be useful for t~e 
countries wanting to join WEU because they will 
know exactly what they are committing th~J?­
selves to. Not all the countries that want to JOm 
necessarily have exactly the same strategic 
options as those of the seven member states. In 
other words some member states might find it 
necessary to change some of their strategic 
options. This has to be said. Why not? Some 
observers from the countries I am referring to are 
basically very much in agreement with me on 
this point. As to whether I would prefer a 
broader or narrower Western European Union I 
can only repeat that this a matter ~or the member 
countries. It is for them to decide whether to 
bring in other countries intereste~ in our 
organisation. However much I would hke to pl~y 
a political role I cannot go further than that m 
the framework of the treaty. 
I was also asked, if I had to recreate WEU, 
what role I would want the parliamentary 
Assembly to play. Would it be more important 
and more or less dynamic than that of the 
national parliaments? If I had to make a new 
WEU I would give maximum weight to the 
Assembly because it is through the Assembly 
that we shall create the essential consensus on 
the idea of a European defence. That having been 
said it is true that all international, and particu-
larly European, assemblies suffer ~ram not 
having exactly the same powers as natwn_a~ par-
liaments. Where do we look for the ongm of 
national parliaments? Power and money. It _was 
they who determined how muc~ should be gtven 
to the king and to the state and It was from these 
sources that all parliamentary power stemmed. 
The same is not true of international parliaments 
and, for the European Parliament, the opposite is 
true. The parliaments that developed over the 
centuries were able to restrict the spending of the 
monarch and the state. The only power the 
European Parliament has is to increase it. In pa~­
liamentary terms this is a contradiction. That IS 
the problem for your Ass~mbl~ - to whic~ I 
must pay tribute beca~se, Irt ~PI~e of th~ diffi-
culties and the handicaps, It IS playmg an 
extremely important role. The fact is that, during 
WEU's ten years of slumber it was in you that 
the heart of the organisation continued to beat 
and its spirit to survive. Without you ther~ could 
have been no reactivation. WEU unquestiOnably 
carries considerable weight in spite of its limited 
powers which follow the pattern of international 
parliamentary organisations at least until further 
notice. 
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One speaker used the word " spectacular " 
about our organisation. The important thing is 
not to be spectacular but to be effective and to 
have mounting influence in Europe, in transat-
lantic relations, in East-West relations and 
beyond that throughout the world. That is what 
we are in process of doing. When we have 
attained that efficacy and that influence we shall 
then, by the nature of things, be spectacular, not 
for the pleasure of being so but because we shall 
be important. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you 
Secretary-General for answering the many ques-
tions you have been asked. 
10. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance-
Part 11: Political activities of the Council 
(Presentation of the report 
of the General Affairs Committee, Doe. 1099) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The orders 
of the day call for the presentation of the report 
of the General Affairs Committee on the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance - Part 11: 
Political activities of the Council, Document 
1099. 
I call Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur. 
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and gentle-
men, I should first like to congratulate you, Mr. 
President, very warmly on your election as Pres-
ident of this Assembly. I am pleased that you 
personally were elected, but I am also pleased 
because your election confirms that all the 
members of this Assembly have an equal oppor-
tunity, regardless of whether they come from 
small countries or large ones. As matters now 
stand, Mr. President, your presidency, coupled 
with the presidency of the Council, means that 
Western European Union is firmly in Luxem-
bourg hands. But I feel sure the Grand Duchy 
will not abuse this position! 
I should also like to thank the Secretary-
General. His lively and committed statement 
and the comprehensive and thorough way in 
which he has given his answers prove once again 
to my satisfaction how right the Assembly was to 
call, year after year, for a political secretary-
general, rather than a mere administrator and 
senior civil servant. 
Mr. President, I have the honour to present the 
second part of the report which I have to submit 
to the Assembly on behalf of the General Affairs 
Committee. The report had to be divided in two 
because the Council's thirty-second annual 
report was not received until 27th April. This 
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naturally gave rise to some very critical com-
ments in the committee, which covered the 
whole gamut of co-operation with the Council. A 
particular point of criticism was that the Council 
has not taken up Prime Minister Chirac's pro-
posal for a European security charter. But the 
Council's obvious failure to adopt what are, after 
all, very moderate budgetary proposals from the 
Assembly came in for just as much criticism. 
Although the Chairman of the Council, Minister 
Poos, when questioned, answered in optimistic 
vein, these answers have yet to be followed by 
deeds. Not even the tiresome and positively non-
sensical business of charging the cost of our staff 
pensions to the Assembly's budget has been 
changed yet. Certain members- Mr. De Decker 
and Mr. Declercq - have just put forward pro-
posals for the internal restructuring of WEU's 
financial resources. This restructuring would be 
to the benefit of the secretariat and the Assembly 
and to the disadvantage of the agencies. 
Mr. President, I believe we should consider 
these suggestions here. When I look at the tasks 
of some of the agencies, I sometimes doubt 
whether they continue to meet present-day 
requirements. As I said in Rome, the reacti-
vation of WEU, or rather its reanimation, since 
it was in a state of suspended animation, should 
not mean picking up where we left off years ago, 
but creating a new WEU. But a new WEU will 
entail new agencies. Even then I was expressing 
doubts as to whether a military expert, however 
good he might be, could really give valid answers 
to questions raised by conflict studies. In other 
words, it may be impossible to restructure the 
agencies without affecting the staff and making 
changes. 
Mr. Secretary-General, I believe I am speaking 
for the Assembly when I assure you of our full 
support in these matters. I am also sure that we 
shall be discussing budgetary matters tomorrow, 
after the speech by the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council, and especially after the debate on Mr. 
Linster's report. 
Despite all the criticism of what I consider to 
be deficient co-operation and deficient flow of 
information between the Council and the 
Assembly, we must, I feel, look closely at the 
problems the Council has to solve. It will then be 
realised that it is not always easy for the Council 
to inform the Assembly promptly and compre-
hensively. 
Take the proposal for the establishment of a 
European security charter. This proposal, which, 
as I said in Luxembourg, seems to me to be a 
consequence of French security policies in recent 
years and did not therefore come out of the blue, 
had clearly not been agreed with the govern-
ments of the other six member countries. It is 
said that one government in particular reacted 
with annoyance and obvious hesitation and has 
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so far adopted a fairly guarded position. So it is 
understandable, ladies and gentlemen, if in this 
difficult situation the Council does not state its 
views particularly clearly. 
Or take the question of enlarging Western 
European Union that has now been before us for 
some considerable time. Since Portugal sub-
mitted its application in 1984, it has become 
known more or less officially that other countries 
would also like to join. It is understandable of 
course, that the Council should consider all these 
applications together and must therefore 
examine the possible effects of the first 
applicant's accession on other applicants and 
that it should therefore consider whether the 
accession of one country would not perhaps set a 
precedent that would prove binding in the 
future. 
Thirdly, there are the measures to reactivate 
WEU, which have been under discussion since 
Rome, but unfortunately, as I have said only 
under discussion, at least as far as we kno~ offi-
cially. We all know this is a sensitive issue. Reac-
tivation must not create the impression that the 
seven member states are forming a bloc within 
the European NATO countries, excluding the 
countries which do not belong to WEU, or that 
closer co-operation within WEU is directed 
against the United States. 
Mr. President, it is quite certainly true- as we 
have just heard from the Secretary-General who 
has encouraged us in many respects - that 'more 
progress has been made in these matters within 
the Council and its working groups than the 
Assembly knows officially. From time to time we 
hear something about this from our national rep-
resentatives on the Council, though at the same 
time they are anxious for us to understand that 
written information is not readily handed out. In 
that case I would say to the ministers and ambas-
sadors here: we must join in finding other 
channels of communication and information. 
This might be done in various forms such as the 
mixed committee that we have in th~ Council of 
Europe. Though I do not underestimate the diffi-
culties, the flow of information must be greatly 
improved and the dialogue between Assembly 
and Council must be stepped up if the Assembly 
is to fulfil its mandate in accordance with the 
Charter. 
I should now like to say a few words about 
some of the subjects which the committee refers 
to in the draft recommendation and the draft 
order, or has discussed in particular depth. 
In paragraph 1 the committee recommends 
that the Council convene a conference of heads 
of state and of government ofthe signatory coun-
tries of the modified Brussels Treaty and of 
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countries effectively determined to take part in a 
European security organisation in the context of 
the ~tlantic ;\lliance in order to define jointly 
secunty reqmrements for the next ten years and 
the role to be attributed to WEU to this end. I 
would point out that in addition to the seven 
member states of WEU, the committee deliber-
ately invites the other West European countries 
to attend such a conference and to make their 
contributions. 
Paragraph 2 sets a time-limit which the 
Assembly believes should be observed for a 
favourable response to Portugal's application for 
membership. I have just said that I can under-
stand why the Council is considering Portugal's 
application in a wider context. But I would stress 
that the committee took the unanimous view 
that the way in which Portugal's application has 
remained before the Council for years could be 
seen as inconsistent with diplomatic and western 
courtesy. I have put this very discreetly. The 
words used in committee were more direct. I 
should also point out that the reference to Por-
tugal is not an attack on the other applications. 
Portugal is mentioned because we have been 
considering its application for years and dis-
cussing it with our counterparts in the Portu-
guese Parliament. 
In the draft order the General Affairs Com-
mittee is instructed to organise a conference of 
elder statesmen. Here we were guided by the idea 
that such politicians, who are well-known in 
Europe but are no longer exercising govern-
mental duties, are able to speak more freely and 
frankly about these major problems than can 
politicians constantly faced with elections in all 
our countries. This is surely tqe only reason why 
we are sometimes surprised suddenly to hear 
statements from one country or another which 
do not seem absolutely consistent to us and cer-
tainly could not always necessarily have been 
deduced from past policy. We think it would be 
g?od to have discussions with experienced politi-
cians who have at some time been responsible 
for the ~ations and the development of Europe, 
and to hsten to their opinions. It will certainly 
not ~e e.asy to prepare ~ conference or colloquy 
of th1s kmd. SelectiOn will also create difficulties. 
At all events, the colloquy should be held before 
the conference of heads of state and government, 
so as to help the politicians now in power to 
form their opinions. 
A final word, Mr. President, on the rela-
tionship between the European Community and 
WEU, because this too was discussed at great 
length in committee. In the report I have laid 
particular emphasis on the statements by the 
Commission's President, Mr. Delors, and the 
correspondence between Mr. De Decker and his 
prime minister. From other ·sources, too, we 
have the definite impression that the European 
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Community is taking a greater interest in 
security policy. It is, of course, difficult to draw a 
clear dividing line. The European Parliament 
will not allow anyone to forbid it to state its 
views on security or defence policy questions as 
well. European political co-operation, which, of 
course, is also concerned with the relationship 
between the Twelve and the East European coun-
tries, will be unable to exclude security policy 
questions in this process. But we believe it must 
be made clear - and, ladies and gentlemen, we 
should also use our political contacts with the 
members of the European Parliament to this end 
- that the Twelve cannot take responsibility for 
these matters and that this responsibility must 
continue to rest with Western European Union. I 
believe this needs to be made clear as a matter of 
urgency and I call on you all to do what you can 
to help. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you 
Mr. -\hren<;. 
11. Election of three Vice-Presidents 
of the Assembly 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I have been 
informed of three new candidates for the three 
remaining posts of Vice-President of the 
Assembly, namely: Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. 
Valleix and Mr. van der Werff. 
If there are no objections, I propose that these 
three Vice-Presidents be elected by accla-
mation. 
Is there any objection? ... 
I note that the Assembly is unanimous. 
I therefore declare Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. 
Valleix and Mr. van der Werff elected as Vice-
Presidents of the Assembly. 
The order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents 
according to age is as follows: Mr. Ferrari 
Aggradi, Mr. van der W erff, Sir Frederic Bennett, 
Mr. Valleix, Mr. Soell and Mr. Pecriaux. 
12. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance -
Part II: Political activities of the Council 
(Debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, 
Doe. 1099) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - We now 
come to the debate on the report of the General 
Affairs Committee on the European pillar of the 
Atlantic Alliance - Part II: Political activities of 
the Council, Document 1099. 
I call Mr. Antretter. 
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Mr. ANTRETTER (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, Mr. 
Ahrens's written and oral reports reveal once 
again what heavy work the Council is still 
making of implementing the intentions 
announced by the foreign and defence ministers 
nearly three years ago in Rome. Today we know 
less than ever what the ultimate aim of European 
security policy is, or what practical contribution 
WEU is making to it. 
In his excellent report Mr. Ahrens rightly 
recalls that one of the main reasons for the 1984 
decision to reactivate WEU was to ensure that 
the public might play a larger role in Europe's 
efforts in the security field. But what is the reality 
three years later? 
Although more members of governments now 
refer in their speeches to the need, or even their 
determination, to continue the process of reacti-
vating WEU, the governments represented in the 
Council of Ministers have not yet presented the 
public with actual results in one single problem 
area that are convincing enough for the public to 
gain the impression that this organisation is 
capable of playing a decisive role in the determi-
nation and shaping of Europe's destiny in 
matters of security and defence. There is cer-
tainly no sign of public involvement. Even infor-
mation, the necessary preliminary to invol-
vement, is lacking. 
I will explain this with the help of a few prac-
tical examples. What do we hear about the Coun-
cil's activities in the area of arms control and dis-
armament, the vital subject that has been 
keeping us in suspense in Europe since Reyk-
javik, if not earlier? A recent article in the Inter-
national Herald Tribune on the outcome of the 
WEU Council's spring meeting on 27th and 28th 
April in Luxembourg was headed: " West Euro-
peans agreed they had nothing to say ". 
Ladies and gentlemen, I do not share this neg-
ative view. But it is one of many examples of 
how WEU's activities are currently received by 
the media. 
I welcome the fact that so much of the 
communique issued after the Council's meeting 
in Luxembourg is devoted to the WEU member 
countries' position on the disarmament negotia-
tions in Geneva. But if we look at the text care-
fully, we find no indication as to what the gov-
ernments actually intend to do to ensure that 
more account is taken of Europe's security 
interests in these negotiations. So once again I 
doubt whether the Council will comply with the 
Assembly's recommendation and present a joint 
WEU position on Mr. Gorbachev's proposals at 
the forthcoming meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council. 
The results are even more meagre when we try 
to glean something from the written version of 
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the Council's thirty-second annual report. Fur-
thermore, Mr. President, the subject " Disarm-
ament and arms control " is conspicuous by its 
absence from the lists of contents in both parts of 
the annual report. In both cases it is hidden away 
under the heading "East-West relations". This 
gives the impression that there is opposition in 
the Council to making too open a reference to 
these problems. This section certainly does little 
more than generally reiterate old positions. It is 
no good looking here for topical statements. 
We representatives can, of course, put ques-
tions to the Council. But what do we get for our 
pains? Mr. Close, for example, forwarded several 
questions on the disarmament issue to the 
Council on 26th November 1986. It took the 
Council until 21st May 1987, almost six months 
later, to send on its answers, consisting mainly of 
a repetition of the statements in the Luxembourg 
communique. With an information policy like 
this, it seems almost ironic when the Council 
confirms in answer to the last question that it 
shares the view of the honourable member that 
public awareness on defence issues is 
important. 
Ladies and gentlemen, what is the situation as 
regards co-operation on armaments? In the Lux-
embourg communique the ministers stressed, 
among other things, the importance of closer and 
more systematic co-operation in the field of con-
ventional weapons. But what is actually being 
done to solve the outstanding problems with 
regard to the standardisation and inter-
operability of weapons systems? 
Nor is it very encouraging to hear the answers 
our own governments give to these questions. In 
March of this year I asked the Federal Defence 
Minister about the fate of the joint German-
British-Italian howitzer project, and about the 
possibility of supporting it within WEU. The 
defence ministry replied that there were no plans 
to support this project within WEU, since the 
organisation had no responsibilities in this area. 
Then, what is WEU here for? Can we still give 
credence to the section of the Rome declaration 
in which the ministers emphasised that: " As 
regards armaments co-operation, WEU should 
be in a position to play an active role in pro-
viding political impetus "? What was the 
Standing Armaments Committee established for 
in the first place? It has not met for quite some 
time, and we still know nothing about the Coun-
cil's plans for its future. Finally, we are bound to 
ask what the new agency for the development of 
equipment co-operation - Agency Ill - was set 
up for. 
Since the three agencies for security questions 
began their activities early in 1986, the Assembly 
has heard absolutely nothing about any results 
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they might have achieved. And yet in a doc-
ument on WEU's public relations, adopted in 
1985, the Council announced that it would be 
instructing these agencies to prepare material 
specifically for public relations purposes. 
Nothing has come of this. 
We can only speculate about the eventual 
structure of the WEU organs. The Luxembourg 
communique says that the ministers had heard a 
report by the presidency. Although we hear of the 
existence of numerous reports or interim reports 
- an interim report on European security 
interests in the present strategic context, a report 
prepared by the special working group analysing 
the politico-strategic implications of the SDI 
research programme and an outline study on 
problems of security in the Mediterranean, for 
example - what we do not hear is what they 
contain. 
Ladies and gentlemen, if the Council is not 
even giving us parliamentarians the opportunity, 
however modest, of joining in the deliberations, 
how does it imagine the general public can be 
enabled to follow the Council's and govern-
ments' motives and thinking on security 
policy? 
I will conclude with a few words on the pro-
posal for a WEU summit meeting of the heads of 
state and of government. I very much welcome 
this initiative and feel it should have been taken 
earlier, because the Council's long delay over the 
applications received from other countries has 
greatly complicated matters in the meantime. 
When Portugal was the only country seeking 
membership, the Council could have given it a 
positive answer without any difficulty. Now it is 
forced to take simultaneous decisions on at least 
four quite disparate applications. This also 
means that it must consider carefully who, apart 
from the present members, is to be invited to the 
summit meeting. The subjects to be discussed at 
this meeting must also be prepared very carefully 
if practical results are to be achieved. At all 
events, the outcome must not be a reprint of the 
Rome declaration, a declaration of fine words 
and benign hand-outs, a succession of declara-
tions of intent. This time, real decisions on 
security policy must emerge. 
The PRESIDENT (Translati.pn). - I call Mr. 
Soell. · 
Mr. SOELL (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and gentle-
men, I would first like to thank Mr. Ahrens, the 
Rapporteur. In spite of the difficult conditions in 
which he had to write the second part of the 
report, he has succeeded in highlighting the most 
important issues that we have before us in this 
Assembly. 
In particular we should note his direct tackling 
of the problems about which nothing is being 
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done in WEU. Large sections of public opinion 
side with Mr. Jacques Delors, the President of 
the Commission of the European Communities, 
in his view that the reactivation of WEU was 
simply a subterfuge designed to conceal the fact 
that governments were unwilling to concern 
themselves with security matters. 
Even if we members of the Assembly take a 
different view of reactivation and recognise that 
some progress has been made, we have to admit 
that, since the reactivation agreements signed in 
Rome in October 1984, the governments of the 
member countries have done nothing but pour 
cold water on public opinion and its ideas about 
WEU. The impression has gained ground- and 
not just among the public in Germany - that the 
most important stimulus in WEU reactivation 
was fear of the anti-arms race movement. Now 
that the strength of that movement has waned, 
some governments seem to have lost all interest 
in reactivation. 
This kind of attitude is prejudicial to Europe's 
common security interests, particularly at a time 
when East-West relations are undergoing radical 
change. 
Just recently, and more specifically since the 
Reykjavik summit in October 1986, the public in 
member countries has been asking itself why the 
voice of Western Europe is not to be heard when 
the talk is of linking defence problems with dis-
armament problems. No reply has yet been 
forthcoming. 
On the contrary, governments and public 
opinion in Western European countries are pri-
marily concerned about all the new disarmament 
initiatives like those once again proposed by the 
Soviets at the Warsaw Pact summit in East 
Berlin. 
These proposals were outlined at the meeting 
that the Bureau of the Assembly had in Moscow 
in early April. We were already wondering then 
whether the Soviet Union was ready to agree to 
asymmetric reductions not only in troops but 
also in weapon systems and to have " non-
provocative " defence structures. Our questions 
received affirmative answers. At the Moscow 
discussions it also came out clearly that the 
Soviet Union was beginning to see the impor-
tance of its relations with Western Europe in a 
new light. This change is based on considerations 
that may be summed up as follows: 
The new Soviet leadership believes that a 
polycentrist world will be more stable than the 
bipolar world we have at the moment. The 
process of political union under way in Western 
Europe is accepted as a fact. For as long as 
Western Europe fails to be politically united it 
will carry far less weight than the United States 
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in the eyes of the Soviet Union. In view of the 
fact that the two parts of Europe have experi-
enced war in their own countries, they are better 
able to explain to others, and therefore to the 
United States, what war means. The Soviet 
Union is convinced that it will never be attacked 
by even a united Western Europe on its own. 
The " new thinking " has made the Soviets 
realise more clearly that tensions between the 
superpowers also reduce the freedom for 
manreuvre of Western Europe; as Western Euro-
peans, we added, at the talks in Moscow, that the 
margin for manreuvre of the countries in Eastern 
Europe in the frozen grip of the Soviet Union 
was also reduced. 
There are no grounds for euphoria because of 
these new Soviet assessments. What we could 
ask for, however, is the will to take an objective 
look at the Soviet proposals and to give con-
structive answers. Without that will, the credi-
bility of a common security policy of national 
governments and parliaments would certainly be 
lessened in public opinion in Western Europe. 
At the same time, there would be seriously 
increased fears that the ambiguities surfacing for 
various reasons in certain governments' attitudes 
with regard to major disarmament measures - in 
the case of the zero-zero option for example -
would make the western alliances incapable of 
structural disarmament. A point that is particu-
larly regrettable, and Mr. Ahrens rightly 
criticised it, is that the " harmonisation " of the 
views of the various governments " about the 
true security situation in Europe", particularly 
in the field of armaments control and disarm-
ament and with regard to the changing East-West 
relations, has so far not materialised nor even 
begun to materialise. 
If that harmonisation fails to be achieved 
during the next few months, particularly as 
regards a concrete mandate for negotiations 
between the Atlantic and the Urals on conven-
tional disarmament - of particular interest to 
Western Europe- the claim to want to reactivate 
WEU will lose all semblance of credibility. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Close. 
Mr. CLOSE (Belgium) (Translation). - My 
address will be a rather more elaborate version of 
the points I raised a little time ago after the 
Secretary-General's speech. It will be confined to 
four items I believe to be important for the 
future work of our Assembly. 
My first point is one I had occasion to raise 
last week in Quebec at the parliamentary 
assembly of the North Atlantic Council. It is a 
question of reminding our American friends that 
the advocates of the deployment of Euromissiles 
used two arguments when speaking in their 
national parliaments: the recoupling of the 
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United States and Europe and the restoration of 
deterrence at European level because the cruise 
and Pershing II missiles would enable us to hit 
Soviet territory. The opposition's argument was 
then: what is the point of this new arms race, this 
redeployment, because we still have thousands of 
nuclear warheads in Europe plus the nuclear sub-
marines? It was said this would be an intolerable 
escalation. 
Our American friends seem to have short 
memories because, after the Reykjavik summit 
and the Geneva negotiations, we are now being 
asked to forget the arguments we used. A few 
days ago Mr. Weinberger even repeated the 
argument that the left used against it. The con-
clusion is simple: we have lost face and some of 
our political credibility. 
Secondly, I am convinced that the Geneva 
negotiations will succeed, for one thing because 
the United States and Mr. Reagan in particular 
see an immediate domestic policy advantage in 
them and for another because the Soviet Union 
and Mr. Gorbachev will draw considerable psy-
chological benefit from them not only among 
their own public but also in Europe. The result 
will be that a whole spectrum of what I call inter-
mediate nuclear deterrence will disappear; for 
me, the distinction between very long-range, 
long-range, medium- or short-range missiles is 
artificial. 
What will then be the situation in Europe? In 
the West we had missiles that were capable of 
reaching the Soviet Union. They will disappear. 
All the others are battlefield or medium-range 
missiles. In the East, however, all the missiles are 
strategic whether their range be 4 000 km or 
30 km because the preferential " reception " area 
will be the Federal Republic of Germany. 
I wonder if we are not about to return to the 
strategy of massive retaliation abandoned in 
1960 for obvious reasons, or the Rapacki plan of 
famous memory. 
Thirdly, given this situation, it is clear that 
Europe has to do something because the flexible 
response strategy seems to me increasingly com-
promised. I believe there is a consensus on the 
response, namely the strengthening of our con-
ventional forces. Everyone agrees on the prin-
ciple but opinions differ about how it is to be 
done because all European countries will ulti-
mately be faced with a practically impossible 
budgetary situation, or what has been called 
structural disarmament given that a tank or air-
craft now or in the 1990s will cost ten times what 
it did in the sixties. 
Take my country's case. If we had to replace 
our air force fleet - 144 combat aircraft - at the 
rate of 500 million Belgian francs apiece it 
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would swallow up the whole of our present 
defence budget for a period often years. In a situ-
ation like that, the Assembly - and that is its role 
- would have to study a number of problems. It 
would first have to look at the possible overhaul 
of our structures which are still offensive and 
rather like those of the Anglo-American allies at 
the time of the Normandy landings. Next there 
would be the choices of equipment to be made 
and priorities to be established. Would it still be 
reasonable to buy tanks at astronomic prices 
when we could have third-generation missiles 
capable and certain of destroying them in a few 
seconds? You may remember the television pic-
tures of the fighting in Chad. In one afternoon, 
Milan missiles - I am not advertising for French 
products which, as everyone knows, are 
excellent, further proof having recently been 
given us in the Persian Gulf.,... costing 600 000 
francs, knocked out 40 tanks worth 100-200 mil-
lions. The cost-effectiveness ratio has to be con-
sidered. Another basic point is the use of 
reserves. If the nuclear deterrence pillar crumbles 
away and if we have increasingly to rely on con-
ventional weapons do you for one second think 
that a tenuous defensive line 800 km long from 
the Elbe to the Alps, with strictly nothing behind 
it, would stand up to a surprise offensive and the 
blow it would be capable of striking at selected 
points? 
It is not a question of a three to one superi-
ority, which means nothing any more, but ten or 
twelve to one. If we do not replace defence in 
line by defence in depth we shall lose the battle 
of Europe in three days. 
We have to study how long mobilisation takes, 
and the organisation and role of our millions of 
reservists currently little used or not used at all. 
To me it seems a paradox that, with such a 
wealth of reservists, we have to rely on rapid 
American reinforcements- five weeks- to con-
solidate, should the need arise, the defence of 
Europe. 
President Reagan has spoken out about a 
serious incident in the Persian Gulf. I under-
stand the reaction of Ameri<;ans saying: why 
should our sailors get themselves killed in the 
Persian Gulf to defend the economic interests of 
Europe and Japan, which are greater than those 
of the United States in that area? What was 
Europe's answer? Nothing. The problem of out-
of-area risks, whether it be in the Middle East or 
Southern Africa could also concern this 
Assembly. 
Lastly, I referred a moment ago to the 
enhanced radiation missile, the so-called neutron 
bomb. If the Federal Republic of Germany is 
really going to be the battleground for nuclear 
weapons whether they come from friend or foe it 
seems to me that it would be useful to have a 
weapon that would be the only answer to the 
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superiority of Soviet armour and would cause 
only insignificant and secondary damage to the 
weapons that are part of our present arsenal. The 
Assembly should, if we are to remain credible in 
the eyes of our public opinion, set itself a precise 
programme. 
(Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took 
the Chair). 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
van den Bergh. 
Mr. van den BERGH (Netherlands) (Trans-
lation). - Mr. President, for the umpteenth time 
our organisation, WEU, finds itself in a kind of 
crisis, at least if I judge the mood correctly. 
Everyone is grumbling, not only about our own 
activities but about the activities of the Council 
of Ministers in particular. I believe this grum-
bling and complaining about our role, this grum-
bling and complaining because our importance is 
not sufficiently appreciated, may well go on for 
the next ten years, unless we try to plot a course. 
I should like, in all modesty, to say something 
about this. 
The basic problem faced by Western European 
Union, the European countries, the European 
governments and European parliamentarians, 
has arisen through our unwillingness to make 
fundamental choices in the various bodies where 
aspects of European policy are discussed. I will 
explain what I mean by this. We believe that 
Western European Union must discuss the 
security aspect of European policy. Mr. Delors, 
good Frenchman that he is, naturally wants to 
make something of his presidency of the Com-
mission of the European Communities as well, 
and has also discovered security policy. He 
believes the debate on the political aspects of 
security policy should take place in the Com-
mission. All Europeans become nervous 
whenever such discussions take place because 
reference is made to the importance of NATO. 
The important economic aspects of defence 
policy are discussed by the Independent 
European Programme Group, to which the 
French fortunately belong. The Eurogroup dis-
cusses similar aspects. The result is that various 
interrelated aspects are discussed in a very large 
number of bodies, without the necessary choices 
being made at political level to define where we 
should be discussing what. That, in my opinion, 
is the problem of Western European Union, 
because a few years ago we failed - and the gov-
ernments failed - to make WEU responsible for 
co-operation in the area of defence equipment. 
We decided to consider the security aspects, as 
long as they do not concern NATO, but we are 
not really doing that. We said that political 
co-ordination must begin in WEU. We really are 
going about things in a half-baked way. 
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What I want to say to our Rapporteur is this -
and I agree with him in this respect: if we do not 
specify - and I have the impression that the 
Council of Ministers has made more progress 
here than we have - the subjects for which we 
think Western European Union must have 
political priority, the complaints there have been 
up to now will continue in the future. I urge that 
we discuss, very positively and without trying to 
lower the level of co-operation within NATO, 
the security aspects of NATO's policy for 
Europe, including the economic aspects that are 
important here, and I suggest that Western 
European Union should be the central 
organisation as regards the production of 
weapons systems, to a far greater extent than it 
has been up to now. 
I believe that what I have just said is more 
urgent than ever before. This brings me to my 
second comment. The two zero options are very 
likely to be taken up. I feel we should be happy 
with that, because it undoubtedly means that the 
European dimension will gain in importance, 
especially as regards security policy in the con-
ventional sphere. Whether you feel that the 
present level should be maintained, or that more 
should be done - this is the main question that 
will be asked. I am also thinking of public 
opinion, which we have discussed on so many 
occasions. Virtually no one in Europe knows of 
the existence of Western European Union but 
public opinion can be activated if we make this 
very specific aspect of European policy, the con-
ventional balance in Europe, for which we have a 
direct responsibility, the main topic of discussion 
in Western European Union in the years to 
come. There has been a great deal of denigration 
of the agencies here, and rightly so, because we 
scarcely even see anything of them. I have the 
general impression that the agencies tend to be 
places to which retired generals and officials are 
posted until they reach 65, without having any 
real significance. The agencies, WEU itself and 
the Council of Ministers should make the con-
ventional problems in Europe, irrespective of 
their effect, the central political issue in the 
future. 
Thirdly, I find it absurd - and I mean no 
offence to anyone - to have the kind of political 
discussion with the Secretary-General that we 
had before this debate. With all due respect for 
the Secretary-General, I consider it beneath the 
dignity of a parliamentary assembly to appear to 
have more discussion of political matters with 
the Secretary-General than with the represent-
ative of the Council of Ministers. 
I mean no discredit to the Secretary-General, 
but it is unacceptable. In order to activate the 
Council and the Assembly and familiarise the 
public with our activities, we need political 
debates with representatives of the Council of 
Ministers. Things must not go on as before. I 
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have been a member of this Assembly for several 
years, and what I have often witnessed goes 
roughly as follows: in all humility a member of 
the Assembly, an independent parliamentarian, 
puts a modest question to a minister, who is then 
kind enough to give the Assembly what is usually 
a rather inane answer. That is the level of the 
political debate between the Assembly and the 
Council of Ministers. WEU cannot possibly gain 
political influence and political importance as an 
assembly unless we drop the half-baked role the 
Assembly has been playing for years and per-
suade the Council of Ministers to join in a 
genuine political debate with the Assembly. 
There is another example. I do not know if you 
follow this; there is very little point in it anyway. 
The answers the Council regularly gives to ques-
tions put by the members of the Assembly, but 
usually not until ten, twelve, fourteen or eighteen 
months have elapsed, are generally so vacuous as 
to be a disgrace to parliamentary dignity. 
In conclusion, I have one or two more com-
ments. In the coming years the Assembly's 
reaction to the new applications to join WEU 
from various countries, such as Spain, Portugal, 
Turkey, Greece and perhaps others, will be 
important. I quite appreciate why the Council is 
reticent in its response to these applications -
that has been the case here, too - but in certain 
respects I think it is a mistake. I consider the 
applications from various countries and the 
interest shown in the Assembly's work by 
Norway and Denmark to be an important 
political signal from a number of European 
countries that they want to make a contribution 
to the formulation of plans for European security 
policy. Although I quite see the practical 
problems involved, I feel it is arrogant of the 
current members of Western European Union -
and I have had a taste of this atmosphere - to 
think the debate on the European security 
problem can be confined to them alone. It is 
quite obvious that a number of other countries 
which are not members of WEU but are 
members of NATO have at least as much 
interest in this problem as the present member 
countries. I urge the Council of Ministers and the 
Assembly, given the practical problems as well, 
to respond favourably to the views of countries 
that do not belong to WEU, because they may 
provide an impetus for a wider-ranging debate 
than exists at present on the future of European 
security policy. 
Mr. President, here we are, three years later, 
still talking about the reactivation of WEU. I 
think this is scandalous: we simply cannot go on 
saying the same things over and over again for 
three years. WEU - and I am referring specifi-
cally to our Assembly - can only gain the respect 
of the general public and of the Council of Min-
isters, which generally regards us as a quantite 
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negligeable, and can only become politically 
influential if it is prepared to take on the 
Council, if it is prepared to formulate policy 
more lucidly and if it acts more like a parliament 
than it has in the past. Unless the parliamentary 
Assembly becomes politically active in this way, 
I do not think there is any chance of real acti-
vation and influence in the future, let alone 
respect from the public. So we must stop com-
plaining about the inadequacy of the roles played 
by the Council of Ministers, the Secretary-
General and the agencies. It is parliamentarians 
like us who must play an enterprising and 
authoritative role and provide a serious impetus 
for the reactivation of WEU that we have been 
talking about for years. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is adjourned. 
13. Changes in the membership of committees 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I have been 
informed of changes in the membership of com-
mittees. 
First, the Belgian Delegation proposes that on 
the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments Mr. Bogaerts be a titular member in place 
of Mr. Dejardin and that on the General Affairs 
Committee Mr. Dejardin be a titular member in 
place of Mr. Bogaerts. 
Secondly, the French Delegation proposes that 
on the General Affairs Committee Mr. Pontillon 
be a titular member and that Mr. Bassinet be a 
titular member in place of Mr. Mermaz; and that 
on the Committee on Rules of Procedure and 
Privileges Mr. Mermaz be an alternate member 
in place of Mr. Bassinet. 
Is there any opposition? ... 
The changes are agreed to. 
14. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting 
tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 2nd June, at 10 
a.m. with the following orders of the day: 
The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance -
Part II: Political activities of the Council 
(Resumed debate on the report of the General 
Affairs Committee, Document 1099). 
Are there any objections? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? .. 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 6.05 p.nl.) 
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SUMMARY 
1. Attendance register. 
2. Adoption of the minutes. 
3. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance - Part II: 
Political activities of the Council (Resumed debate on the 
report of the General Affairs Committee, Doe. 1099). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. van der Sanden, Mr. Irmer, 
Mr. Eisma, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Muller, Sir Frederic Bennett, 
Mr. Caro, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Valleix, Mr. du Monceau, 
Mr. Burger. 
4. Change in the membership of a committee. 
5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. 
The sitting was opened at 10 a. m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
I. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended 
to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). In 
accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, the minutes of proceedings of the pre-
vious sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
3. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance -
Part 11: Political activities of the Council 
(Resumed debate on the report 
of the General Affairs Committee, Doe. 1099) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The orders 
of the day call for the resumed debate on the 
report of the General Affairs Committee on the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance - Part II: 
Political activities of the Council, Document 
1099. 
I call Mr. van der Sanden. 
Mr. van der SANDEN (Netherlands) (Trans-
lation). - Mr. President, after yesterday's debate, 
1. See page 16. 
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during which Mr. van den Bergh made what 
amounted to a political statement and devoted 
rather less time to Mr. Ahrens's report - the 
second part of Mr. Ahrens's report, I should say 
- I feel it would be a good thing to add a few 
comments on this second half of the response to 
the Council's thirty-second report. 
My impression is that Mr. Ahrens- and with 
him, the General Affairs Committee- has tried 
to produce a kind of shock effect on the Council. 
I have just been making a mental comparison 
with the landing of the small German plane with 
its nineteen-year-old pilot in Moscow's Red 
Square. That must have had the same effect there 
as the report presented by Mr. Ahrens today for 
our approval has had here. I have just had 
another look at the draft recommendation. If you 
consider paragraphs (i) to (vi), you will see the 
following striking words and phrases: the first of 
these paragraphs contains the word " pro-
testing", the second the words "no action", the 
third "no effective decision", the fourth "no 
practical action", the fifth" no answer" and the 
sixth " the absence of effective and adequate 
information". That is enough for the Council to 
be going on with! It really could not be put any 
clearer than that. It seems to me that the solution 
proposed by the General Affairs Committee for 
waking up the Council must have the same shock 
effect. 
The rather forceful criticisms we find in Mr. 
Ahrens's report chiefly apply, in my opinion, to 
the actual functioning of the Council of Min-
isters. I should not be surprised at this, because 
as the first Rapporteur replying to the thirtieth 
report of the Council - the first to be submitted 
to the Assembly after the Rome decision to reac-
tivate WEU - I too had to impress on the 
Assembly that something had to be done about 
mentality, the mentality that is typical of the 
Council's attitude towards the Assembly. 
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This may be a bit of an exaggeration, but we 
feel the Council's thinking goes something like 
this: "You Assembly of representatives of the 
people - and we accept that that is what you are 
- you are, of course, here as a result of the 
Brussels Treaty, but it really is rather tiresome of 
you to take your work as seriously as you do. We, 
the Council of Ministers, are the ones who really 
know best how to arrange, or perhaps not 
arrange, security matters internally, among our-
selves. And if we do not agree among ourselves, 
you, the Assembly, really must not interfere". 
Mr. President, that is the impression I have had 
for the last three years, after and despite the deci-
sions on reactivation, decisions which we natu-
rally wholeheartedly endorsed. 
As the Assembly feels increasingly involved in 
the work of Western European Union, especially 
since the reactivation decisions, the members of 
this Assembly must also be enabled to do their 
work in the best way possible. I have a very prac-
tical question to put to the Rapporteur in this 
c~ntext. Since it is clear that, as the problems 
with which the Assembly and therefore the 
Council concern themselves become more 
complex, the workload facing the members of the 
Assembly increases, should it still be necessary, 
as the treaty requires, for the national delegations 
to be members of both the Council of Europe 
and the Assembly ofWEU? Would it not be sen-
sible to seek to split these delegations? We could 
then - to put it bluntly - probably be more of a 
nuisance to the Council than we have been in 
recent years. 
Mr. President, I will now look at the actual 
proposals the Rapporteur is putting to us. He 
proposes the organisation of a colloquy followed 
by a kind of summit conference of the heads of 
state and of government. I wonder whether this 
should be seen as a kind of " testimonial to 
poverty " as regards the Council. Is not the 
Assembly now telling the Council: " You are not 
up to your job, you of the Council of Ministers 
and the Permanent Council in London are obvi-
ously incapable of finding appropriate solutions 
to the problems uppermost in the minds of the 
public throughout the world and hence in this 
part of it as well". What are we now proposing? 
We, the Assembly of Western European Union, 
are going to convene a kind of court of appeal. 
Now the heads of state and government are to 
descend from on high to meet together and tell 
the Council of Ministers precisely what it must 
and must not do. The Council would simply 
have to abide by this for the time being. Mr. 
President, if this is the approach to be adopted, I 
shall not, of course, be so happy, because the 
control exercised by a parliamentary body, or 
this Assembly, over the Council will then be 
slightly weakened by the interposition of this 
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conference ofheads ofstat~ and of government. I 
must tell you that this in itself is not a very 
desirable development. For the Rapporteur, it 
seems that beggars cannot be choosers. I feel the 
poverty of our situation has been borne in on 
him so acutely that he is willing to grasp at this 
expedient to achieve our common objective. 
The report drawn up by Mr. Bianco last year 
raised a wide range of questions. What replies 
has the Assembly actually received? I think the 
Rapporteur has answered that question in his 
report: virtually none. What is Mr. Ahrens in fact 
doing? What he is doing, in the name of the 
General Affairs Committee as well as his own, is 
this. Without counting them, I have the 
impression that Mr. Ahrens has included even 
more questions in his report than Mr. Bianco did 
in his last year. If only for the statistics, it would 
probably be worth counting up Mr. Bianco's and 
Mr. Ahrens's questions to the Council. But the 
fact remains that we are still waiting for down-to-
earth answers of substance from the Council of 
Ministers. 
Mr. President, I feel this Assembly has taken a 
clear political stand on the matters that now 
require an answer from Western European 
Union as a matter of urgency. It is also clear that 
we are now telling the Council of Ministers that 
it must take up the gauntlet and actually respond 
to the urgent questions of importance to the 
Assembly at the moment. I would add once 
again - probably once too often - that we regard 
the work this organisation is supposed to do as 
necessary work. In the attempts to tackle the 
world's problems there should in fact be no dif-
ference between the Council's and the 
Assembly's approach. The two should be 
thinking along the same lines - after all, our aim 
is the same. As I have said before, when we talk 
about Western European Union, we are not 
talking about a completely uncommitted 
co-operative body where we agree if we agree, 
and if we do not, we say "Too bad", and go 
home. No, we are talking about a Western 
European Union in which we join in trying to do 
the very necessary work of achieving the highest 
possible level of security in our society. 
Mr. President, a brief comment on the sub-
stance of this. Although I am not basically in 
favour of holding the proposed summit con-
ference, it may in fact be necessary, because the 
Council is obviously not doing enough to take 
the decisions that should be taken. 
Mr. Ahrens's report also criticises the Coun-
cil's failure to take any decisions in Luxembourg 
on the establishment of a European security 
charter, as proposed by Prime Minister Chirac 
during the Assembly's last part-session. I would 
emphasise that I share the view that the estab-
lishment of a European security charter of this 
kind must in no way be allowed to interfere with 
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NATO's activities or our relations with the 
United States, our greatest ally. But this does not 
alter the fact that we in Europe must be able to 
specify the limits to what we can and what we 
want to do. 
I see that the Rapporteur in fact shares the fear 
I expressed during the discussion of the first part 
of his report. I asked him then if we still had 
enough time to draw up a European security 
charter of this kind. I could now put this 
question again in the light of the proposal for a 
summit conference and in the light of interna-
tional developments, which include the stream 
of proposals pouring in on us from both the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Do we have 
time to think about a European security charter, 
while developments may be proceeding without 
our knowledge? I do not think that should be 
allowed to happen, in other words that we should 
be able to exert as much influence as possible on 
our allies in the United States. So I am pleased 
with the statements we find in the report that 
President Reagan himself has recognised that 
Western European Union does not want to 
develop activities without NATO and outside 
NATO, but genuinely intends to maintain the 
goal of unanimity among the allies. This means 
that the sensitive reactions in the United States 
are now probably a thing of the past. But I think 
it would be a good thing - I ought really to be 
saying this to the Council of Ministers - if we 
made a clear reference to this statement by Pres-
ident Reagan in the NATO consultations, so as 
to avoid a recurrence of the misunderstandings 
that have occurred in the past. 
My next point concerns the question of 
enlargement. Mr. Ahrens knows that I feel an 
early decision should be taken on Portugal's 
application. I believe Portugal is entitled to that. 
We agreed on this in the General Affairs Com-
mittee and at the Assembly's session in Luxem-
bourg. 
As for the other European NATO countries, I 
should like to make it absolutely clear once again 
that on tactical and also on practical grounds I 
think it would be better for the Council first to 
finish off its work on the reactivation decisions 
and then to consider the undoubtedly difficult 
and complex questions arising in connection 
with the further enlargement of WEU. 
Mr. President, let me conclude by saying that 
in the play of political forces between the two 
superpowers, where world peace and security are 
at stake, Europe - if I may put it this way - has 
always played a rather subordinate role because 
it is itself divided. Time grows short. This means 
that we in Europe must first reach agreement and 
speak with one voice, in NATO, for example. 
Only then can there also be a major 
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improvement in the atmosphere between the 
Council of Ministers and the Assembly. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Irmer. 
Mr. IRMER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and 
gentlemen, only when we take a closer look at the 
title of the report we are discussing today, " The 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance", and 
especially the subtitle, " Political activities of the 
Council", do we begin to appreciate what has 
been achieved here in both respects: nothing at 
all. The previous speaker put it very forcibly: it 
says here that we protest against the report 
appearing so late; we regret that the Council has 
not done this and that. This is a shameful and in 
fact a shocking result. 
The Rapporteur, Mr. Ahrens, cannot be 
blamed in any way. Quite the contrary. He has 
endeavoured with a great deal of commitment to 
make the best of this lamentable situation, but 
what is a rapporteur to do in a position like this? 
I feel this regrettable situation should make us 
think very carefully about two things. First, what 
do we want? What is our task? Second, what 
instruments, what resources do we have at our 
disposal for performing this task? Our task is 
clear. We want a common European defence 
policy within the NATO alliance. That is an 
urgent need, because it is unacceptable that the 
European voice should be heard as little within 
NATO as it is at present. We undoubtedly have a 
wide range of security interests in common with 
our American partners. But there are also large 
areas where our interests differ. 
Take the geographical situation. We naturally 
view a conflict in the Mediterranean, like the one 
involving Libya in April of last year, completely 
differently from the citizens of the United States. 
Europeans attach more importance to the con-
flict in the Middle East, simply because of its 
geographical proximity, than do the Americans. 
Let us imagine Pershing missiles deployed at the 
gates of Stuttgart and Amsterdam. This would 
affect our citizens quite differently from the cit-
izens of Chicago or San Francisco. 
But what are we Europeans doing in this situ-
ation? We are squabbling and failing to agree. If 
the American President wants to know what the 
Europeans are thinking, he cannot ring up one 
office or one president and say: "Mr. President, 
what would the Europeans like?" No, he has to 
make ten, twelve, fourteen, sixteen telephone 
calls. He has to ask ten, twelve, fourteen, sixteen 
times: " How would the Europeans like this? " 
He then gets ten, twelve, fourteen, sixteen dif-
ferent answers from which to elicit what the 
Europeans want. This is a hopeless situation. 
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What does the American President do? What 
would any sensible person do in his place? He 
does what he thinks right and the Europeans are 
left empty-handed. 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, that is 
the outcome of the present situation. I am exag-
gerating slightly, but in principle the fact is that 
we are becoming more or less friendly satellites 
of our allies. But that is not how it should be. We 
Europeans must analyse and define our security 
interests and then decide what we are aiming at. 
We must make a point of our European interests 
in the alliance. We are as far removed from that 
situation as we have ever been, and I find myself 
wondering why. It may be that we have the 
wrong institutions and that we have in the end 
accepted the fragmentation of the institutions we 
happen to have. 
Yesterday the Rapporteur, Mr. Ahrens, said -
rightly if we consider the legal side - that respon-
sibility for defence matters rests with WEU, not 
with the European Community. That is correct. 
But then, ladies and gentlemen, we should ask 
ourselves ifWEU, at least in its present state and 
with its present structure, is the appropriate 
political body for actually developing a common 
European defence policy, even though that is 
legally its responsibility. The recommendation 
from the General Affairs Committee is indic-
ative: it calls for a conference which would not 
be confined to WEU's present members but 
would, sensibly, extend beyond them. When I 
consider European security and defence policy, I 
should like the Danes to have just as much of a 
say as the Portuguese. Why should consideration 
be given here to the security interests of the Bel-
gians or the Germans or the Italians, but not to 
those ofthe other European members ofNATO? 
It does not make sense. It is therefore necessary 
to question whether WEU, with its present 
structure, is not in urgent need of enlargement if 
it is to meet its responsibilities. 
There is a second point I should like to raise. 
What does this Assembly do? It can complain. It 
can lament. It can provide valuable impetus. But 
does it exercise the slightest vestige of control? 
This goes right back to the roots of our authority. 
Which of us - there may be certain exceptions: 
our past President, Mr. Caro, for example, who 
was undoubtedly helped in his election to his 
national parliament by the fact that he was Pres-
ident of this Assembly, and the same may also be 
true of our new President, Mr. Goerens - but 
which ofus ordinary members was elected to his 
national parliament because he also has a seat in 
this Assembly? Which of us thinks, when pre-
paring for re-election, that his activities here 
might have any particular part to play? No, we 
are elected as national representatives. When the 
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decision is taken, the focus is on national 
problems. We sit here by indirect right, deriving 
from our democratic legitimation elsewhere. 
This, of course, hampers us in the proper ful-
filment of our responsibilities. 
There is another thing - and I am grateful that 
the previous speaker referred to it: how are we to 
cope with the workload? We have duties to dis-
charge in our national parliaments. I have to 
return to Bonn this evening, I cannot stay here 
until the end. On Thursday, our Federal Chan-
cellor is making a government statement which 
is being prepared in the committees. Excessive 
work is preventing us from meeting the responsi-
bilities we have here. 
As I said, the European institutions are frag-
mented. On the one hand, we have the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 
which is responsible for human rights, the envi-
ronment, culture, all the finer things in life. On 
the other hand, we have the European Par-
liament, which, according to what Mr. Ahrens 
said yesterday, is really responsible only for eco-
nomic questions. That has changed. The single 
European act has formalised what the European 
Parliament has been doing in recent years. It has 
been made partly responsible for foreign policy, 
for what used to be known as European political 
co-operation. But I ask you: how can European 
political co-operation or European foreign policy 
be separated from security and defence policy? It 
is surely logical that, in implementing the single 
European act, the European Parliament should 
also concern itself with defence policy, and it has 
increasingly been doing so since it was directly 
elected. I would remind you of Mr. Haagerup's 
report, drawn up as long ago as 1981, and of Mr. 
Klepsch's report, both of which concern aspects 
of European defence policy. 
Here we sit, in the WEU Assembly, with no 
power and no authority and we are supposed to 
do something in this small sector of defence 
policy. That is surely impossible. How are we to 
formulate defence policy without discussing 
unemployment, the economic structure and all 
the political interrelationships in Europe as well? 
I urge that we seriously consider whether the 
instruments available in Europe are in fact still 
sufficient, given the present structure, to deal 
with the problems. I believe that we in this 
Assembly should also say very loudly and clearly 
that we must work towards a European union 
with full powers in the political sector, without 
omitting or excluding any areas. From this it 
must logically follow that a democratically legiti-
mated assembly can spur on the Council of Min-
isters, check its activities, and force it to do 
certain things, namely and in particular, seri-
ously to address the pressing political 
problems. 
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It is easy for the Council of Ministers, of 
course. It is always the same people who -
wearing different hats - meet both here and 
there. They meet at different places and perhaps 
under different chairmen, but the same ministers 
who form the European Community's Council 
also form WEU's Council. The same people 
meet again when the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe sits. But the assemblies are 
split and have no power. 
Ladies and gentlemen, I recently made the sug-
gestion - and I will conclude with this - that we 
might consider whether the tasks incumbent on 
us here could not be assigned to the members of 
the European Parliament who represent the 
member countries of WEU though this would 
entail an amendment to the treaty. They are 
always meeting. They have far more time for this 
work than we have. They are directly elected and 
have a direct mandate relating to European unifi-
cation. But we are drawn from our national par-
liaments and do our work here on the side, as it 
were. 
I realise it is rather unusual for a member to 
question his own position and his own authority. 
It would mean no one would come here unless 
he happened to have a seat in the European Par-
liament as well. But to be logical, and in view of 
the work that needs to be done, I feel we should 
give some thought to this proposal, or at least 
consider whether a first step could not be taken 
here. 
Finally, I want to say that the development of 
a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance has pri-
ority. Our peoples want it and our governments 
say they want it. In fact, everybody wants it. 
Why does it not come about? WEU's Council 
has done nothing to achieve it, or, if it has done 
anything, we have heard nothing about it. And 
that in itself is a scandal, ladies and gen-
tlemen. 
This Assembly must insist with all its might on 
the development of further initiatives here. We 
must have no taboos. We must ask ourselves: is 
WEU, and especially this Assembly, the right 
body? I think not. We must develop into a 
European union with comprehensive powers. 
Then the institutions and instruments at our dis-
posal will be capable of dealing with this great 
task. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Eisma. 
Mr. EISMA (Netherlands) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, I want to compliment Mr. Ahrens on 
his report. Although it is a small step, it is a 
further step in the direction of a European pillar 
of the Atlantic Alliance, designed to maintain 
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security in Europe. I will just say a few words 
about Mr. Ahrens's recommendations. 
He proposes a conference of heads of gov-
ernment, which is rather like Mr. De Decker's 
proposal. I understand that Mr. Ahrens also 
wants to involve the countries which have 
applied to join WEU. I shall touch on this point 
in a moment. It is also similar to the proposal 
Mr. Delors made a few months ago when he 
wanted to organise a summit conference on 
European security questions following Mr. 
Gorbachev's proposals. 
In connection with Mr. Irmer's statement I 
note that the European Community will ulti-
mately be the political forum for security 
matters. The new single European act is a small 
step forward in this respect, but for the time 
being we still depend on Western European 
Union when we are discussing European 
security. Countries such as Ireland are also 
members of the European Community, occupy-
ing a special position and for the moment pre-
venting the Community from saying anything 
definite about security problems. I would say to 
Mr. Irmer that we must regard WEU as a staging 
post. It comprises seven members, who are all 
members of the Atlantic Alliance and also of the 
European Community. If these seven members 
can regularly say something unequivocal about 
the European pillar of security policy - and we 
regularly do our best in this respect here - the 
activities of this union of seven members can, as 
it were, be " slotted in " to the European Com-
munity, with its twelve members. I see this as a 
phased process. My party believes that WEU has 
a role to play for the time being. 
To revert to Mr. Ahrens's proposal, he wants a 
major summit conference of the heads of gov-
ernment. I feel it is still rather too soon for that. 
The same applies to Mr. Delors's proposal. We 
must take care not to put forward proposals 
which are not feasible. The establishment of a 
European security charter is, of course, central to 
the agenda again for this summit conference. If 
we put this subject on the agenda prematurely for 
so serious an event as a summit conference, we 
must remember that on 28th April the ministers 
of defence and foreign affairs did not find it pos-
sible to issue a statement on a European security 
charter. We must therefore be very careful about 
saddling another body with this subject. Very 
careful preparations must be made. First of all, 
the defence and foreign ministers must agree on 
substantive improvements within Western 
European Union. If this is not done, the kind of 
summit conference that is proposed will simply 
be counter-productive. 
I am also interested in Mr. Ahrens's reaction 
to the idea that all the countries applying for 
membership of WEU should now be involved in 
a summit conference of this kind. Mr. Ahrens is 
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thinking of Portugal in this context, but it is dif-
ficult to single out Portugal from among the 
countries which have so far applied for mem-
bership: Spain, Greece and Portugal. Why invite 
only Portugal to this summit conference? Why 
not the other two countries? We must be very 
careful about taking a decision on this before it 
has been officially established who is to become 
a member of Western European Union. Let us 
not forget that the European Community is proof 
that excessively rapid enlargement can be 
counter-productive. We must first put our own 
house, with its seven countries, in order. We 
should be warned against too early a decision. As 
the British say: you can take a horse to the water 
but you cannot make it drink. This must be our 
motto when we talk about organising new 
summit conferences. 
It was decided in the General Affairs Com-
mittee this morning that a colloquy would be 
held at the beginning of March next year. We are 
very much in favour of this. This is the occasion 
when applicant countries can make their views 
known. We must gather together the right people 
at the right time, but we must ensure that the 
defence and foreign ministers first prepare the 
European security charter. Only if the prepar-
atory work is done is there any guarantee that a 
future summit conference has a chance of 
success. If we hold a summit conference prema-
turely I believe it will be a fiasco. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Baumel. 
Mr. BAUMEL (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, ladies and gentlemen, with Bonn's 
approval of the zero-zero option Europe has sur-
rendered completely. After much talking 
between governments, experts and military tech-
nologists the western response on European mis-
siles is now virtually decided and our debate has 
lost much of its significance. Without enthu-
siasm and ingloriously the Atlantic Alliance is 
going to accept the deal proposed by Mr. Reagan 
and Mr. Gorbachev. For many Europeans this 
amounts to an act of resignation. Following the 
shock of Reykjavik the Europeans see them-
selves caught in the trap of the first zero-zero 
option unwisely suggested by themselves some 
years previously in the hope that it would be 
turned down by the USSR, and they now see Mr. 
Gorbachev putting forward exactly the same idea 
- one might also say the trap - and gaining the 
initiative through a series of increasingly sur-
prising and clever proposals aimed at winning 
over the general public who always want peace 
from their leaders. 
The paradox is that NATO is liable to deprive 
itself of the good missiles in its arsenal while 
retaining the bad, thereby relinquishing the 
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weapons which could protect us and maintain 
our ability to attack Soviet territory. All those 
who are rushing to accept these proposals fail to 
realise that by doing so they are depriving us of 
our ultimate weapon with whic.h we could launch 
operations against Soviet territory from 
Europe. 
This is the reason why the USSR has done 
everything to bring about the withdrawal of the 
Pershing lis which are alone capable of reaching 
Soviet territory and has displa)led in its efforts a 
determination and strength of will which I 
should very much like to see on the western side. 
The resulting paradox is that we shall grad-
ually find ourselves in a naked and empty 
Europe between two imposing arsenals which 
will remain untouched, because our dear 
European pacifists, the " greens " and the neu-
tralists who are campaigning for the zero and 
zero-zero options and the rest fail to say a word 
about the 12 000 Soviet missiles which will not 
be touched or about the thousands of missiles 
which will continue their existence inside the 
American fortress. The result will be a Europe 
virtually stripped of defence between two super-
powers which will increasingly exercise their 
strategic and nuclear condominium throughout 
the world. 
Is that what the Europeans want ? What an 
abdication! What a historic opportunity of 
keeping a capacity for European action will be 
lost. 
What is needed is what Europe lacks -
political will and a determination to defend 
itself, but the fact is that for the last twenty years 
there have been three kinds of Europeans: those 
who wish to defend themselves, those who wish 
to be defended by the Americans without any 
effort on their part and those who wish to do 
nothing but live peacefully in a sort of neutral 
oasis. 
In this situation, we must ask ourselves some 
questions as it is clear that no one can be 
opposed to disarmament measures provided 
they are verifiable and balanced. However, the 
problem of real and genuine verification is 
wholly unresolved. 
The paradox is that we are going to eliminate 
Europe's nuclear weapons and so leave the 
Warsaw Pact with its crushing superiority in con-
ventional forces. 
As the zero and zero-zero options are under 
discussion, why do the western allies not suggest 
a triple zero option? The third zero would cover 
tank divisions, conventional weapons and air-
craft. When discussions are taking place on the 
removal from Europe of the American missiles 
which alone gave us the absolute assurance of 
security why not add to the disarmament agenda 
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the unbelievable Soviet superiority in conven-
tional forces which, in the absence of American 
or European missiles, will expose Europe to very 
grave danger? The fact is that for thirty years our 
state of equilibrium has been the result of a 
double imbalance with a nuclear imbalance in 
favour of the West. That will be lost. 
Europeans cannot fail to be surprised by the 
present enthusiasm of the two superpowers for 
the disappearance of European nuclear weapons 
leaving, as Mr. Raimond, the French Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, has pointed out, a very large 
number of nuclear warheads in the United States 
and the Soviet Union. 
The elimination of the American missiles sta-
tioned in the west of the continent will not stop 
Europe being threatened by the 11 000 Soviet 
nuclear warheads facing Western Europe and 
capable of delivery with an accuracy which has 
been greatly improved in recent years. 
We are in a completely contradictory situ-
ation. The Europeans are accepting proposals 
which mean the denuclearisation of Europe, or 
in plain terms its political demise followed by its 
strategic nullification, but at the same time they 
are not uttering a word about the other imbal-
ances menacing Europe or about the need to 
reinforce conventional forces, as the response 
that can be made to the tragic reduction of 
nuclear forces in Europe is to strengthen the 
West's conventional armaments. 
But which government and which parliamen-
tarian in this Assembly will dare suggest that 
their parliament should double or treble defence 
budgets to enable the West to restore the balance 
at a time when Europe is affiicted by unem-
ployment, recession and inflation? 
It is therefore Utopian to believe that we shall 
be better able to defend Europe without nuclear 
missiles and without making the slightest addi-
tional effort with regard to our land forces and 
weapons systems, particularly as the proposals 
from some quarters for the development of intel-
ligent electronic weapons systems are extremely 
costly and will find acceptance nowhere. 
That is why we think that our present situation 
is a matter for the gravest concern, and we must 
sadly admit that since Reykjavik Europe has 
probably failed to measure up, as it should and 
could have done, to the demands of one of the 
last great moments in history. It has failed to do 
so because it has been unable to establish a 
common position. One after the other the 
European nations, with the exception of France, 
have given way. For the sake of good relations 
with our German neighbour, France did not set 
out clearly, officially and publicly its deeply held 
convictions. It tried at any cost to reach 
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agreement to co-operate between itself and 
Germany, and the result is disappointing as Mr. 
Kohl has wholly accepted the proposals from the 
East. 
In this situation we feel that we should try to 
begin at the bottom, that is to say with the elimi-
nation of weapons liable to turn Europe into a 
nuclear battlefield while retaining a reduced 
number of missiles of greater deterrent potency 
which can be targeted on the only country where 
any decision to start a war would be taken - the 
Soviet Union. 
Instead of this we are witnessing, as I 
remarked just now, the immunisation of Soviet 
territory thus leaving Europe exposed to the full 
gamut of aggression and threats. In this tragic 
scenario we might at least have hoped to see a 
clearer display of European solidarity, but alas 
Reykjavik was followed not by a backlash but by 
moaning and groaning. 
Paris is therefore in an awkward situation, as 
we have our own individual, independent 
attitude to this security and defence problem. We 
believe, I think, that the minimum response in 
present circumstances would be for us to stop 
protesting ineffectually against what cannot be 
changed and for the European governments to 
approve a safeguarding statement, taking note of 
the forthcoming agreement but reserving our 
future position by stating clearly that it concerns 
only American weapons, and those in Europe in 
particular, but not any which might be available 
to the Europeans today or tomorrow, assuming 
that European defence could one day become a 
reality. Such an initiative would be theoretical at 
the moment, but it would leave the door open 
for the European defence which must at some 
time be envisaged. 
In circumstances of necessity and growing dif-
ficulty there is no option for Europe but to direct 
its thoughts, not to the celebrated European 
pillar which has been talked about for years but 
only exists in the imagination of some, but to the 
basis of action for the practical defence ofEurope 
founded largely on the will of the powers deter-
mined to defend themselves, which are essen-
tially the Federal Republic of Germany with its 
conventional army, the United Kingdom with its 
forces and France. 
These are the three factors essential for the 
defence of Europe. 
I have no wish to hurt anyone, especially not 
our friends and allies, but it is true that the real 
defence of Europe is largely dependent on these 
three conventional, naval and nuclear arsenals. 
An effort must be made to do something, 
whatever the cost. 
Perhaps we can hope that something will be 
done within WEU. Listening to the Secretary-
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General yesterday I felt great admiration for the 
optimistic and evocative way in which he pre-
sented our activities. I am very sorry to tell him 
that to outside opinion and to the press, which 
devotes only a few lines to our debates, Western 
European Union appears more like a puppet 
theatre than a political and military head-
quarters. 
I therefore believe that we should think deeply 
about what is to happen next. What has been 
done belongs to the past. Let us be realistic - all 
is not lost. It is our strength of will, our actions 
and above all the support of public opinion 
which will prevent Europe being the principal 
victim of what are now called " the new 
East-West relations". 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Muller. 
Mr. MULLER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and 
gentlemen, I should first like to thank Mr. 
Baumel for the description he has just given. He 
has put his finger on various sores that are 
causing us a good deal of pain at the moment. 
The fact that we are now discussing a report 
entitled " The European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance " means that the whole thing can only 
be considered in a very euphemistic light, 
because there is precious little evidence of a 
pillar. It is crumbling everywhere. The 
description seems to have more to do with relics 
than reality. 
So here we are, standing once again - I repeat, 
once regain - at the Wailing Wall when we see 
that the Council of Ministers is not giving us any 
answers, that no action is taken, that announce-
ments are not followed up. You will recall the 
great meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers 
in Venice last year, where they were closely 
guarded from the air, from the sea, from all sides, 
though I really have no idea why, because it was 
a media event, not a political event for which 
guards would have been needed. When you see 
all this, you are bound to get the impression that 
Europe has no problems, that Europe takes vital 
decisions on disarmament questions, that our 
security is absolutely guaranteed. Otherwise the 
ministers could not have behaved in the dilet-
tante way they have for the last few years. 
We all know that the real situation is quite dif-
ferent. We know that the fulcrum of world poli-
tics has long since moved away from Europe. It 
was once around the Mediterranean basin, then 
it moved to the Atlantic area, between the 
United States and Europe and it is now shifting 
to the Pacific region. Europe is becoming 
peripheral and no longer has any idea of its pos-
sible significance. 
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Added to this, at the meeting in Reykjavik and 
what followed, the two superpowers, the United 
States and the Soviet Union, have evidently 
resumed a policy which in some ways reminds 
me of Yalta, the meeting that took place at the 
end of the second world war, where Roosevelt 
and Stalin made decisions on Europe. There was 
only one real expert on Europe taking part in this 
dialogue, and that was Mr. Stalin, while Mr. 
Roosevelt was largely sustained by illusions, as 
they very soon proved to be after 1945, when any 
hopes of creating new democracies - for instance 
in Eastern Europe - were dashed. This situation 
ought really to make any responsible European 
politician stop and think and cause him to do all 
he can to secure a joint European geo-political 
initiative, particularly on defence policy, by at 
least a given number of key countries in 
Europe. 
At this point I should like to make a few com-
ments on what Mr. Irmer said just now about the 
role of this Assembly. He believes that the 
European Parliament could, in principle, 
perform this Assembly's function. In theory, I 
agree with him, but I doubt if it is possible in 
practice, ladies and gentlemen, because the 
European Parliament is a very much larger 
creature - if I may put it that way - than the 
WEU Assembly. Although the European Par-
liament is directly elected, it has no power, as we 
know. The people there cannot even solve the 
problem of farm prices, so how do they expect to 
solve the problem of European defence? I believe 
that if anything is counter-productive to the 
European idea, it is the European Parliament. 
We shall see this borne out at the next direct 
elections to the European Parliament, when 
probably not even half the population of the 
Federal Republic will cast their votes, because 
they are not prepared to commit themselves to 
something which is basically impotent. The 
outcome of this development is that the coun-
tries associated for defence purposes in WEU 
must again become one, effectively operative 
element. We have gone on and on complaining. 
We have uttered warnings, which had no effect, 
but perhaps for once some eyes will be 
opened. 
I have a few words to say about the 
enlargement ofWEU. Personally, I am extremely 
sceptical about this. When I look at the European 
Community, for example, I observe that its 
enlargement has not strengthened the European 
idea. Imagine the European Community being 
expected to speak with a single voice on foreign 
and defence policy issues: with Greece there, and 
Ireland, and France, and the Federal Republic. 
The situation would be far more complicated in 
the European Community than it is with the 
seven countries who have joined together to 
form Western European Union. Hence my reite-
rated objection to enlarging this nucleus of the 
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Seven in the beliefthat the more members it has, 
the more powerful this organisation will be. 
I believe the opposite is more likely to be true. 
The nucleus that still exists here and was created 
after the second world war on the basis of the 
Brussels Treaty on quite specific grounds should 
be revealed again, and it should be made clear 
with the modified Brussels Treaty what its real 
task has always been. 
The great risk we face - Mr. Baumel has 
addressed this issue with his comments on the 
double zero option - is that the special situation 
of Europe's defence should be decoupled from 
the United States. This danger, this threat to 
Europe can only be overcome if Europe has the 
political will to recall its own strength - and 
perhaps its own weakness, too - in defence 
policy matters; to recognise it and to attempt 
from this position to take initiatives, rather than 
always looking to Big Brother in Washington and 
expecting him, as it were, to pull Europe's 
chestnuts out of the fire. We Europeans have 
failed dismally, especially in the last few days 
and weeks and months. 
Mr. Baumel said just now in connection with 
Reykjavik that Europe had failed to measure up 
to the demands of one of the last great moments 
in history. I do not want to leave it at these fine 
literary phrases. I could quote Bismarck, who 
spoke of the cloak of history which can only be 
grasped once as it passes by. My view is not as 
literary as this, but I should like to point out that 
in recent weeks and months it has been Europe 
that has not recognised the signs of the times, 
that it has been the statesmen of Europe - and I 
would include the French President, because Mr. 
Baumel talked so much about French policy -
who, far from keeping an eye on the cloak of 
history, have kept it on the cloaks of the tele-
vision editors and the media, because it is they 
who largely determine the climate of public 
opinion today. The politicians no longer call the 
tune, on the contrary, they follow where the 
media lead. 
The great danger I see today is that, if the pillar 
we were talking about continues to crumble, and 
more and more sand runs out of it, the whole 
European idea could be at risk, in some countries 
at least. I will not conceal my grave concern 
about my own country, the Federal Republic, 
where more and more people can be heard saying 
that there should be a separate German way, 
there should perhaps be a chance now of 
achieving reunification in the context of a debate 
on disarmament, and the Soviet Union, which 
has pursued a strategic policy in Europe for 
decades, might be tempted to put out some lime 
twigs on which one bird or another might 
settle. 
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Ladies and gentlemen, no one who considers 
European policy and the role of Russia - I 
repeat, Russia - in European policy in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries can deny that 
there has been some continuity in this policy, 
irrespective of whether it has been a foreign 
policy determined by the Czar or by the Bol-
sheviks. I believe that we, who are also a com-
ponent part of European policy, should regard 
these European policy trends as a reason for con-
sidering how we can regain our own positions, 
how we can secure Europe - Europe, which 
means so much to world democracy and freedom 
and to human rights - in such a way that its 
independence is preserved. 
I have one more thing to say in conclusion 
about Mr. Ahrens's report. Of course I welcome 
a colloquy of this kind. Of course I hope that 
something positive will come of this colloquy or 
summit meeting, or whatever it may be called. 
But I must say this: we do not have much time 
left to try and find something we could do. It is 
not five minutes to midnight but only a few 
seconds to midnight, ifl may put it that way. I 
can only hope that the events of the past few 
weeks will have opened the eyes of various 
people in the ministries to a need that has now 
become urgent. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Frederic Bennett. 
This is a particularly important occasion as Sir 
Frederic is taking the floor for the last time in 
our Assembly. 
On behalf of the Assembly I thank you, Sir 
Frederic, for all you have done for the Assembly 
in so many capacities, in committees, the Presi-
dential Committee and within the Assembly 
itself. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). -
Thank you, Mr. President, for that unexpected 
and unrequested courtesy and privilege, which I 
much appreciate. 
This is my valedictory speech in the Assembly. 
I have served here constantly for well over a 
decade and, whatever the result of the elections 
in the United Kingdom on 11th June, I shall not 
again be able to address the Assembly as I do 
today. 
You, Mr. President, have been good enough to 
grant me the opportunity to make a few personal 
remarks. That enables me to thank or congra-
tulate a number of people. 
First, I congratulate you, Mr. President, on 
your election. I wish you a successful three years. 
They will not be easy but I am sure that you have 
the courage to use them wisely. I pay tribute to 
our outgoing President, Mr. Caro, who has 
looked after WEU and changed it from the insig-
nificant entity that it was when he took office. 
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Whether it is achieving the right measure of con-
fidence and support from governments is 
another thing. However, Mr. Caro has done what 
he can to bring the WEU Assembly alive again 
even if he has not altogether succeeded in con-
veying the same sense of importance and 
urgency to the member governments, or at least 
some of them. 
I should like to say what a happy period it has 
been for me working with the Secretary-General 
on the other side of the road with whom I have 
enjoyed a relationship unusual for a parliamen-
tarian with an official. There was complete confi-
dence and we have worked quietly together to try 
to further aims which, even if he cannot say so 
publicly, I know he has in his heart for the well-
being of the Assembly. 
I have been touched by the messages I have 
received, not only from political groups but else-
where, and the friendship it has been possible for 
me to enjoy from so many colleagues of different 
political parties as well as my own and my allies. 
I should like to recall the time I went to Beijing 
and my hand was completely squashed in a large 
Mercedes-Benz by an over-zealous Chinese 
guard. It was a communist colleague who undid 
the door, took me in and bathed my hand and 
gave me a large vodka. One cannot expect any 
better tribute than that. 
It would be invidious to run through the 
names of the staffbut, because of my most active 
membership of the General Affairs Committee, I 
owe a great deal to Mr. Burgelin, who provides 
for us a unique service in having to supervise, 
look after and guide reports emanating from so 
many different political and national sources. He 
will be one ofthose who will live in my memory. 
The same applies to Mr. Borcier, who is himself 
nearing retirement and who has done his best to 
obtain publicity for an organisation that too 
often has not deserved it through its own fault. 
Nevertheless, he has striven hard to obtain that 
help for us. 
Finally - I hope that my Prime Minister is not 
listening - I want to thank someone who does a 
lot of work and whom I regard as the most com-
petent and efficient person I have ever met. That 
is why I hope that the Prime Minister is not lis-
tening. Maureen Basse does a wonderful job here 
quietly and without causing trouble for anybody. 
There I must end my list for reasons of brevity 
but I want to thank all the members of the staff 
in that respect. 
I now turn to the substance of my speech. I 
happen to think along lines similar - that is for-
tunate because it does not always happen - to 
those of the two preceding speakers. I do not 
usually read speeches: in fact I have never done 
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so before - I suppose that that results from my 
training as a barrister in England. However, 
today I shall largely read the valedictory speech I 
made in Strasbourg on East-West relations 
simply and solely because, if I may say so with 
conceit, I have read through it several times and 
do not think that I could say it any better, even 
after reflection. 
I believe that Europe today, as a result of Mr. 
Gorbachev's various initiatives, is in a highly 
dangerous situation. His various initiatives, 
whatever else they have done, have so far acted 
as a divisive force within Europe and across the 
Atlantic. Whether that is deliberate, conscious or 
unavoidable is not for me to say but is for the 
future to decide. It is neither warmongering nor 
anti-peace to tell the truth as I see it. For my 
part, at my age, I have to remember other voices 
and other rooms. There were many in the 1930s 
who were called warmongers when they warned 
of the dangers ahead deriving from an imperi-
alist Nazi power. The most costly war in history 
in blood and misery ensued as a result of taking 
at face value those who said they had no 
intention of in any way expanding their terri-
torial ambitions in Europe. We know what hap-
pened as a result. 
We who are critical of Mr. Gorbachev's inten-
tions are often told that we are being unrea-
sonable and should not expect the Soviet 
Kremlin and Mr. Gorbachev to dismantle the 
whole Russian Soviet system merely to please us 
in the liberal pluralist democracies. We know 
that he will not do that and it is unreasonable to 
ask him to do it because it would be an act of 
political and economic suicide for him to 
undertake. None of us should expect him so to 
do and it would result in failure. However, those 
of us who are cynics are not asking that. We are 
not asking Mr. Gorbachev and his colleagues to 
alter the economic and important social system 
but simply to cease doing things that cannot be 
said to be an essential part of any socialist or 
Marxist philosophy anywhere. We are not asking 
him to do anything about internal policies that 
would be or could be regarded as interference by 
him in the internal, economic or social attitudes 
of another power. 
We are asking simply for a fuw negative things. 
We are asking him to do things that will not 
harm in any way the internal structure of the 
Soviet Union and the political system that cur-
rently obtains there. For exam.ple, we are asking 
him to cease repressing freedom of all expression 
and outlook in the satellite states. It is not part of 
a Marxist creed to use military power to repress 
freedom of expression in other countries. We are 
asking him to stop financing Cuban mercenary 
forces dedicated, admittedly and openly, to 
destabilising countries in South America, Central 
America, South Asia and Africa. 
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We are also asking him to use his power to dis-
mantle the infamous Berlin wall, which some of 
us visited recently, and where 75 victims have 
now been scored and have been shot for trying to 
escape from what is described on the media and 
in propaganda as a Russian-dominated paradise 
into what is described in some sections of the 
media as the capitalist hell that obtains in the 
West. Yet these men, women and children have 
been shot for no greater sin than trying to leave a 
situation that they find unendurable. It cannot 
be to condemn the political philosophy of the 
Soviet Union to ask it to cease doing things of a 
barbarity practically unexampled in history. 
There is a long list, but I shall mention only 
one more. We are asking Mr. Gorbachev, above 
all, to stop talking about what his intentions are, 
backed up by certain optimistic elements in the 
media. We are asking him simply to cease 
slaughtering and torturing Afghan peasants and 
people. Is that an unreasonable request if we are 
to believe in his credibility? We are asking really 
for fewer words and more deeds, and I do not 
think that such a demand is wrong, unreasonable 
or the result of a warmongering attitude. 
Let us recall one significant disarmament 
factor. We have enjoyed peace and security in 
Europe by maintaining a unique nuclear 
deterrent and not, as some would have us 
believe, by trying to match levels of conventional 
weapons. I want to recall some history to those 
here today. At the beginning of both the second 
world war and the first world war the two sides 
had a near parity of conventional weapons and 
not the gross imbalance that now exists. 
However, that did not stop those wars. That was 
because there was no unique deterrent. We 
should be asking for a deterrence and not merely 
an adequate means to defend ourselves if 
attacked. That is because we do not want a war 
to happen in which we have to use our deterrent. 
In war, one sort of weapon can be matched 
against another, and to ask for a deterrent is not 
to request the build-up of conventional forces. 
That past has shown that whatever we do in that 
context the existence of rival conventional forces 
does not stop wars. Indeed, the building up of 
conventional weapons has led in the past to the 
starting of wars. 
It seems that once again we are in danger of 
losing our way, despite all the lessons of history, 
by concentrating our energies and efforts on 
improving our defence capacity if and when a 
war breaks out and not on maintaining a 
deterrent. That does not seem to be a very logical 
policy to pursue. 
I should like to recall that we have enjoyed a 
high level of peace and security in Europe. The 
reason for that lies in the unique nuclear 
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deterrent that we have possessed in order to 
prevent wars and because the USSR, although 
militarily enormously powerful, has been eco-
nomically weak. It has been unable out of its 
own resources to feed even its own people. That 
great power that can send people to space still 
has to go into the market to buy food to feed its 
own people. 
I pose a question for all seriously to consider. 
Of course we must welcome what Mr. 
Gorbachev is doing in Russia to improve the 
economy, but are we all sure in our hearts that a 
stronger Russia will be more or less a potential 
danger than the economically weaker one that we 
face now? What lesson in history is there to 
justify the thought that as a great power becomes 
stronger it becomes more peaceably inclined? 
On the other side of the equation, as both Mr. 
Baumel and Mr. Muller have said, there is the 
current situation in the United States. I returned 
depressed from my most recent Council of 
Europe mission to that country, a mission under 
the chairmanship of Mr. Baumel. I was driven to 
the conclusion, although we were told from the 
minute that we landed in Washington until the 
moment that we flew away that European 
security and European freedom were still funda-
mental requirements of American policy, that it 
is difficult to be absolutely sure, whether in terms 
of the Reykjavik summit or those that have 
taken place elsewhere, that these splendid decla-
rations are necessarily to be relied upon in ten 
years' time rather than tomorrow or the next 
day. 
When we talk about arming ourselves we have 
to think what our position will be a decade or 
more from now and not of our position today or 
tomorrow. It would be a brave man who 
declared himself to be absolutely sure what the 
attitude of the United States will be to Europe's 
security a decade or two decades from now. 
Sophisticated technology is improving the 
opportunities of a large sovereign power far away 
to look after its own basic requirements and 
security without going overseas. 
When I was in Washington I came to the con-
clusion that under the surface there was a signif-
icant element in domestic political American 
attitudes to an early arms control agreement that 
had little to do with the needs of European 
security and all too much to do- these are hard 
words but they are correct - with trying to gain a 
political plus for a president and a party in the 
wake of the Irangate scandal. An arms control 
agreement would be one of the most obvious 
ways in which to improve the tarnished prestige 
of America domestically. 
I cannot pretend that I leave this Assembly at 
the end of this sitting with a feeling of happiness 
about Europe. I feel that we shall have to have a 
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complete re-appraisal of Western Europe, the 
heritage of Europe and the responsibilities that 
we shall have to take on if Europe is to look after 
itself, which it will have to do certainly within 
fifteen to twenty years, if not ten. As Mr. Muller 
said, we shall have to kindle that spirit. 
I remain unashamedly a cynic, but an unhappy 
one. I pray that I shall be proved wrong in my 
cynicism. There will be no joy in being able to 
say in a world shattered by the same naivety that 
nearly destroyed us all in the free West in 1939: 
" I told you so. " 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Sir Frederic. Allow me to add that WEU is a 
home where you will always be welcome. 
I call Mr. Caro. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - I am very 
pleased to follow Sir Frederic, whose kind words 
I greatly appreciate. I would like to say again how 
agreeable it has been to work in his company and 
with his collaboration. With his departure the 
Assembly is losing a man of experience, wisdom 
and conviction who fights for the ideas he 
believes in and is reluctant to compromise 
though always ready for collective action with 
respect for the qualities of others provided they 
also respect his. His has been an outstanding 
example of parliamentary behaviour which it is a 
pleasure to recall. We shall remember the 
example he has set and will, I am sure, retain the 
friendship built up with him over the years here 
and in the Council of Europe. Sir Frederic will be 
remembered as one of the outstanding politi-
cians in the history of our Assembly. 
I come now to the report under discussion and 
wish to congratulate the Rapporteur, Mr. 
Ahrens, and say at once that his document has 
my fullest approval. I hope that it will be sup-
ported by the largest possible majority, not only 
for the sake of the political credibility of our 
Assembly in the present challenging circum-
stances but also because of the powerful argu-
ments forming the basis of the proposals pre-
sented to us on behalf of the General Affairs 
Committee. 
Now that I can speak a little more freely and 
with less restraint - although I have sometimes 
gone to the limits of the acceptable - I will say 
that Jacques Delors did well when be suggested a 
European summit on defence problems in the 
context of the Twelve. Jacques Delors saw the 
political situation as it really is and he made his 
proposal firstly because the twelve members of 
the Community are not just any countries but 
countries whose failure to act in political concert 
would jeopardise the Community's future and 
Europe's political organisation. But how is it pos-
sible to talk about European political 
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co-operation if the subject of " defence " is per-
manently excluded. Defence is in fact the foun-
dation for all the conditioned reflexes of national 
foreign policies which cannot be worked out 
jointly without the necessary consultation. 
Jacques Delors was also right' in realising that 
WEU was also failing to move forward. In the 
words of Mr. Muller- what is difficult for twelve 
ought to be easier for seven - and that is what we 
have all invariably been weak enough to believe. 
The Seven were doing nothing, and when 
Jacques Delors said "Action !" the reply was: 
"Impossible. The Treaty of Rome, areas of 
responsibility and some countries, like Ireland, 
virtually rule it out". Broadly speaking, this was 
the line taken by the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Community Council of Ministers, our friend Mr. 
Tindemans. And the answer was: this is a matter 
for WEU. And we agreed, saying to ourselves: 
what a stroke of luck, thanks to Jacques Delors 
and Leo Tindemans WEU is at last going to 
establish its position and international credibility 
at a time when the disarmament debate is 
arousing expectations and questions among 
Europeans. What is Europe going to do? Who is 
to speak for Europe? When and how is this to 
happen? The way ahead seemed clear. 
In the Assembly we did our utmost, in 
agreement with the Council, to speak for Europe, 
and the appreciation expressed to the Luxem-
bourg chairmanship in this connection is no pre-
tence, far from it. But the result has been a 
political agenda crowded with subjects to which 
we are well accustomed. 
Cast your minds back, ladies and gentlemen. 
In 1985 President Reagan's strategic defence ini-
tiative proposal was considered and our govern-
ments decided that there should be a 
co-ordinated European reaction. This was fol-
lowed a week later by unco-ordinated reaction 
and unilateral responses. 
With regard to the disarmament issue which 
we discussed yesterday with the Secretary-
General, it has been difficult for WEU to engage 
in the debate, at least publicly, and the Secretary-
General's replies to the remarks I made to him 
yesterday bear eloquent witness to our con-
tinuing disarray on this fundamental question 
which has meant some inability to engage in 
public collegiate examination and to agree on a 
European position. 
And the issue of terrorism from 1985 to 1986 
is not for us but will be discussed elsewhere - in 
Tokyo or perhaps in the Communities, although 
three successive meetings showed the Council to 
be incapable of dealing with this problem. 
And so we come to 1986-87 with Reykjavik 
and Mr. Gorbachev's famous speech at the end 
of February 1987. Europe remains in a per-
manent dilemma while Mr. Gorbachev asks the 
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Europeans for their response and the United 
States does the same after Mr. Shultz's trip. Both 
parties use the same language, state the same 
requirement and appear for their own individual 
reasons to have a similar timetable. 
We were meeting at that time in Luxembourg, 
and the meetings were happily arranged to 
coincide. What good relations we then had with 
the Council and what an extraordinarily rapid 
link there was between the Council of Ministers 
and the Assembly during those two days of 
intensive work, with the Assembly acting as a 
sounding board for the basic debate on ideas, in 
our role as representatives of the whole range of 
European public opinion with all its trends, 
beliefs and desires. 
An excellent relationship with a Council 
properly under pressure from the Assembly; a 
Council trying with real urgency to respond to 
the Assembly's expectations and letting it be 
known through its Chairman that it has decided 
to do everything possible to achieve a common 
stance on this fundamental aspect of the 
East-West dialogue but this point has not yet 
been reached. 
Let us then follow the historical trend of our 
Assembly, to which some ascribe an authority 
not found elsewhere, an authority essential to the 
great debate of society today, an authority which 
is the very foundation of our various national 
sovereignties and thereafter, if fate allows, of 
what might be European independence and sove-
reignty within a European framework and with 
European principles along lines which it is up to 
us to define having regard to our history, our tra-
ditions and the future we wish to forge. 
If we wish to draw conclusions would it be 
wrong to suppose - and I am not a pessimist -
that, in a situation where our whole political and 
economic environment acknowledges the 
intrinsic and crucial value exclusively vested in 
Western European Union, the fact that nothing 
happens in spite of this is due to the fact no one 
wants anything to happen? As Jacques Baumel 
said a short time ago, and I now repeat in more 
moderate terms, the announcement to Europe of 
the German position on Mr. Gorbachev's double 
zero proposals was conveyed to us parliamen-
tarians and I imagine to you government dele-
gates by this morning's radio and press reports, 
except in the case of those lucky enough to 
receive official despatches. If the spirit of the 
ministerial meeting in Luxembourg had been fol-
lowed, the Council of WEU should have been 
informed first of the position of the Federal 
Republic of Germany so that the other European 
states could be urged to agree a joint European 
position with the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 
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This is indeed our political objective. I will 
even go further, and those who know my phi-
losophy will not be surprised to hear me repeat 
the point. As a Frenchman and deputy for 
Alsace, I tell you that, if we wish to think as 
Europeans and follow a European path, we must 
first think of the possible theatre of operations in 
the event of a war. As a Frenchman and as an 
Alsatian I know I must make an effort - which 
becomes easier with practice - to think like my 
German friends. Until I have fully absorbed the 
attitude of mind and the responses of our 
German friends to the European defence issue I 
shall always fail to get to the truth of the matter. 
They are the first to be exposed, and their nation 
is cut in two. These are problems unknown to us 
which we can and must shoulder with them, and 
as soon as that happens the question moves 
beyond Germany as it moves beyond France 
with its nuclear deterrent and beyond the United 
Kingdom with its nuclear forces into the dimen-
sions of European solidarity. This is the great 
debate awaiting us tomorrow. But there is not 
only Germany on the European political stage; 
there are also France, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium, 
Turkey, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Norway and the 
other nordic countries with which we share a 
common destiny. This is the European option. 
Does that mean that we shall at once 
transform our WEU into a vast forum without 
knowing where we are going? Not at all. I am the 
first to say that if we have a doctrine it is the 
Brussels Treaty. As we asked the Council to 
apply it, let us apply it also in the Assembly. If 
we really wish to concern ourselves with security 
problems we must first make it plain that we are 
capable of defending the principles and funda-
mental conditions of our defence. Once we are 
able to provide for our defence, bearing in mind 
the present changes in the United States 
position, we shall be able to defend a joint 
position on disarmament. 
Joint agencies must operate and be kept 
properly informed. Enlargement is an aspect of 
tomorrow's European Community. 
The European Commission will not meet the 
1992 dateline if a coherent foreign and defence 
policy does not emerge by then, as otherwise the 
essential element will be missing. Even if we are 
not yet ready because of the requirements of 
what I shall term political verification and 
perhaps legal safeguards which are regularly cited 
by the Council, let it not be thought for goodness' 
sake that we are failing to respect Article XI of 
the Brussels Treaty which allows us to open our 
organisation to others. 
Let us not give the impression to Portugal, 
Spain, Greece or Turkey, who have made official 
approaches, or to Norway and Denmark, who 
wish to maintain the closest possible relations 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. Caro (continued) 
with us, that we are excluding these countries 
from co-operation with us on foreign policy and 
defence - issues which are fundamental to a 
coherent European position in the great debate 
and dialogue between continents. 
The whole problem is in essence a problem of 
communication and explaining to the public. All 
I have just said contains nothing novel and 
represents only an attempt to summarise and 
identify the facts as we know them. We are con-
fronted by the global demands of the two super-
powers. The emergence of Europe with its abun-
dance of individual peculiarities and its respect 
for its component states demands that existing 
organisations should function to the best of their 
ability, respecting treaties but trying as far as pos-
sible to embrace every element of the indispen-
sable political will. 
In his report, Mr. Ahrens asks us to take 
another leap forward, and the fact is that reacti-
vation will be brought about by electric shock 
from outside and also by repeated awakening of 
our political conscience. These awakenings lead 
us to demand that our heads of state and 
government define this European presence in the 
great continental dialogue on defence, in con-
junction with all the efforts being made in the 
European Community, to establish our security. 
They lead us to assert Europe's right to speak 
with a single voice. Even if the essential is not 
fully achieved, at least a large step will have been 
taken. We have to change our methods, alter our 
language. It is not fair to leave our peoples con-
stantly at the mercy of an excellently crafted 
speech by that great media manipulator Mr. 
Gorbachev. We must also win minds with 
striking ideas and show that the West and the 
Europeans especially know where they want to 
go. Thanks to public opinion we shall be able to 
make headway against those who wish to reduce 
our influence and launch an attack on us which, 
though not military perhaps, would be liable to 
destroy our determination to build a peaceful 
and organised Europe. 
Ladies and gentlemen, I sincerely hope that 
this report will be approved and that the 
. essential measures are taken after its adoption to 
ensure that governments assist us in the pro-
posed undertaking. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
De Decker. 
Mr. DE DECKER (Belgium) (Translation). -
Ladies and gentlemen, it is very difficult to speak 
after Mr. Baumel, Mr. Muller, Sir Frederic 
Bennett and Jean-Marie Caro in particular. Our 
Assembly may have lost a great president but it 
has gained a great speaker and politician, and I 
wish to thank him for the brilliant European 
speech he has just made. 
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Like General Close, Mr. Baumel and Sir 
Frederic Bennett I would like to say why, in my 
opinion, nothing has changed in Moscow. The 
masters of the Kremlin still have their two major 
objectives: to uncouple the defences of Europe 
and the United States and to weaken Europe. 
When the Soviets deployed their SS-20 mis-
siles, their aim was to uncouple European 
security from that of the United States. Ladies 
and gentlemen, I wish to draw your attention to 
the fact that, when they now propose to 
withdraw their SS-20s in exchange for the with-
drawal of cruise and Pershing missiles, their aim 
continues to be that of uncoupling European 
security from that of the United States. When 
they deployed their SS-20s, they did so in the cer-
tainty and deep conviction that Europe and the 
alliance would be unable to respond to this spe-
cific threat to Western Europ~. 
When we took the twin-track decision in 1979 
and during the next five or six years, they 
gambled that we would lack the political will to 
follow suit by deploying medium-range 
American missiles which coul(l reach Soviet ter-
ritory from Europe. Luckily they were wrong! 
So, when Mr. Gorbachev suggests withdrawing 
his SS-20 missiles against the withdrawal of the 
cruise and Pershing missiles, nothing has 
changed. The purpose of uncoupling us from the 
United States is as obvious and certain as ever. 
Looking at what is now known as the double 
zero option, I rather have the feeling that there is 
one zero too many. We are going to withdraw 
long- and short-range intermediate missiles, and 
I truly believe that in withdrawing the long-range 
INF we are committing a historic mistake for the 
fundamental reason that we shall thereby reduce 
our ability to apply our flexible response strategy 
because there will then be nothing between the 
tactical operational theatre nuclear weapons 
and the strategic intercontinental or submarine-
launched missiles, which are all strategic in 
nature and represent the highest level of the 
flexible nuclear response. The absence of inter-
mediate nuclear weapons between the very-
short-range tactical armaments and the long-
range strategic missiles considerably weakens the 
credibility of the flexible response strategy in 
Europe, and that is very serious. 
There is a zero too many because, as Mr. 
Baumel has very rightly said, we are going to 
commit the terrible mistake of withdrawing 
American weapons stationed in Europe which 
can reach the Soviet Union and can exert 
pressure on the people in Moscow who might 
decide on conflict and take the risk - which we 
all hope they will not take - of a war in Europe. 
So, by withdrawing these weapons we reduce our 
ability to deter the Soviets from entering into a 
European conflict. 
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Mr. De Decker (continued) 
But, as I said, the second Soviet objective is to 
weaken and divide Europe. By withdrawing their 
short-range intermediate missiles they are, of 
course, meeting one of our wishes since when the 
SS-20s were withdrawn we also wanted to see the 
removal of weapons threatening us from closer 
countries like the German Democratic Republic 
and Czechoslovakia - a measure which would 
clearly oblige us to remove our missiles of the 
same type or to undertake not to manufacture 
them. So, as General Close has pointed out, we 
are limiting nuclear forces in Europe to short-
range nuclear weapons stationed solely on the 
territory of the two Germanies. 
It is plainly essential to listen to our German 
friends' views on this subject, but I fear it will 
raise very serious problems of solidarity between 
Germans and non-Germans in the European 
Community, WEU and the alliance. The 
presence of long-range cruise missiles in the five 
countries - comprising not only Germany but 
Benelux, Italy and the United Kingdom - had 
the great advantage of expressing the solidarity 
of the European members of the alliance on the 
defence of our continent. By withdrawing these 
nuclear weapons from our five countries and 
leaving them only in Germany we are rejecting 
such solidarity in the extreme case of a conflict in 
Europe, and that seems to me to be exceedingly 
dangerous. 
I hope that the journalists among us today, 
having heard all this morning's speakers, will 
understand that the WEU Assembly is playing its 
part by treating Mr. Gorbachev's disarmament 
proposals without that naive enthusiasm or weak 
relief to which we are all too accustomed, even 
from our governments. Here, in this parlia-
mentary Assembly which provides a link 
between our governments and public opinion, 
we look upon this double zero option not with 
enthusiasm but with a very great deal of uncer-
tainty and questioning, and as far as I am con-
cerned with a lot of anxiety. 
Ladies and gentlemen, I thank Mr. Ahrens for 
having devoted half his report to the suggestion I 
made in reply to Mr. Delors that a summit of the 
heads of state and government of our seven 
countries should be arranged to produce a 
political response to these questions and queries. 
As Mr. Caro has pointed out, Mr. Delors was 
probably right politically in calling for a summit 
of the heads of state and government of the 
Twelve. As the Twelve co-operate politically it is 
reasonable to hope that one day they may also 
make a s~rious approach to the security policy of 
our contment. 
For the moment, two facts are clear. Firstly, it 
is not permitted by the Treaty of Rome. Sec-
ondly, among the EEC member states one -
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Ireland - is neutral while in others like Greece 
the political situation is in a state of constant 
flux. We know that even if these questions were 
discussed by the Twelve their present political 
situations would make it impossible for the 
European governments to reach a coherent, 
rapid and effective decision on this subject. 
Mr. Martens, the Prime Minister of Belgium 
and Chairman-in-Office of the European 
Council, went to see President Mitterrand after 
Mr. Delors's proposals. At the press conference 
following this meeting at the Elysee their embar-
rassment was obvious. They felt that it would be 
difficult to debate this matter within the 
European Community and felt, intuitively 
perhaps, that the discussion could be more easily 
conducted in WEU. 
I also have the impression that, like the public 
in our countries, our heads of state and gov-
ernment also know too little about WEU. Only 
our ministers for foreign affairs and our defence 
ministers are aware of it. Our heads of state and 
government have never met in their capacity as 
heads of security for the seven member countries 
of Western European Union. 
This was the reason for my letter to Mr. 
Martens. And, in this context, that is why I am 
very pleased that our Assembly, thanks to Mr. 
Ahrens's report and to the work of the com-
mittee chaired by General Close, can today 
endorse the wish for a summit conference of 
heads of state and government as those ulti-
mately responsible for the security of our coun-
tries. 
As Mr. Caro has said, this European security 
conference could review the situation and 
express the wishes of our democratic countries 
for the defence of our liberty and the con-
struction of Europe. 
(Mr. Pecriaux, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Valleix. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, I am tempted to ask whether there is 
anything to add following this morning's sub-
stantial contributions. 
Ladies and gentlemen, we have been wanting 
to reactivate WEU for several years, and we are 
applying ourselves to the task with determi-
nation and dedication. As a result our plenary 
Assembly, especially under Mr. Caro's presi-
dency, "picked up speed" and it is very for-
tunate for Europe that it did so, as it means that 
we have not been entirely left standing by the 
disarmament initiative launched by the Soviet 
Union. 
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However, we have difficulty in keeping up 
with events at the rate at which they are now 
moving. It is clear that our Assembly has trouble 
in keeping abreast of the rapid succession of dis-
armament proposals. 
I note in passing - and it is a point which has 
not been mentioned this morning - the self-
evident historical truth that totalitarian struc-
tures are invariably better placed to take initia-
tives and to engage in political action, and God 
forbid, military action as well, more easily than 
states with a democratic system. The latter have 
to pay attention to public opinion and must act 
with the consent of their citizens. They also have 
to co-ordinate their actions. 
We cannot, for example, fail to notice the con-
trast between our own efforts, however dedicated 
and praiseworthy these may be, and the 
command exercised by the USSR. However, we 
have only one obligation and that is to 
succeed! 
How much more difficult work is on our side! 
A comparison with Mr. Gorbachev's recent per-
formance in Bucharest is revealing. There were 
no reports of debates lasting for hours and hours 
or even days or of any differences of view! These 
are truths which need to be grasped, as in a 
democracy habit sometimes outweighs objec-
tives and values. In this context our habits do 
not always serve us well! 
What is the situation today? 
If you will allow me a paradox, Europe is-
today the battlefield of disarmament. It is an 
unfortunate fact that we do not necessarily hold 
all the trumps or, I repeat, the means of 
responding to the succession of initiatives 
launched by the General Secretary of the Soviet 
Communist Party. 
How do I see the situation? In much the same 
terms as previous speakers. Like Mr. Baumel, 
however, I must stress that in these East-West 
negotiations Europe curiously finds itself, not 
necessarily by choice but as a matter of fact, con-
fronted by solutions which may well be among 
the worst which could have been chosen from its 
point of view. 
But what freedom of choice do we have? There 
lies the drama of our debates and the crux of our 
questionings. With regard to Euromissiles I share 
the views of Mr. Baumel and Mr. De Decker and 
I am afraid we are taking the wrong path. To 
leave Europe to its own devices with a 
denuclearised zone more favourable to the 
Soviet Union than to Europe itself is a great 
danger. It is clear here that the debate is being 
conducted above our heads. Sir Frederic Bennett 
spoke ofYalta, but this is very different as Yalta 
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belongs to the past and, with all the risks that it 
entailed, we have since surprisingly lived in 
peace thanks to the balance of terror. We are 
pleased that attempts are being made to move 
away from this situation, but only on condition 
that a balance is maintained, and that is not 
clearly established. Ultimately by following this 
path we run the risk, from direct negotiations 
between the United States and the USSR, firstly 
of a serious strategic mistake affecting Europe 
and secondly of bringing the i present European 
solidarity into question. This has just been 
pointed out by Mr. De Decker, and I completely 
support his analysis. He referred to the case of 
Germany and its partners and to our own 
attitude which must be one of complete soli-
darity. But is there not some risk in this? If so, 
the USSR has secured a tactical advantage. 
Turning to Euromissiles I am, again, not in 
favour either of the zero option or of the double 
zero option. Mr. Baumel mentioned a triple zero 
option and I would almost say " Why not? " as 
the French positions are very clear. It is obvious 
that these negotiations must be comprehensive 
and must therefore cover the whole range of 
armaments including conventional and chemical 
weapons. If not, they are a snare, and an 
East-West agreement reached over Europe's head 
could produce a Europe which was free but 
exposed to the designs of an eastern power 
nursing imperialistic ambitions. 
There are many questions to be asked about 
the effects and consequences of current develop-
ments. 
In this connection I wish to reassert that 
France, together with the United Kingdom, 
shares its partner's refusal to allow its own 
deterrent force to be included in this external 
debate. This is in the overall West European 
interest. We must therefore keep this deterrent 
force and we must not forget that the current 
negotiations are moving towards the concept of 
creating a sanctuary. Whether on the American 
or Soviet side we must not forget that their unas-
sailable national laboratories and their arsenals 
will remain. Europe must therefore retain this 
deterrent trump card. 
. We are, ladies and gentlemen, confronted by 
this great debate. As I said at the beginning, it 
does not seem to me that we have managed to 
match our pace to that of the successive initia-
tives of the Soviet leader. Our activities do 
include some highly positive elements, especially 
with regard to reactivation, but we must also 
acknowledge the inadequacies of our rate of 
response in relation to current needs. I would 
like to draw attention to what I regard as some 
particularly worrying aspects of the present 
highly dramatic situation and of the combined 
efforts of WEU, the Assembly and the 
Council. 
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With regard to the Assembly, the Council and 
the Secretariat-General, which is its active, hard 
working and trustworthy servant, it is a matter of 
satisfaction that this reactivation brings together 
the will of the Assembly, the proven capabilities 
of the Secretariat-General and, on occasion, 
those of the Council of Ministers, though on 
occasion only. Just as we are passing through a 
crisis in the western world with Europe as the 
battleground of disarmament, we are witnessing 
disengagement from America and may also see 
decoupling within Europe, ifl may so describe it. 
It must be recognised that the two are cumu-
lative. A loosening of the links within Europe can 
only result in a loosening of all the links between 
us and the United States. We have some friendly 
grievances, but grievances just the same to put to 
our American allies. The subject is after all 
serious. Their attitude has changed slightly, as 
they now consult their European partners, who 
still have difficulty, however, in speaking with a 
single voice. The proof is provided by the imme-
diate situation in which it seems that our British 
and German friends are now officially agreed on 
the double zero option, but where are we 
going? 
Mr. Baumel was quite right in saying that the 
very fact that views are expressed here one after 
the other, albeit in a certain order which is liable 
to be changed, is in itself a disturbing feature. It 
means, ultimately, an admission by Europe that 
it cannot speak with one voice. This being the 
case, our Assembly does what it can, but its 
powers are, of course, limited. It draws the 
attention of the Council of Ministers to the 
necessity and urgency of trying to gain control 
over the present developing situation, which has 
not yet run its course but which should, if pos-
sible, be ended by concerted action to halt this 
succession of agreements week after week. 
Imagine for a moment the inner satisfaction 
this gives the Soviet leaders playing the role of 
the cats in this cat and mouse game. This dif-
ficult situation demands that we take urgent 
action to present a more united front. Mr. 
Secretary-General, the Council of Ministers must 
recognise its vital obligation to call a halt to these 
separate pronouncements and a concerted 
position must, if possible, be agreed, even if it 
does embrace different shades of view. That 
would be so much better than a succession of 
responses at sixes and sevens. I am obliged to say 
here that France will obviously not be able to 
adjust its position to the declared views of some 
of its partners. Let there be no decoupling, Mr. 
Secretary-General. It is the unanimous wish of 
the Assembly that these circumstances should be 
the occasion for tightening up WEU's internal 
mechanisms, not with the executive opposed to 
the legislative, but as the expression of our 
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common will to do everything to act in closer 
concert. 
Decoupling - the word can be used at different 
levels - is also liable to occur with the United 
States. Their disengagement from Europe will 
meet with understandable national satisfaction 
among Americans - it will be one burden less. 
There will also be greater indifference to Europe. 
An aeon ago -twenty years -I was received by 
Mr. Sam Yorty, Mayor of Los Angeles. General 
de Gaulle had just made a 
declaration about a certain "Quebec libre" and 
other issues which had raised considerable 
ripples in America of a difficult and diverse char-
acter. The Mayor of Los Angeles explained to me 
that tendentious statements of this kind and a 
personality like General de Gaulle were needed 
to awaken interest over there in what was going 
on in Europe. While that is all very humorous 
and amusing it also means that this reaction seen 
from the Pacific - and America is a continent -
has certain attractions, as Mr. Muller remarked 
just now. I greatly appreciate his geopolitical 
approach and believe that it will prove valid in 
the future. By our cohesion we must counter all 
the results of the current disarmament process in 
terms of the future and psychologically under-
standable American lack of interest in Europe. 
I would finally like to point out that in this 
whole matter there is one thought which is not 
often voiced- what is the objective of the Soviet 
peace effort? In principle the effort can only be 
welcomed if the search is for real peace. The 
peace of deterrence was real, but will the peace of 
disarmament be the same? What is the USSR 
looking for? We must avoid a priori anti-
communism but equally it is our right and duty 
to look at the post-disarmament prospects which 
are being opened up. 
In this area there are only two options. The 
USSR may be sincere in its efforts and capable of 
a controlled quest for peace, in which case the 
world stands to benefit, but we must be careful as 
tsarist imperialism is an old historical tradition, 
as was briefly remarked this morning. Are we not 
now witnessing a kind of historical replay in the 
guise of communist imperialism? Or shall we 
witness a renaissance of imperialism in future 
years - and perhaps faster than we think - as the 
Soviet Union modernises and increases its might 
through a concerted system or worldwide 
trade? 
The meetings of fraternal parties likely to be 
held in the coming months - on the initiative of 
the Soviet General Secretary - are evidence of 
the existence here and now of a kind of com-
munist internationalism which has certainly 
nothing to do with the Comintern but must be 
taken into account when forecasting the future of 
the modem world. 
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I would now like to refer briefly to a subject 
which has been somewhat neglected, that of dis-
armament and the difficulty of our debates. Our 
discussions lead us in various directions and are 
concerned with institutions, political expediency, 
enlargement and the suitability of various 
forums for this kind of debate. I personally do 
not agree with the analysis made by the presi-
dents of the European Commissions and my 
position differs somewhat from that of my friend 
Mr. Caro. 
My view is that, as the Twelve already have 
enough trouble in fixing agricultural prices, there 
is no clear evidence that the European Commu-
nities would do better. That being the case, it 
would not be right for us to progress towards 
strengthening WEU, come what may, and ini-
tially between the Seven, without increasingly 
associating our partners in spirit who wish to 
join. I refer here both to Portugal, which has 
already made its application, and to Greece, 
Spain and Turkey. My words relate particularly 
to Turkey which has such a specific, unrewarding 
and therefore essential task in acting as the shield 
for Western Europe. It is because Turkey is on 
the borders of Europe that I now tell our Turkish 
friends, and I believe I can speak for France -
how sympathetic we are to its application. They 
are well aware that the Community, and France 
especially, are ready to accept their European 
responsibilities. 
I come now to the practical conclusions. For 
our friends who wish to join in our work we 
must now devise some new procedures so that, 
even if we are experiencing technical difficulties 
in responding favourably to their applications for 
membership, they can participate as more than 
mere observers. I would like these applicants to 
be associated at various levels, de facto if not de 
jure, by more effective procedures establishing a 
closer link than the current arrangements for 
observers. Our Committee on Rules of Pro-
cedure and Privileges could be consulted on this 
subject. 
I now come to the proposals in Mr. Ahrens's 
report, whom I congratulate on his appointment 
as Chairman. These proposals are both simple 
and concrete and consist basically of the pro-
posal for a meeting of heads of state or gov-
ernment open to WEU members and possibly to 
representatives of applicant countries. These 
proposals are interesting, although there are two 
points which worry me. The first is the time scale 
for our action when present events are moving so 
fast. I am particularly sorry that after the pro-
posals made on 2nd December last by the French 
Prime Minister, Mr. Chirac, we have not been 
able to go faster and further towards defining a 
charter or agreement summarising for us what 
could be our undisputed gospel on defence. A 
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document of that kind would make us all much 
more comfortable as we could then rely on it as a 
clearly expressed instrument of solidarity, known 
to the public and serving as a commandment for 
any statesman speaking on behalf of Europe. 
I know that special groups or rapporteurs are 
working on this as an interim report is being pre-
pared, but I am greatly concerned that we cannot 
hope to get this project really off the ground 
before the meeting in The Hague next October. I 
am happy to take note of this meeting, but I 
repeat that anything which could accelerate the 
presentation and finalisation of a European 
security charter would be welcome. As to the 
proposed big meeting, do we have one or two 
years to wait? Here I allude to Mr. Baumel's 
remarks. If the disarmament process goes ahead 
rapidly and, as is to be feared, over our heads, it 
is important that Europe sh<lmld not drop its 
guard but should on the contrary avail itself of 
all the means it still has to provide an individual 
and global guarantee for each of its countries and 
for its defence capability. With this in mind I do 
not believe that we still have a year or two to 
organise a meeting of this kind. 
I would like this point to be made quite clear 
in your proposal, Mr. Ahrens. That is of course 
the gist of your document but the point is 
perhaps not expressed with sufficient determi-
nation in the recommendation submitted to us. 
The present situation calls for a quickening of 
pace. 
I would remind you in conclusion that liberty 
and democracy are fragile and are not gifts of 
nature or of heaven, though they may be of 
heavenly inspiration. We have to defend them 
every inch of the way at a time when disarm-
ament is in the foreground of events. This is the 
joint task ofWEU, the Assembly, the Secretariat-
General and the Council, acting together. Peace 
today and liberty tomorrow need each other. Let 
us not spare any effort to strengthen our union in 
relation to our great American ally and the 
Soviet world. Let us remember, for our govern-
ments and peoples, that pacificism and peace are 
different things. Let us not be afraid of taking ini-
tiatives and of sometimes even exerting pressure 
on our governments in order to strengthen 
Europe and preserve its peace and happiness. 
(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, 
resumed the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
du Monceau. 
Mr. du MONCEAU (Belgium) (Translation). 
- Mr. President, speaking as a newcomer 
attending a WEU Assembly sitting for the first 
time I have some diffidence in voicing a few 
remarks and suggestions. 
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I naturally join all those who have congratu-
lated the Rapporteur on so faithfully reflecting 
our worries, concerns and hopes and 
summarising proposals designed to strengthen 
the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. 
I have heard some representatives criticising 
the expression " European pillar " - I think 
wrongly. I would remind you merely that it was 
used for the first time not by a European but by 
President Kennedy in the sixties and that as 
recently as five days ago it was repeated, seri-
ously and with conviction, by the Secretary of 
State for Defence, Mr. Weinberger, in reply to a 
question put to him in Brussels. If the Americans 
believe in the need to build this European pillar 
of defence, it seems to me that we should be 
wrong to criticise. 
I would now like to make an observation and a 
suggestion. In my view, a democratic and 
political parliamentary assembly requires the 
presence of the ministers responsible for policy, 
who can and must respond to our concerns on 
defence matters. As a newcomer here I see on the 
government bench some good friends and fellow 
countrymen, some eminent and senior civil ser-
vants and even representatives of our interna-
tional institution - but do they have political 
responsibility? 
They will compile excellent reports which will 
be sent to their ministers and in a few weeks or 
months we shall perhaps have a reaction. What I 
feel, Mr. President, is disappointment. 
I have heard our Secretary-General speaking 
with great conviction and I have known him 
long enough to know that he is very sincere, but 
when I read the following words by an eminent 
professor in a study on the activities of WEU 
prepared at the Belgian Royal Military Academy: 
"However, Western European Union has so far 
hardly been more than a debating centre", I con-
clude that we should quickly institute a pro-
cedure enabling the Assembly to demand and 
obtain the presence of the ministers concerned. 
It seems to me that this is the best way to make 
ourselves heard, and it also meets the need to 
pick up echoes from outside our Assembly. 
Like some Belgian christian democrats, I 
wonder whether the ministers of defence and 
foreign affairs of the seven WEU member states 
should not form a European security and defence 
council so that WEU could reply as quickly as 
possible and with a single voice to proposals like 
those of Mr. Gorbachev and to the dangerous 
siren song which is menacing our vital cohesion 
and threatening to produce what Mr. Caro 
recently called a kind of political retreat. 
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As regards the desired and desirable expansion 
ofWEU, let us first consolidate before discussing 
any enlargement, however useful and necessary 
it may be. I do not think many words are needed 
on this subject. Let us be welcoming, by all 
means, but let us begin by organising our-
selves. 
As a final and possibly naive suggestion, would 
it not be more useful and serve our European 
credibility better if our Assembly were composed 
of European parliamentarians? The defence and 
security policy could then be progressively 
co-ordinated with the work of the European Par-
liament. I believe that the aims ofWEU, its cred-
ibility and its political will for the security and 
defence of Europe would be made clearer to the 
general public. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Burger. 
Mr. BURGER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, may I as 
head of the Luxembourg Delegation wish our 
compatriot, the new President, good health and 
clear judgment in continuing the valuable work 
of his predecessor, Mr. Caro, for whom we have 
the highest regard. 
As this morning's last speaker I would repeat 
that Mr. Ahrens has, with his usual frankness, 
arrived at a sound diagnosis. The most 
important problem for us is defence. He has pro-
posed a conference of the heads of state and gov-
ernment of the Seven and of the countries inter-
ested in joining WEU. Luxembourg joins France 
in supporting such expansion. 
It is also suggested that a European security 
charter should be drafted, making greater use of 
the mass media. It is a fact that news is of 
decisive importance in everyday life whether of 
politics, sport or even private affairs. 
It is alarming that opinion polls conducted in 
various countries suggest that the Soviet Union's 
position on disarmament and peace is given 
greater credibility than that of NATO. In my 
opinion, peace and security imply not only a dis-
armament effort but also and above all a real 
effort in respect of human rights and freedom of 
movement - in other words a sincere attitude 
backed by real actions and not by propaganda 
moves. 
When I saw the Berlin wall, the frontier of the 
German Democratic Republic, close to Liibeck, 
and more recently the Czech frontier at Furth im 
Wald, I realised that there was still much to do to 
reach honest, durable and peaceful bilateral 
agreements. Unfortunately, only time will tell 
whether Mr. Gorbachev is dealing without 
ulterior motives as regards firstly disengaging 
Europe from its ally and secondly dividing 
Europe. 
OffiCIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. Burger (continued) 
Mr. Gorbachev clearly has his eyes very much 
on Europe and that is worrying. I was assured by 
Mrs. Rosanna Ridgway, whom we met in Wash-
ington with the Political Committee, that the 
United States would not sign any agreement with 
the USSR without consulting its European 
ally. 
The essential condition is logically that Europe 
should be able to speak with one voice, and as 
soon as possible. The proposal in Mr. Ahrens's 
report is WEU's last chance to unite its efforts in 
a purpose serving the security interests of all 
Europeans, as strength lies in union and our 
enemy is always the same. 
In spite of the changed Soviet tactics, Mr. 
Gorbachev will always be a communist, a com-
munist aware of the economic and technological 
backwardness of the eastern bloc, a communist 
who knows the weaknesses of the West, and a 
communist who has learnt how to master the 
media. In my opinion vigilance is the watchword 
and I shall vote for Mr. Ahrens's report. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - My thanks 
to Mr. Burger, who was this morning's last 
speaker. 
The debate is adjourned. 
4. Change in the membership 
of a committee 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The Lux-
embourg Delegation proposes that Mr. Burger 
replace Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, 
as a titular member of the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations. 
Are there any objections? ... 
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The change is agreed to. 
Mr. Burger will therefore submit the report on 
the voice of Europe after Reykjavik - debates in 
national parliaments on behalf of the Committee 
for Parliamentary and Public Relations. 
5. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this 
afternoon at 3 p.m. with the fbllowing orders of 
the day: 
1. Address by the President of the 
Assembly. 
2. Second part of the thirty-second annual 
report of the Council (Presentation by Mr. 
Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lux-
embourg, Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council, Document 1093). 
3. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance 
- Part II: Political activities of the Council 
(Resumed debate on the report of the 
General Affairs Committee and votes on 
the draft recommendation and draft order, 
Document 1 099). 
Are there any objections? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 12.35 p.m.) 
THIRD SITTING 
Tuesday, 2nd June 1987 
SUMMARY 
1. Attendance register. 
2. Adoption of the minutes. 
3. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
4. Second part of the thirty-second annual report of the 
Council (Presentation by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, 
Doe. 1093). 
Replies by Mr. Poos to questions put by: Mr. Valleix, Sir 
John Osbom, Mr. Caro, Mr. Machete (Observer from Por-
tugal), Mr. Burger, Mr. Elmquist (Observer from 
Denmark). Mr. Caro. 
S. Changes in the membership of committees. 
6. Change in the order of business. 
Speaker: Sir Paul Hawkins. 
7. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance - Part II: 
Political activities of the Council (Resumed debate on the 
report of the General Affairs Committee and votes on the 
draft recommendatwn and draft order, Doe. 1 099) 
Speakers: Sir John Osbom, Mr. Inan (Observer from 
Turkey), Mr. Katsaros (Observer from Greece), Mr. 
Bayiilken (Observer from Turkey), Mr. Elmquist (Observer 
from Denmark), Mr. Ahrens (Rapporteur). 
8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. 
The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT {Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
1. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT {Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended 
to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT {Translation). In 
accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, the minutes of proceedings of the pre-
vious sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
3. Address by the President of the Assembly 
The PRESIDENT {Translation). - Ladies and 
gentlemen, " The deepest thing about it is its 
sleep". This, I am told, is supposed to have been 
said about Western European Union just prior to 
1984. Today it is no longer true and the most 
1. See page 19. 
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sceptical observers are prepared to admit that the 
reactivation of WEU is now well under way. It 
may not be complete, agreed, but it has already 
reached the point where real prospects can be 
glimpsed. 
In the conclusions to his report on the reacti-
vation of WEU, Mr. Ahrens put it this way: 
" There is no doubt that the Reykjavik meeting 
following the launching of the SDI programme, 
created circumstances favourable to Western 
Europe assuming greater responsibility for its 
own security, as is proved by the decisions taken 
by the Council in Luxembourg, Mr. Chirac's 
address and the favourable response to it in 
certain member countries. " He goes on: " The 
main thing for the Assembly is that in this situ-
ation the reactivation of WEU has developed so 
as not to be merely a surge of European 
dynamism which might soon be called in 
question by the trend of special interests and 
events, but is carried into effect by the estab-
lishment of new structures which alone can give 
permanency to the outcome of political decisions 
taken today. " 
Although results are still modest measured 
against the hopes raised by the Rome decla-
ration, reactivation is now a fact. 
Mr. Caro, that tireless architect of reactivation 
at the level of the Assembly, driven by an 
unshakeable determination to see that reacti-
vation succeeds, has never relaxed his pressure 
on successive Council chairmen. His countless 
approaches to Mr. Genscher, Mr. Andreotti and 
Mr. Poos, sometimes on a personal basis and 
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sometimes at the head of a Presidential Com-
mittee delegation, and his many speeches and 
statements have won him the respect of all our 
governments and all the members of our 
Assembly on whose behalf I would like to pay 
him a special tribute. 
Thanks to you, Mr. Caro, the enlargement of 
WED, which is one of your greatest enthusiasms, 
has become reality at least as far as the parlia-
mentary Assembly is concerned. For this to 
happen, you managed to get a proposal accepted 
authorising the Spanish and Portuguese Delega-
tions to take part in the work of the Assembly as 
observers. 
During your period of office, no opportunity 
for enhancing the prestige of our Assembly was 
allowed to pass. I sincerely hope that you will 
continue to use your talents in the service of our 
Assembly. 
Ladies and gentlemen, being elected President 
of the Assembly at this particular moment means 
taking on a task that is both difficult and fasci-
nating. As a national of a member state whose 
political and military power on the world scene 
is obviously slight, I would like to thank you for 
the many expressions offriendship that you have 
offered to me and, through me, my country. 
Having been born in 1952, the year when the 
treaty instituting the European Defence Com-
munity was signed, I witnessed neither the 
horrors of the second world war nor the prom-
ising beginnings of the long march towards 
European unification. Winston Churchill's 
famous speech at Zurich in 1946, the decision to 
set up the Council of Europe in 1949 and Robert 
Schuman's speech in 1950 proposing the creation 
of the ECSC all happened before I arrived. 
So my generation already has to look in the 
history books to find out about the first attempts 
at European unification. By contrast, the dra-
matic events in the early 1960s like the Cuban 
missile crisis and the building of the wall of 
shame in Berlin left their mark on our minds. 
The emancipation of the third world countries, 
too, is a matter of concrete reality for my gene-
ration. 
To conclude from this that that generation is 
uninterested in its country's security or the 
alliance of which it is part would clearly be an 
over-simplification. Actually, the state of mind 
of the 1980s seems to me too superficial to justify 
the claim that " all is for the best in the best of all 
possible worlds " as far as security is con-
cerned. 
The side effects of the peripheral conflicts, and 
the risk of a chain reaction, are evident. So it 
seems to me essential to draw attention to the 
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special way in which the younger generation feels 
and assesses the threat. 
But do not misunderstand me. This in no way 
means that the younger generation wants nothing 
to do with the military aspects of security. We 
are, incidentally, well placed to know. Our 
threefold parliamentary mission at the national 
level and in the parliamentary assemblies of the 
Council of Europe and WED confronts us, 
almost daily I would say, with the delayed-action 
bombs threatening us from Within. One is the 
unacceptable level of unemployment in most of 
our countries and another the ecological crisis 
which, in the absence of a i deliberate policy 
taking due account of the need for sound man-
agement of our natural resources, is no good sign 
for the future. Though I have mentioned only 
these two facets of the threat from within, it does 
not mean there are no others. On the contrary, I 
have deliberately referred to these aspects of 
security in the wider sense because there are 
some people who cannot resist the temptation of 
exploiting these evils for more than doubtful pur-
poses. 
In a democratic regime nothing constructive 
can be done without trust. So let us try to merit 
the trust of our fellow citizens by sparing no 
effort to find answers to the principal concerns of 
our time. 
Do these few thoughts of a more general 
nature imply that WED's specific role in defence, 
as defined in the modified Brussels Treaty, is not 
what our countries expect of it? Not at all. The 
truth is that an appeal to solidarity in defence 
will only draw a favourable response from our 
societies to the extent that we demonstrate our 
solidarity when it comes to finding answers to 
other major concerns of our day. It is on this that 
our credibility will depend. 
With WED's mission now recognised and 
clearly defined, the next point is to review briefly 
the ways and means available to our Assembly to 
achieve its objectives. The fact is that the 
European Communities, that have such huge 
budgetary resources, do not have the role of 
defining the broad principles of a European 
defence policy whereas WED, to which the single 
act assigns that function, is cruelly short of 
funds. 
Mr. Chairman of the Council, with your per-
mission I shall turn to you, as my predecessor so 
often did, to ask you to continue with your 
efforts to secure a favourable response to our 
Assembly's budgetary demands. Our views do 
not differ on this point. During your chair-
manship, which will come to an end in a few 
weeks time, the points of agreement between the 
Assembly and the Council outweighed those of 
disagreement. 
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It needs saying, Mr. Chairman, that in fact 
there are many things we share including the 
same recognition of the need to get the car our 
Secretary-General is so fond of going again and 
even to get its tank filled. 
As regards our personal relations, Mr. 
Chairman, I shall confine myself to these few 
comments in order to dispel the slightest doubt 
there may be about the aims of Luxembourg 
which will always be ready to serve and never 
seek to impose itself. 
As to my personal convictions, I do not intend 
to keep you in the dark. I advocate a united 
Europe, including a " security " dimension, and I 
campaign for the emancipation of such a Europe 
destined to play a greater role in the framework 
of the Atlantic Alliance. We know that, since the 
second world war, our national states on their 
own would have had bleak prospects for the 
future in the absence of any European 
co-operation. 
Is the future one of continental states - China 
- USSR and the United States? Europe too? 
Perhaps. But if it wants to get to the start-line at 
the same time as the others it would be wrong to 
bank on them turning up late. 
Assuming it wants to reach its objective in the 
year 2000 at the latest, we only have twelve years 
left. I hope that the closeness of that date will 
spur us to put behind us quarrels whose derisory 
nature no one can dispute. 
That, ladies and gentlemen, is my programme, 
those are my hopes. 
4. Second part of the thirty-second 
annual report of the Council 
(Presentation by Mr. Poos, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, 
Chllirman-in-Office of the Council, Doe. 1093) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The orders 
of the day now call for the presentation by 
Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, 
of the second part of the thirty-second annual 
report of the Council, Document 1093. 
I call Mr. Poos. 
Mr. POOS Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, how could I fail 
to express the satisfaction, not to say delight, of 
all our compatriots at seeing you elected - the 
first Luxembourger ever - as President of this 
European Assembly? There is no question that 
the Assembly has chosen you largely because of 
the wide range of your qualities. For my part 
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there is just one that I would like to single out: 
you have always and in every situation put the 
higher interests of this organisation above par-
tisan considerations. So the luck of the calendar 
has Luxembourg presiding even though it is for a 
very short period, over the two WEU organs at 
once, the Assembly and the Council. 
The honour conferred on you today is on a par 
with the satisfaction we have had in directing the 
work at Council level over the last twelve 
months. I would not wish to go on to the points 
on which I had prepared myself more particu-
larly to speak without expressing all my gratitude 
to the outgoing President, Mr. Caro, who, 
through his unfailing dynamism over the last 
three years, has greatly helped to make the reacti-
vation of WEU a reality. I do not for a moment 
doubt that the experience acquired in his period 
of office as President will also be available to his 
successor. 
Mr. Caro, you deserve WED's gratitude. 
Of the three opportunities I shall have had to 
address this Assembly this is without a doubt the 
most perilous. 
Whereas in December you were content, par-
ticularly here, to hear the President outline his 
intentions and his programme, the April 
occasion was already, in many respects, a more 
difficult exercise. It was unprecedented - being 
an extraordinary session coinciding with a minis-
terial meeting - and I had the privilege of 
briefing you on the results of the Council discus-
sions immediately after the event. 
Today, however, it is a question of taking 
stock: of the actions that have been started, the 
studies that have been produced and the reports 
that have been written. 
I propose to talk to you without beating about 
the bush. If I had to describe the state of mind I 
am in today in a few words and therefore very 
succinctly, I would say that the satisfactions I 
have felt over the last twelve months largely out-
number the few misgivings and question marks 
that I would not wish to conceal from you either. 
That will be the first part of my address. Then, 
after taking stock, I would not like to leave the 
rostrum without explaining to the Assembly 
what I, as Chairman-in-Office, feel to be the 
requirements of European security in the light of 
the new cards that have now been dealt in 
East-West relations. 
That will be the subject of the second part of 
what I have to say. 
I think I can say that if there is one thing we 
have unquestionably succeeded in together it is 
that WEU is now talked about. 
This organisation, so greatly criticised and 
largely forgotten, has recently been experiencing 
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a renewal of interest that has surprised even its 
keenest supporters, those who kept their faith in 
WEU throughout this long crossing of the desert. 
The countless articles and commentaries in the 
specialised press and the many speeches of 
Europe's highest-placed leaders are evidence 
enough. In that context, the speech by Mr. 
Chirac, the French Prime Minister, at this very 
rostrum of your Assembly was without any 
doubt a major event. Under the same heading I 
should mention the speech, breaking completely 
new ground, made by Sir Geoffrey Howe, my 
British colleague, in Brussels. Lastly, it would be 
wrong not to include the explicit reference to 
WEU in Chancellor Kohl's recent government 
statement when presenting his cabinet to the 
Bundestag. 
International events, dominated since October 
last year by the "Reykjavik happening", cer-
tainly have a lot to do with it because it is true 
that for the first time in many years there are 
prospects of wide-ranging substantial changes 
affecting the future of the old continent's 
security. The fact remains that the modest con-
tribution we have made by the action we have 
taken to put WEU in a good shape is unques-
tionably a major cause for satisfaction. 
Apart from this aspect, which has to do with 
what political observers and therefore public 
opinion think of our organisation, it is the sub-
stantial work accomplished at all levels which 
entitles me to assert that reactivation has effec-
tively become a fact. 
More than just a reason for satisfaction, the 
mounting interest in the consultations in the 
various bodies concerned is wholly remarkable. 
Probably the most timely decision taken during 
the course of our chairmanship was that senior 
officials from the ministries for foreign affairs, 
together with political directors and even their 
opposite numbers in the ministries of defence, 
should be closely associated with this work. 
Regardless of the definition of the 
organisation's future structures and the diffi-
culties arising out of the dispersed locations of its 
constituent parts, the constant and above all 
committed presence of the officials who actually 
advise the political authorities in the member 
states is invaluable. Their presence has very 
quickly enabled the work of the Council to be 
focused on the heart of the matter: Europe's 
security interests. 
The interim report tabled at the Council 
meeting in April, which will be finalised during 
the next few weeks, is unquestionably of vital 
importance in its effort at clarification. Many of 
our citizens are currently in some doubt about 
the direction and content of security in Europe 
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and I sincerely hope that, once it has been 
finalised, this document will ha~e the widest pos-
sible distribution firstly among the public in our 
own countries and then those of our allies so that 
misunderstandings about our intentions and 
even ill-concealed worries may in this way be 
quickly dissipated. 
That leads me to the third positive item: the 
appreciation of all our allies for the Chairman's 
unceasing efforts to preserve the confidence of all 
our partners including those who are not, or not 
yet, members of our organisation. 
The danger of the reactivated WEU being 
regarded as a club within a club and causing a 
fatal divide within the alliance that could, let it 
be said, only benefit our opponents was clearly 
perceived by Luxembourg when it took over the 
chairmanship of the organisation. 
Over and above the direct conversations at the 
highest level and the very frank exchanges of 
letters between George Shultz, the American Sec-
retary of State, and myself, I f~el I can only say 
that, thanks to the restraint an<l care with which 
our various actions and in particular the minis-
terial discussions have been conducted, that 
danger has been avoided. It enabled Mr. van den 
Broek, who will be succeeding me in a few weeks 
at the head of the organisation, to say after our 
recent ministerial meeting in Luxembourg that 
the Luxembourgers had successfully met what, in 
principle, was an impossible challenge: " to reac-
tivate the organisation without causing trouble 
with our non-member allies". 
A thing which, ultimately, is even more 
important than the three points I have just made 
is the fact, repeatedly demonstrated in recent 
months, that there is now a real desire to take 
part and therefore be associated with reacti-
vation. 
Sufficient evidence of that was the intensity of 
the discussions we had between foreign affairs and 
defence ministers both in November and in April. 
Their simultaneous presence at the same table and 
the frankness of the exchanges are very worthy of 
comment, although this is hardly reflected in the 
dry language of the communiques. 
Those who could find no better word to 
describe reactivated WEU and referred to it as a 
kind of" ginger group", an expression that raises 
many a smile, were probably not wrong. In 
WEU, Europe now has a suitable forum for dis-
cussing the specific problems arising out of its 
especial vulnerability within the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
As against these grounds for satisfaction there 
are, unfortunately, as in any human enterprise, 
shortcomings whose continued existence really 
betrays an attitude of latent mistrust of the 
process under way within our organisation. This 
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is mainly to be observed at the level of financial 
management. These budgetary quarrels have to 
stop. They have no place in a reactivated 
WEU. 
In reality, as you recently stressed at a meeting 
between the Presidential Committee and myself, 
it seems to me vital that the mission given to Mr. 
Cahen, the Secretary-General, at the proposal of 
the Chairman-in-Office, should quickly hammer 
out guidelines that will enable relations between 
your Assembly and our Council to be 
normalised. 
The thorny question of enlargement that per-
sisted throughout the period of our chairmanship 
and became more acute as the number of appli-
cants rose has not been dealt with either, to my 
mind, as it should have been. The four candi-
dates being, as it happens, faithful allies and 
three of them member states of the Community, 
the very minimum in such circumstances would 
have been to have given them an interim and 
therefore delaying reply. 
In view of the Council's inability to arrive at a 
consensus and agree a timetable and objective 
eligibility criteria, wisdom dictated the proposal 
conveyed to you last April, namely to take 
another look at this question but not until spring 
next year. 
To conclude this part of my address, I sin-
cerely hope that these questions to which I know 
your Assembly attaches very great importance 
may be resolved with the active help of the 
future Chairman of the Council and pave the 
way to a new understanding between our two 
institutions reflecting our wish for even more 
friendly and therefore fruitful relations. 
Mr. President, your Excellencies, ladies and 
gentlemen, the nature of the developments now 
under way and of the changes that are likely to 
take place on the world scene in the months and 
years to come is such as to pose some very 
serious questions. They will call for exceptional 
effort from European leaders if they are going to 
make their views count and defend the interests 
of Europe. 
The success of Atlantic solidarity and the open 
policy of the new Soviet leaders now mean we 
can envisage a new phase in East-West relations. 
The Reykjavik summit and the resumption of 
the Geneva negotiations have opened the way to 
the first disarmament agreement since the 
post-war period. I specifically said " disarm-
ament" since all the previous agreements were 
concerned only with the limitation of arma-
ments. 
Confined to nuclear weapons in its first phase, 
this agreement will nevertheless create a 
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momentum enabling further negotiations to be 
envisaged in two fields of particular interest to 
Europe: conventional and chemical weapons. 
As many colleagues pointed out at the last 
informal ministerial session of the Council of 
Europe, we are presented with an historic oppor-
tunity and we must not fail to seize it. 
For over forty years the defence pact agreed in 
the Atlantic Alliance has enabled Western 
Europe to live in security and to attain unprece-
dented prosperity. The question of whether this 
prodigious result - as anyone remembering the 
countless tragedies marking Europe's history will 
agree it is - is due to our defence system does not 
in fact matter. The essential thing to me is the 
fact that the treaty signed in Washington on 4th 
April 1949 wholly fulfilled its purpose, which, ifl 
may remind you, was the maintenance of peace 
and security and the defence of our freedom and 
our common cultural heritage. 
During that period, the NATO defence doc-
trine has undergone some major changes. We 
have moved from the doctrine of" massive retal-
iation " that we had to start with to the " flexible 
response". This doctrine has proved and is con-
tinuing to prove its soundness both in terms of 
political integration and military deterrence. 
It would consequently be inconceivable to 
challenge a doctrine that has served the purposes 
of our alliance so well but the changes that are 
likely to take place in the near future in the mil-
itary field following the disarmament agreements 
that the United States and USSR are talking 
about in Geneva require us to make the nec-
essary adjustments to our strategy to bring it into 
line with the new requirements of our security. 
Given the continuing numerical advantage of 
the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces in central 
Europe and in view of the exceptionally grave 
consequences of any premature recourse to 
nuclear weapons in the event of a conflict -
witness the Chernobyl disaster - it is essential 
that the Europeans, within the alliance, provide 
themselves with a platform or a charter setting 
out their security requirements in clear and 
unequivocal language. 
I wanted to inform you of the ideas of the pres-
idency on this subject and, in spite of the fact 
that the report which is being produced on it by 
the Council is not yet finished, I think I can 
identify twelve essential principles which I 
believe should be adopted at the present stage of 
our work: 
One, the primary objective of a European 
security policy is to prevent any form and any 
threat of military conflict by an adequate 
deterrent and defence. 
Two, for the moment and in the foreseeable 
future, the security of Western Europe cannot be 
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ensured without a defence structure including 
both conventional and nuclear capabilities com-
bined in visible and inseparable fashion to make 
a credible deterrent. 
Three, a strong conventional component con-
stitutes the paramount condition for Western 
Europe's forward defence strategy. 
Four, the security of Western Europe is incon-
ceivable outside the Atlantic Alliance. The con-
tinued presence of American conventional and 
nuclear forces in Europe safeguarding the link 
between European and American security is 
indispensable. 
Five, the nuclear forces of France and the 
United Kingdom make a major contribution to 
European security. 
Six, every European state should enjoy equal 
security and in return every European state must 
contribute to common defence according to its 
capacity to do so. 
Seven, a European security policy and the 
defence contribution underlying that policy 
requires the broadest possible consensus of 
European nations on the essential objectives of 
that policy. 
Eight, increasing the effectiveness of European 
countries' defence effort will depend on 
improving co-operation on armaments. 
Nine, military security and detente are com-
plementary. The ideal instrument for this basic 
concept is an armaments control policy whose 
object is to maintain and strengthen stability at 
as low a level of armaments as possible. 
Ten, the global balance in the elements on 
which Europe's security is founded must be pre-
served at every stage of the armaments control 
process. 
Eleven, armaments control policy must not 
lead to any territory of a potential adversary of 
Europe being made a sanctuary. 
Twelve, the security of Europe cannot be con-
sidered in isolation from the rest of the world. In 
assessing the risks, the European states must take 
into account the tensions and conflicts outside 
Europe where such developments could affect 
their security. 
This list of principles clearly indicates the two 
essential and priority objectives our seven gov-
ernments are pursuing: - to strengthen the 
European pillar of the alliance; NATO needs a 
strong and united Europe which has a common 
concept of its security interests and defends them 
publicly. This requirement is in everyone's 
interest including that of the United States; - to 
declare our readiness for and therefore interest in 
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political dialogue with the other part of Europe; 
whilst the progress which must be made with dis-
armament over all categories of weapons must 
come first it must not rule out other issues. The 
continued division in Europe does not make it 
any the less of an historic absurdity. We need to 
bridge this divide by peaceful means. War and 
the use of force have never been and never will 
be instruments of European policy although that 
policy must, of course, be prudent, realistic and 
open. 
Aside from progress with balanced and 
mutually advantageous economic co-operation, 
our basic yardstick for assessing real 
improvement in East-West relations will remain 
the position as regards human rights in the coun-
tries of East Europe. 
The release of all prisoners of conscience, and 
political prisoners in all the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries, the reunification of families too long 
divided and the free movement of men and 
women constitute the test we shall apply to the 
policy of openness of the new General Secretary 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
Just as there can be no que:stion of granting 
Moscow unilateral advantages at our expense we 
should not fail to encourage Mr. Gorbachev in 
his policy and take him at his word whenever 
what he says contains a positive message for the 
whole of Europe. 
In the present context of East-West relations, 
therefore, WEU needs to act and respond as a 
genuinely coherent entity and not give the 
impression of yielding to pressure from any side. 
Mr. President, before stepping down from the 
rostrum, let me thank both you and your 
Assembly for the friendliness of our relations 
and to ask once again for your confidence for the 
future, with particular regard to the efforts of the 
future Netherlands Chairman. 
Reactivated WEU will only progress with the 
help of everyone, not only all its organs but 
above all on the basis of a consensus among its 
seven member countries. 
In the case of highly politi<l:al and very sen-
sitive subjects like the question of our collective 
security and transatlantic relations it is my duty 
to tell you that they do not always lend them-
selves to public debate. Whilst it is perfectly 
legitimate for your Assembly to seek to be 
informed as promptly and fully as possible, as 
the report recently presented by Mr. Ahrens 
stressed, the concern for discretion in the diplo-
matic action of the chairman is equally legit-
imate. 
In this context, Mr. President, kindly allow me 
before I conclude to confirm that the Luxem-
bourg Chairman-in-Office was not unmoved by 
the many public calls from many European 
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leaders - the President of the French Republic, 
you yourselves, the President of the Commission 
of the European Communities, Prime Minister 
Martens and others I forget - for a summit 
meeting whose purpose would be to express an 
agreed attitude on the part of European member 
states to the recent proposals of the General Sec-
retary of the CPSU on intermediate nuclear 
weapons. I would like you simply to know that 
the chancelleries concerned are fully informed of 
the readiness of the present Chairman to take the 
necessary steps once it is everybody's wish. 
For the rest, I would like to confirm, if that is 
necessary, our profound attachment to this 
Assembly as the ideal channel for explaining to 
public opinion the effort that needs to be made 
to strengthen Europe's security. It is only in that 
way we shall be able to cement that solidarity 
that a community of destinies, of shared pros-
perity and dangers, calls for. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you 
Mr. Chairman of the Council for your address. 
Several of our colleagues have said that they 
wanted to ask you questions. 
I call Mr. Valleix for the first question. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - Like 
everybody here I appreciated the high quality of 
your speech, Mr. Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council because, once again, you blended 
serenity and determination with great clarity. At 
the end you even associated prosperity with 
dangers, a daring association but a true reflection 
in fact of the way things are today. 
After the meetings we have had, particularly 
the last one, I share the pleasure of our Presi-
dents, Mr. Caro and Mr. Goerens, at having been 
able to have a real dialogue in Luxembourg in 
the context of a quite exceptional meeting. True, 
as Mr. Ahrens pointed out, we may not be able to 
have one every year but, at all events, it was a 
welcome initiative that we shall, I hope, be able 
to repeat and, who knows, the sooner the better 
because we shall never share the same road 
enough. 
My question relates wholly to what is going on 
today and goes back to the thoughts I presented 
to the Assembly this morning. The way things 
are going it is clear that the reactivation or 
revival of WEU - which is not an idle word 
although it does not, of course, wholly corre-
spond to our ambitions and our hopes - is 
nevertheless a fact and has made progress in 
many ways. We give the Secretary-General, 
whose efforts are coupled with those of the 
Assembly, due recognition of this fact. 
Will not the difference in pace between the 
reactivation effort and the acceleration of current 
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events, particularly in the capital issue of disarm-
ament, eventually leave reactivation behind, if I 
may say so, whilst disarmament forges ahead. 
I said this morning that Europe, at the 
moment, is the battlefield of disarmament. 
Mr. Chairman, what action do you, and 
tomorrow your successor, intend to take to 
ensure that our ministers and governments stay 
more closely geared to events in defining this 
security charter whose main principles you have 
listed to us in a presentation which was one of 
the main features of your address to us this 
afternoon? 
How can we set the seal on this agreement 
when officially there are no meetings before that 
in The Hague in October? It is a long way off. 
At the same time, Mr. Chairman, there is a 
NATO meeting in a few days time. Will Europe 
be able then to speak with one and the same 
voice? What can we expect in Chancellor Kohl's 
speech to the Bundestag the day after tomorrow? 
In short, can we hope for better co-ordination 
and for the European chorus to be more or less in 
tune both in NATO and, above all, vis-a-vis our 
Soviet " partners "? Or are we, whilst hoping for 
WEU reactivation, going to watch 
broken-hearted as our Europe united in WEU, 
which would like to increase its membership, 
breaks into pieces? 
Mr. Chairman, have you any reassurances to 
give us? Could some procedure be envisaged in 
the present paradoxical situation in which our 
reactivation efforts are in opposition to events 
which are out of our hands? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - Thank you, Mr. Valleix, for your 
generally favourable appraisal of the progress of 
WEU reactivation. True, it is still far short of our 
expectations but nevertheless it does provide evi-
dence to public opinion at home and the rest of 
the world of a real advance. 
To my mind, external events - what you call 
the acceleration of events - have served WEU's 
purpose. The seven governments have been 
made to face up to their responsibilities. The 
importance of an organisation like ours and its 
essential nature has been demonstrated. 
I hope it will be possible within the next few 
months to finalise, under the chairmanship of 
my successor Mr. van den Broek, the twelve 
points of the charter which I have just listed and 
faithfully reflect the present stage of the work in 
the Council organs. The existence of such a 
charter, which, of course, must be kept flexible so 
as to allow for the changes that, in East-West 
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relations in the years to come, will enable 
European interests to be better concerted and 
better presented to our partners and those with 
whom we have to negotiate. 
As regards the stance of the German Gov-
ernment, you are not unaware that, over the past 
weeks, many informed consultations have taken 
place not only in the political parties but in gov-
ernments. The fact that the six partners of the 
Federal Republic of Germany were to some 
extent agreed made possible this stance, that pre-
sented some difficulty internally. Finalised yes-
terday it will be announced publicly to the Bun-
destag on 4th June next. 
There now is a European view with regard to 
the agreement on intermediate missiles. That 
agreement will be finalised at a meeting of the 
NATO Permanent Council at the end of this 
week. It will then, probably, be ratified by the 
NATO Council when it meets in Reykjavik 
during the following week. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
John Osborn. 
Sir John OSBORN (United Kingdom). - I con-
gratulate Mr. Poos on his office. He has 
emphasised the importance of East-West rela-
tions and he cited the twelve principles. We have 
debated Western European Union as a pillar of 
the Atlantic Alliance. The alliance must bring 
together defence ministers and foreign ministers 
with a strong administrative back-up if it is to 
succeed. 
My question is addressed primarily to Mr. 
Poos as Foreign Secretary of a Western European 
Union member country. In cricketing terms it 
might be regarded as a body-liner. 
The United States of America decided some 
time ago to escort ships in and out of the Gulf. 
One of those ships was struck by an Exocet 
missile belonging to Iraq. The United States of 
America appears to be providing naval cover for 
oil exported from the Gulf, about 92% of which 
is exported to countries other than the United 
States. 
President Reagan will raise the issue with the 
heads of state at the economic summit in Venice. 
As Foreign Secretary, what is your view, Mr. 
Poos, about the best method or umbrella to 
achieve a co-ordinated response? One might say 
that the European Economic Community should 
treat the issue as a foreign affairs matter. The 
subject has been debated here often enough and 
it is often said that it is not a NATO problem. In 
asking you to reply to the question I highlight the 
need to talk about foreign relations and defence 
- together - on a much wider scale. Do you 
think that Western European Union has a part to 
play? 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - This is a very important 
question. Europe is indeed concerned about the 
course of events in the Gulf and more still about 
the Iraq-Iran war which is destabilising one of 
the vital areas in the world for the West's oil sup-
plies. 
However, as the NATO Secretary-General 
said, the Gulf war is not the alliance's internal 
affair. It concerns us but it should not be dealt 
with directly by the organs ·of the Atlantic 
Alliance or those of WEU, which explains why 
the WEU Council has never discussed it. 
What is wanted is bilateral collaboration 
between the United States and certain major 
European powers: I am thinking of France and 
the United Kingdom in particular. We need tri-
lateral negotiations on safeguarding the West's 
interests in that part of the world. I am thinking 
of our military interests and the safeguarding of 
the sea lanes. But I definitely feel that we must 
not make this a NATO-WEU question. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Caro. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - Minister, 
my question relates to your reply to Mr. Valleix 
which concerns present events. What are the 
intentions of the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council with regard to consultations between the 
governments of the member states concerning 
the German Government's stance on the reply to 
be given to Mr. Shultz on the subject of Mr. 
Gorbachev's proposals? According to the infor-
mation you yourself, Mr. Chairman, were kind 
enough to give our Assembly in Luxembourg, 
the convergence that was hoped for an all sides 
was to lead on to consultation, not only between 
capitals but also within the Council, on the key 
position of the European response with regard to 
disarmament. We are still living with that 
assumption and those expectations. 
In the reply you have just made to Mr. Valleix 
however I think I heard you say that you thought 
there would be a European reply on the occasion 
of the next meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council. That means that the European reply 
would be given within the alliance as usual, by 
way of bilateral talks, whether co-ordinated or 
otherwise. But, once the Bundestag has taken its 
stand on the presentation by Chancellor Kohl 
and the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 
there will be no submission of the matter to the 
Council of Ministers of Western European 
Union for the co-ordination of policies on which 
you, Mr. Chairman, and we the Assembly took 
our stand by a unanimous vote. 
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This seems to me to be a major problem in the 
present debate, given the fact that several 
member countries of the alliance, strangely 
enough the seven countries of Western European 
Union and, ifl may add, my own country in par-
ticular, surely need concerted action among 
Europeans as such with a view to a co-ordinated 
reply within the alliance. Could I, with the expla-
nations that I hope will confirm the facts, have a 
precise answer? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation).- When the ministers of the Seven 
last met on 27th April in Luxembourg, the 
problem was clearly not ripe for a definitive 
decision which explains why the Luxembourg 
discussions were not conclusive. But you are not 
unaware that they helped to clarify ideas and in 
particular to assist the Federal Republic of 
Germany to decide its final options. It has to be 
understood that that country feels itself to be 
most concerned particularly by the shorter-range 
nuclear missiles because it could well become the 
battlefield if that type of armament were to be 
used. 
Of course, the calendar and the acceleration in 
the East-West process have not helped us 
because it was only yesterday that the German 
Government decided its position. Up to now, as 
far as I know, the other member states have not 
yet been officially informed of the German Gov-
ernment's decision, but we know that the Bun-
destag will be informed on 4th June, that there 
will be a debate and probably a vote of confi-
dence on the proposed measures or decision. 
Now it so happens that the NATO Permanent 
Council is already due to meet on 5th June next, 
the day after the Bundestag debate. That being so 
it is difficult to imagine a European meeting to 
concert views between the two. In practice, 
however, since everyone knows of the decision of 
the German Government through the press there 
will be no basic divergences, since all the other 
countries have more or less officially declared 
themselves in favour of the zero-zero option 
subject to retention of the 92 Pershing missiles, 
which are also the subject of debate in the 
German Government. The Reykjavik minis-
terial meeting scheduled for the following week 
should normally simply rubber stamp the posi-
tions taken at the NATO Council meeting on 5th 
June. Although this procedure does not exactly 
correspond to the objectives of European 
co-ordination within WEU, it should enable us 
to achieve the results we want, namely to give 
the Americans a clear and precise mandate for 
their negotiations with the other party in 
Geneva. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Are there 
any other questions? 
I call Mr. Machete, Observer from Portugal. 
Mr. MACHETE (Observer from Portugal) 
(Translation). - You said, Mr. Chairman, that 
the Council had postponed its decision on the 
enlargement of WEU to the spring of next year. 
Do you not think that, in a way, this weakens the 
efforts of the European members of NATO to 
strengthen political co-operation with regard to 
defence and the construction of the European 
pillar in the alliance? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - It is very easy for me to reply to 
the observer from Portugal because you must 
know that, throughout my period in office as 
Chairman, I have continually urged that we 
accept the Portuguese and Spanish applications 
for membership. I also think that the interest 
that the four applications show there to be in 
WEU is an encouraging sign. But enlargement is 
a process with difficult political and legal impli-
cations, which explains why the decision has not 
yet been taken. I would nevertheless remind you 
that it has not been postponed sine die because 
we agreed at our last ministerial meeting to 
return to the enlargement problem once the reac-
tivation of WEU was completed, in other words 
at the ministerial meeting in spring 1988. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Burger. 
Mr. BURGER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
Minister and friend, I would like to ask you first 
where we stand with the Political Committee for 
European Security consisting of senior officials 
from the ministries for foreign affairs and 
defence, secondly, whether Mrs. Rosanna 
Ridgway's visit had anything to do with this 
committee and, thirdly, what the future of the 
committee is with the Netherlands about to take 
the chair? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - The Political Committee for 
European Security definitely exists. It is already 
working but without an official birth certificate 
because the final document on the missions and 
tasks of WEU has not yet been formally adopted 
by the Council of Ministers. The political 
directors meet regularly, as an adjunct to the 
European meetings, to discuss security questions 
which are outside the competence of the 
European Communities. The creation of this 
consultative body at administrative and political 
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level has also been discussed with our American 
partners who seem to have no objection. I can 
tell the Assembly that this process of European 
consultation on security questions no longer 
arouses any apprehension or suspicion on the 
part of our American allies as we have cleared up 
these questions in meetings between the 
Chairman-in-Office and the American adminis-
tration. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Elmquist, Observer from Denmark. 
Mr. ELMQUIST (Observer from Denmark).-
Like my colleague from Portugal, Mr. Machete, 
I am here as an observer to represent the Danish 
Parliament, the Folketing. I have been listening 
with great care to the Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers, and I should like to know how the 
twelve points that he has raised compare with 
the draft recommendations in Mr. Ahrens's 
report, on which we shall be voting this 
afternoon. How does the idea in the first para-
graph to convene as swiftly as practicable a con-
ference of heads of state and government 
compare with the twelve points that have been 
put before us this afternoon? I appreciate that it 
is rather early to ask for a reaction when the draft 
recommendations have not been voted upon, 
but does the Chairman of the Council of Min-
isters think that they are in compliance with his 
twelve points? I have in mind the convening of a 
conference in a broader context than a WEU 
basis. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - The applications to join WEU 
that have reached the Bureau of the Chairman-
in-Office do not, I am sorry to say, include one 
from Denmark. I would have preferred to have 
had such an application from the Danish Gov-
ernment and Parliament among my papers. We 
regard Denmark as a faithful member of the 
European Community and of the Atlantic 
Alliance; it could perfectly well have its place in 
WEU as well. 
But that was not the point of your question 
which concerned the compatibility with 
Mr. Ahrens's report of the twelve points under 
discussion in the WEU organs for a European 
security charter. It is up to this Assembly first to 
discuss that compatibility, to give its answer and 
to convey to the Council of Ministers its direc-
tives with regard to the changes or amendments 
it wants to make to these twelve points as its con-
tribution to the decision which is to be taken 
very soon. 
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Regarding a summit of member countries, I 
think I gave you an answer in my address: the 
present Chairman-in-Office - and I have no 
doubt that it will be the same in the future - is 
fully prepared to organise such a meeting but, for 
it to take place, there clearly has to be a con-
sensus among the Seven. Unfortunately that has 
not been forthcoming so far, which I very much 
regret. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Caro. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - I would 
like to ask you a supplementary question. I know 
too well the way you think an<il the action you 
have taken to be for one second tempted to put 
you in the wrong but, as Chairman of the 
Council, you speak for all the governments of 
our member countries. Disarmament is the key 
problem of the day; we have all been intensely 
involved in it. All of us, governments and 
members of parliament, have been keen to 
demand that Europe should speak with one and 
the same voice. You have put your weight 
behind that effort, Minister, and you know that 
we have appreciated this and have paid tribute to 
you for it. However, in the reply you gave me a 
moment ago - and I totally agree with the way 
you think - you said we are unfortunately 
victims of the calendar. 
You are right, these are facts that you hit like a 
wall if you fail to see them. But Mr. Chairman, 
whilst the European governments decided to 
take their time before replying to Mr. Shultz and 
not to give a hasty answer to a request that was 
too categorical, at least by the deadline set, do 
you not think that the Council could also bear in 
mind that there are three entities asking for a 
reply from Europe? First there was Mr. Gor-
bachev who asked your opinion in Prague. Three 
days later there was Mr. Shultz, but, at the same 
time or at least thereafter, there was also our 
Assembly, your Assembly, European public 
opinion. 
At a time when the political test is at issue -
you used the word " test " yourself a moment ago 
- can we accept, particularly if our relations of 
trust with the United States have been managed 
as you have just told us - and I am delighted to 
hear it - at a time when consultation among 
Europeans would seem to be such as to allow a 
common position to be worked out, regardless of 
the differences in assessment there may be 
depending on whether you talk, of double zero, 
triple zero or even quadruple zero, because we 
know that ballistic missiles are also involved, 
how is it possible that the Council cannot also 
think about methods and set a timetable that 
includes an opportunity for Europeans to delib-
erate, in their legitimate institutions, in order to 
enable those institutions to be active as the 
treaties require them to be? 
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At so important a juncture as this, I would be 
sorry if a problem of timetables prevented 
Europe's voice from being heard when, as you 
say yourself, it is ready to speak, and from being 
heard in its own time and place, provided 
Europe does speak with one and the same voice 
in the North Atlantic Council, even at the level 
of the Permanent Council. 
I very much hope that the Council realises the 
importance of this political event. The thing 
should not be minimised because there is no dif-
ficulty in substance. The problem is one of 
working procedures. All our machinery - Chan-
cellery, Secretariat-General, Council of Ministers 
and Assembly - is ready to move into this role. I 
think this is the moment to do so or, if we do 
not, to record officially our regret so that this is 
the last time. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council.. 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, I think this last 
contribution comes at an appropriate time to 
close this discussion. I fully share the concerns 
and thinking that your ex-president has just 
voiced. With him I regret that neither this 
Assembly nor the Council of Ministers has so far 
been able to define the European position, vis-
a-vis Mr. Gorbachev, Mr. Shultz or public 
opinion in Europe, or Europe's security options 
on the subjects which are on the negotiating table 
in Geneva. 
I shall convey this feeling of the Assembly, 
which I wholly share, to the governments of the 
member states. The events that have taken place 
in recent months should teach us a lesson. Here 
again, I come back to the definition of the 
charter and the common principles which seem 
to me essential and likely to facilitate a European 
response in the future. 
For there is no concealing the fact that, in the 
next few months and years, during the imple-
mentation of the Geneva agreement on 
Euromissiles and during the negotiations that 
will follow and swiftly spread into the other, 
chemical and conventional, fields of disarm-
ament a rapid definition of Europe's position 
will be required of your Assembly and the 
Council of WEU. 
When next autumn we have completed our 
reactivation, armed with what we have learnt in 
recent weeks, we will be able to respond more 
quickly and, above all, play a more active part in 
relation to the rest of the world and our own 
public. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). Mr. 
Chairman, I thank you sincerely for having 
replied to all these questions with the skill typical 
of your chairmanship. I would also like to thank 
the small but very efficient team that has given 
you its support. 
5. Changes in the membership of committees 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The French 
Delegation proposes the following changes in the 
membership of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments: Mr. Fourre as a titular 
member in place of Mr. Galley, and Mr. Galley 
as an alternate member in place of Mr. Fourre; in 
the membership of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions: Mr. 
Galley as a titular member in place of Mr. Fourre 
and Mr. Fourre as an alternate member in place 
of Mr. Galley. 
Are there any objections? ... 
The changes are agreed to. 
6. Change in the order of business 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. De Decker. 
Mr. DE DECKER (Belgium) (Translation). -
I wish to propose a change in the order of 
business. 
You have yourself prepared an excellent report 
entitled " The voice of Europe after Reykjavik -
debates in national parliaments " which is down 
for debate on Thursday morning. 
From the information I have been able to 
gather, only a few members of the Assembly 
seem to have their names down to speak. That 
being so I wonder whether it would not be more 
efficient and convenient to have the debate on 
this report at the end of business tomorrow 
afternoon. 
I have spoken to Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman of 
the Socialist Group and Mr. Reddemann, 
Chairman of the Federated Group, and they both 
agree. If the Assembly also agrees this would 
enable us to bring forward the debate and 
perhaps shorten our proceedings. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. De 
Decker, it is no longer my report but that of 
Mr. Burger. 
I will put this proposal for change in our order 
of business to the Assembly. 
Are there any objections? ... 
The proposal is agreed to. 
I call Sir Paul Hawkins. 
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clarification, Mr. President, do I understand that 
the Assembly will close tomorrow evening and 
that there will be no business on Thursday? Such 
a change will make a great deal of difference to 
some members who have booked hotels and so 
on. I wish to be sure so that we may all make 
other arrangements. I had not understood from 
what you said that that would be the effect of the 
change. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. De 
Decker has proposed we change our order of 
business and has told us that the two other 
chairmen of political groups were in agreement. 
I have consulted the Assembly which has 
approved the proposal. We therefore have a clear 
decision and that is that. I can well understand 
that it may raise problems for certain colleagues 
but I also think that, for practical reasons, the 
decision was the right one. 
7. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance-
Part 11: Political activities of the Council 
(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Com-
mittee and votes on the draft recommendation 
and draft order, Doe. 1099) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the resumed debate on the 
report of the General Affairs Committee on the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance - part 
two: political activities of the Council and votes 
on the draft recommendation and draft order, 
Document 1099. 
In the resumed debate I call Sir John 
Os born. 
Sir John OSBORN (United Kingdom).- First, 
Mr. President, I wish to congratulate you on your 
appointment. I should like to thank Mr. Caro for 
his leadership over an important three years, and 
I should like to endorse the views expressed by 
Sir Frederic Bennett, who has taken the very 
strong line that WEU is about defence rather 
than disarmament and that we should not forget 
that. 
I have listened to the debate today and to the 
debate yesterday on the report of the Council to 
the Assembly of WEU. We heard an excellent 
address by the Secretary-General, Mr. Cahen. 
The role of the Secretary-General in the reactivated 
WEU is becoming increasingly important and I 
value Mr. Cahen's contribution. 
The report that we have before us has been 
produced by Mr. Ahrens. It recommends a col-
loquy to which the public would have access. 
That fills me with a certain alarm if it is to be 
other than a public relations exercise for WEU. It 
recommends that there should be a meeting of 
ministers of defence and foreign ministers to 
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continue those meetings that have taken place in 
Bonn, London and Luxembourg, and possibly to 
prepare an agenda for the meeting of the heads of 
state, as we have discussed. 
The report is about strengthening the pillar of 
the Atlantic Alliance, and that is vital. There was 
an important debate on this subject in Luxem-
bourg. My contribution was about procurement 
and meaningful disarmament. I had just taken 
part in a visit of my country's parliamentary and 
scientific committee to SHAPE and NATO 
headquarters in Brussels and Mons. I attended a 
meeting with General Rogers just after Mr. 
Gorbachev had made his offer to remove inter-
mediate nuclear weapons, which followed on 
President Reagan's initiative of 1981. 
Mr. Baumel spoke this morning about the 
political will in Europe to determine its own 
defence. For a quarter of a century I have been 
convinced that Western Europe can survive only 
as a political, economic and military entity. The 
peoples of our countries, let alone their national 
parliaments, would resist a move to what is 
implied by the European federalism, but at heart 
I am, I admit, a European federalist. I accept that 
because of the sovereignty of each country in 
Europe, and the individual cultures of each 
country and the separate languages, this is an 
ideal to be aimed for into the next century and 
not a matter for today. 
Members of parliament from our countries are 
involved in a number of institutions. Some go to 
the North Atlantic Assembly and the European 
Parliament which has an interest in industry, 
including defence procurement. I remember rep-
resentations to Western European Union by 
Mr. von Hassel and Mr. Klepsch of Germany. I 
also remember representations from some of my 
British colleagues including Mr. Tom Nor-
manton. Commissioner Narges has responsi-
bility for industry and is concerned with the 
ability of European industry to supply. 
Many of us in the Council of Europe and 
Western European Union are also members of 
national parliaments. Those of us here must in 
future find a better way to " take along " - to use 
an English slang phrase - members of our 
national defence and foreign affairs committees 
when European aspects are considered. I should 
like to see treaty revisions so that those who 
attend the Western European Union Assembly 
are different from those who attend the 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. To that end I 
support the view of Mr. van der Sanden. 
If my country is anything to go by, I find that 
too many parliamentary debates, including those 
on defence and disarmament, tend to consider 
such matters as national issues rather than 
European or international issues. The Secretary-
General, Mr. Cahen, wrote in March to the Pres-
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ident outlining the role of Agency I involving the 
Soviet Union's tactics and arms control and dis-
armament issues. He referred to the fact that 
Agency ll deals with threat assessment and the 
conclusion of the agencies, let alone their deliber-
ations, should be better understood in our com-
mittees in future. 
I have had meetings in my country with the 
Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. George 
Younger, and Lord Trefgarne. Indeed, Lord 
Trefgarne has addressed the Assembly in the 
past. There are technical aspects of verification. I 
have alerted Mr. John Wilkinson, the Chairman 
of the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions, to the work that must 
be undertaken. However, that work also involves 
ministers and is a NATO problem and as much a 
NATO problem as ours and must be an interest 
of the Science and Technology Committee ofthe 
North Atlantic Assembly. 
My attention has been drawn to the United 
Nations' reports on this subject. However, some 
questions following Geneva and other talks must 
be answered. What access does a verification 
team have to nuclear and conventional forces? 
Who would constitute such teams? Would there 
be teams from armed forces, sappers, engineers, 
REME senior staff or civilian technicians? 
Would all that be under the NATO umbrella? If 
so, what safeguards would there be for the 
European theatre? There are many questions, 
and as Chairman of the British-Soviet parlia-
mentary group I have listened with interest and 
respect to Sir Frederic Bennett's wide-ranging 
warning about the dangers following Mr. Gor-
bachev's response in peace and disarmament 
offers to the West. I am reminded that arms 
control has a limited role to play in European 
security. 
My country is in the throes of a general 
election. One party is willing to accept unilateral 
nuclear disarmament and depend on conven-
tional forces in Western Europe that are inferior 
to those in the Soviet Union. That point was 
hotly contested by the Prime Minister, Mrs. 
Thatcher, in the press and on television last 
week. However, to ask the United States of 
America to withdraw its forces - and particularly 
cruise and Pershing missiles- without a realistic 
deal with the Soviet Union is a hostage to United 
States' isolationism, which is strong, particularly 
in the Democratic Party. The Western European 
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance must now make a 
better contribution to its own defence and be less 
dependent on the American taxpayer. 
That point brings me to Agency Ill and the 
unacceptable fact that European defence forces 
are too sovereign and each European country too 
greatly dependent and reliant on its own sov-
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ereign forces and equipment. The political will to 
achieve greater standardisation and greater effi-
ciency with defence procurement still has a long 
way to go. It involves industry ministers in each 
country and the Commissioner of the EEC, Mr. 
Narges. Only last December Lord Carrington 
spoke about a European concept of defence R 
and D. British scientists are perturbed by the fact 
that defence R and D accounts for about 50% of 
total R and D expenditure. 
Western European Union must be aware of Sir 
Frederic Bennett's injunction. That is why 
I welcome the fact that the Committee on Scien-
tific, Technological and Aerospace Questions 
will promote a symposium on European 
research, European standardisation and pro-
curement policies for defence. That must involve 
spokesmen from national governments, repre-
sentatives from national parliaments and partic-
ularly representatives from the industry, science 
and technology committees of those parliaments. 
However, it must include representatives from 
the industries that supply our defence forces. 
I want to return to the points made by the Sec-
retary-General. I hope that Agency Ill will report 
to the Secretary-General and show encouraging 
progress in procurement and co-ordination of 
defence research. As the Secretary-General said 
in his speech, much of the initiative of Western 
European Union depends on ministers and their 
back-up staffs. 
I have made these comments because I hope 
that the next report to the Council will cover 
these matters in greater detail and show the 
Assembly where it should concentrate its 
attention and work. Finally, I want to return to 
the question that I asked Mr. Poos about a 
European answer to the request to be made by 
President Reagan. I accept Mr. Poos's reply. 
However, I think that inevitably his reply will 
disappoint the people of Europe and the admin-
istration of the United States of America. The 
Assembly must find a way to care for Europe's 
defence interests together on a wider scale rather 
than relying on bilateral deals between the 
United States of America and one or two coun-
tries including Great Britain. Much work 
remains to be done and I hope that the Secretary-
General and the new President will give thought 
to that work. 
(Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Inan, Observer from Turkey. 
Mr. INAN (Observer from Turkey) (Trans-
lation). - Mr. President, I would first of all like 
to say a big thank you to yourself and to Mr. 
Caro for having so neatly righted an injustice 
committed by another French friend, our col-
league, Mr. Baumel, in his statement this 
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morning. With a gesture, Mr. Baumel dismissed 
not only four members of this organisation from 
the defence of Europe but also the other 
European countries which have been involved in 
its collective defence for nearly forty years. This 
he said in front of the representatives ofNorway 
which defends the northern flank and us, repre-
sentatives of Turkey, a country which on its own 
and with an army of 800 000 men defends 37% 
of our common frontiers with the Warsaw Pact 
countries. 
To claim that Europe is defended by three 
countries only is not European thinking, Mr. Pre-
sident. 
I too visited the United States from lOth to 
13th May last with the Political Committee of 
the Council of Europe referred to this morning 
by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Burger. We had 
wide-ranging contacts with the representatives of 
the Department of State and members of Con-
gress. I would like to tell this Assembly about 
some of my own findings. 
The first is that, at the moment, public and 
private life in the United States is dominated by 
the post-war generation. This new generation has 
no awareness of the circumstances in which the 
Atlantic Alliance was set up, the imbalances of 
the conventional forces in central Europe and the 
scale of those of the Warsaw Pact, or of the 
threats to us from the East. It is more concerned 
with economic competition from the Pacific and 
particularly Japan in electronics, and from the 
European Economic Community. That is its 
over-riding preoccupation. 
My second point is that we heard it stated -
more firmly by the members of Congress than by 
the administration - that the United States had 
decided to enter into an agreement with the 
Soviet Union on nuclear weapons. Let Europe 
take note. Our continent is, moreover, more or 
less resigned to it and several speakers today 
have taken that line. We seem to be headed for a 
change in a system that has safeguarded stability 
and peace in Europe and across the Atlantic for 
over forty years. The vital element in that system 
- the nuclear umbrella of the United States - is 
on the verge of being almost completely with-
drawn from Europe which, as a result, will be in 
a state of transition. A new system of defence, 
equilibrium and stability will need to be devised 
if possible. 
Such transitional periods are the most haz-
ardous. Changing the essential components of a 
system that has proved itself by safeguarding our 
peace and stability for over forty years without 
providing another reliable system to take its 
place means running enormous risks. 
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Mr. President, Europe is no longer what it was 
forty years ago when economically it was almost 
in ruins. In the economically, technologically 
and politically advanced Europe of today, its 
countries ought to be able to organise its 
defence. 
Observing quietly from this bench, the 
speeches we heard yesterday and this morning 
have not, I must admit, given us much heart. As 
I said every effort is being made to avoid respon-
sibilities. It saddens us. 
We thought that Europe, confronted with this 
challenge - or even without this challenge -
could and should be able, at a time when it is 
becoming larger and is busy constructing its eco-
nomic unity, to create its own parallel defence 
system. As everyone knows anp keeps saying: an 
economic system cannot last without a defence 
system. In fact what do we hear? The Seven are 
in difficulty in their relations between them-
selves and also in regard to ealargement. 
It reminds me of the French expression " les 
calendes grecques ". Last year, the Chairman-in-
Office said that the principles would be ham-
mered out this spring. Now the date is 1988. 
Heaven knows what we will be told when that 
comes. 
This is evasion of responsibility. I am afraid 
that the momentum developed, by circum-
stances in European public opinion, for creating 
Europe's own defence system at last and for 
co-operating with North America on an equal 
footing, if that is possible, in a system where the 
co-operation is not only one way, may be lost. 
Once again we are about to let an historic oppor-
tunity go by. 
We hear it said that Europe should form a 
single nucleus and that its enlargement would 
weaken it. We have also heard it said that in 
Europe there are only three col)lntries bearing the 
burden and responsibility of defence. Personally 
I would have preferred not to be here at this 
debate. The image I personally had formed was 
rather stronger, more advanced and more 
encouraging than what I have seen and heard 
these last two days. 
I come back to Mr. Ahrens's report where he 
deals with enlargement and the application for 
membership by a country which I can name as 
being Greece. In paragraph 11 of the report, in 
the explanatory memorandum, he devotes three 
paragraphs to the difficulties he feels the appli-
cation poses for the organisation. It is not up to 
me to add to them, but Turkey's application is 
referred to in parallel with that of Greece. The 
difficulties and quarrels which unfortunately 
divide the two countries are said to be obstacles 
to their admittance to the organisation. We 
raised this point in committee and Mr. Ahrens 
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was kind enough to include our view on the 
matter in the report. 
The approach to the problem is still negative. 
Reminding the two countries of the disputes 
between them - which they, therefore, have to 
resolve before knocking on the door - is not a 
positive approach. Moreover, Mr. Ahrens 
himself is better placed than anyone to under-
stand this because it was within the European 
and international bodies that his own country 
and France were reconciled. 
I would recall, at this stage in our proceedings, 
that, among the many factors impelling the 
Turkish Government to apply to join the 
European Economic Community, one was the 
fact that the integration of Greece and Turkey 
might perhaps make it possible to find common 
ground for lasting understanding and rap-
prochement between the two countries. 
Once again I appeal to our European partners, 
friends and allies: please do not play one country 
off against the other, do not add fuel to the 
rivalries and quarrels between them and do not 
automatically bring in Turkey when you are 
talking about Greece or vice versa. Pushing one 
country along one path and the other along 
another will not help solve their problems nor 
create an atmosphere of understanding and 
co-operation. On the contrary this type of written 
or spoken statement or attitude poisons the 
atmosphere, creates misunderstanding between 
the two sides and complicates things even more. 
The presence of these two countries in the 
Atlantic Alliance today has been very useful and 
has had a major restraining influence, preventing 
their relations from deteriorating. The two coun-
tries are in fact also in the European defence 
organ which will help to develop understanding 
and co-operation between them. That is why I 
make this appeal and once again request the 
Rapporteur to reconsider paragraph 11 (ii) in his 
report and not to take a negative approach to 
Greece's application in parallel with that of 
Turkey. 
The two names of these countries should not 
always be coupled in a negative light. Personally 
I think this kind of attitude is not a positive con-
tribution to the relations between the two allied 
countries in that region. We see the same kind of 
approach in the Economic Community and else-
where. It is wrong. I hope that Greece has the 
same reaction to this kind of attitude. 
I shall not labour the point any further, 
Mr. President, I would simply say that a colloquy 
is planned for next year on European defence 
objectives. Then - Heavens knows when - there 
will be a summit of European countries, in some 
framework which is not yet very clear. Frankly it 
is like telling events: "Wait for us, we are not yet 
88 
THIRD SITTING 
ready to cope with what you have in store ". It is 
like saying to Mr. Gorbachev: " You are going 
too far and too fast. We are not in such a hurry. 
Our train is racing along but we, the passengers, 
are going too slowly". It is like telling the Amer-
icans: "Wait for us, please, wait a bit longer". It 
is no answer and no solution. I think that I am 
speaking with the voice of the European man in 
the street, European public opinion and 
European governments and decision-makers. 
Whilst events are moving so rapidly, our 
decision-makers are moving slowly but I am not 
sure whether they are also moving in the right 
direction. I have my doubts. In that case there 
will be one exception but, unfortunately, it will 
not be favourable to Europe. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Katsaros, Observer from Greece. 
Mr. KATSAROS (Observer from Greece). -
Thank you, Mr. President. I also wish to make a 
few comments on Mr. Ahrens's report regarding 
Greece's interest in joining WEU. First, his sug-
gestion that Greece considers WEU an alter-
native solution to NATO is, I am afraid, weak 
since Greece fully recognises that WEU is not 
such a substitute. Greece has already come to an 
agreement about NATO bases on its territory 
and is proceeding to negotiate on all other 
matters affecting its relations with NATO and 
the United States of America. 
Mr. Ahrens's second argument, which was 
mentioned by the former speaker, dealt with 
relations between Greece and Turkey and the 
danger of a clash between the two countries. This 
is only a presumption. On the other hand, the 
only conceivable threat comes from our neigh-
bours. It seems that they intend to change the 
status quo of the Aegean sea bed, whereas Greece 
has declared that it demands nothing of 
anybody. 
The participation of Greece in WEU will dis-
courage the risks of a warlike situation. This is 
not the reason why Greece is showing interest in 
joining WEU but simply a comment on certain 
references in the report. 
On the matter of terrorism and Middle East 
relations, Greece has condemned terrorism 
without any reservation. Greece differs in its 
opinion on the ways and means of facing ter-
rorism but that does not weaken NATO's 
position. Each European country has its own per-
ceptions of the Middle East and South Africa and 
such matters because oftraditional, geographical, 
economic and other factors. 
I shall speak about the doctrine according to 
which membership of WEU is linked to EEC 
membership. Mr. Ahrens expresses the view that 
that does not correspond with present European 
facts. However, it should not be overlooked that 
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both the EEC and WEU have a principal role to 
play in Europe's unity. 
Greece and the eleven other EEC countries 
have recently signed and ratified the single 
European act that provides for full co-operation 
in financial, political and international matters. 
Are weapons industries included in such 
co-operation? Are defence matters excluded from 
political co-operation? The report is not in 
keeping with the Community tradition that 
WEU should be the union of the twelve coun-
tries. This position was explained by several 
speakers this morning. In fact, Greece's 
acceptance into WEU would help to maintain 
peace in the Mediterranean and give a broader 
dimension to WEU. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Bayiilken, Observer from Turkey. 
Mr. BA YULKEN (Observer from Turkey). -
My taking the floor after my countryman, 
Mr. Inan, should not give rise to any pretensions 
on our side that our talking to this Assembly is 
because of the size of Turkey or because of the 
size of its contribution to the defence of Europe. 
It is the interest that we have in WEU that 
encourages us to take the floor, and also a tech-
nical procedural matter. I see that here observers 
speak after the honourable delegates are 
exhausted by speechmaking. However, in the 
Parliamentary Assembly observers are just 
recognised even among the delegates. 
I shall start with my observations and evalua-
tions of the report by Mr. Ahrens. I believe that 
the report is a succinct but excellent work as it 
puts in the right perspective the required scheme 
to reactivate WEU and to prescribe the content 
of a European security charter. I should like to 
commend the report, which tells us of the still 
existing opportunities in realising the aims of the 
Rome declaration of 1984 as well as the risks 
awaiting WEU's credibility if governments are 
not determined enough in translating the reacti-
vation into deeds. 
To support Mr. Ahrens's views in that respect, 
permit me to remind our esteemed colleagues of 
the bitter contradictions through which our gov-
ernments and western public opinion had to 
evaluate some important, even vital, require-
ments of European security. We all recall that in 
the face of the growing dangers of SS-20s 
deployed some years ago against Western 
European NATO countries, all the WEU coun-
tries included had to implement the provisions 
of the double-track decisions of 1979. As a result, 
in many WEU countries strong reactions were 
displayed against the deployment of Pershing 
and cruise missiles at the time. It took both time 
and able manoeuvring to appease these reac-
tions. 
89 
THIRD SITTING 
In unbelievable contrast, following the Rey-
kjavik summit, were the reactions that we 
observed, both governmentail and from the 
public. They were reactions that rightly linked 
the security of Europe and the need for some sort 
of missiles in Europe, IRBMs and others, to 
strike a balance between Warsaw Pact countries 
and Western Europe. Can there be better proof 
that there exists in Western Europe, according to 
public opinion, a dangerous lack of information 
about the role of WEU and equally about the 
fundamental requirements of security for 
Western Europe? 
We should not be too ready to criticise public 
opinion. If those who occupy the governmental 
benches were better equipped and more ready to 
take a lead, there would have been no need for 
the defence ministers ofNATO to discuss IRBM 
missiles and other related subjects over so many 
years. I speak from personal: experience. The 
result of the committee meetings of the defence 
ministers since 1981 has been the creation of a 
zero option, but there were others who did not 
propose that approach. 
There is a need to determine as soon as pos-
sible the contents of the European security 
charter. If Europe clarifies its identity in a real-
istic manner, no harm will be posed to the 
cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. On the con-
trary, there would be demonstrated a viable and 
therefore a more durable linkage between the two 
pillars of the alliance. The United States would 
be released from a statute that can be likened to 
the maxim: primus inter pares. For all these 
reasons, the openly expressed will of European 
countries that are NATO members to contribute 
to European security should nc!>t be treated in a 
way that gives the impression that it is not duly 
appreciated. 
We have listened carefully today to many dis-
tinguished speakers, including the Minister, on 
some of the principles of European defence. 
I wish to refer to two of the principles to which 
Mr. Poos referred. They relate to the ideas ofthe 
presidency about the security of Europe. Prin-
ciple 6 states: " Every European state should 
enjoy equal security and in return every 
European state must contribute to common 
defence according to its capacity to do so. " 
Mr. Poos referred also to principle 7, which 
reads: " A European security policy and the 
defence contribution underlying that policy 
requires the broadest possible consensus of 
European nations on the essential objectives of 
that policy. " 
There is no need for me to prove that Turkey 
is making an important contribution to the 
defence of Western Europe, which my colleague, 
Mr. Inan, was good enough to outline. I am sure 
that it is something that is recognised by all those 
who are members of this Assembly. I am sure 
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that there is not too much difference between our 
objectives and those that are set out in the 
Atlantic treaty charter, in the alliance preamble 
and in other alliance provisions. Those provi-
sions are not so different from those that are con-
tained in the Brussels Treaty and in the modified 
version of that treaty. 
There are those who talk about juridical and 
political difficulties. What are these difficulties? 
Portugal is already a member of the European 
Community. Two other countries which applied, 
Spain and Greece, are also members. Turkey has 
been an associate member of the Community 
since 1964. In 1973 I had the honour as Turkey's 
Foreign Minister to sign the transitional protocol 
between Turkey and the EEC. That document 
was signed in Ankara in June 1973, fourteen 
years ago. Turkey agreed with its partners in the 
European Community that the economic 
strategy of achieving parity with members of the 
Community so as to become a full member of it 
- 1992 was the target - was good and sound. 
What has changed in the meantime? What sort 
of difficulties are we facing? 
Are there any political difficulties in respect of 
Turkey? Those who advance such ideas should 
be much more precise. In joining my voice with 
that of Mr. Inan, who represents the party that is 
in power in Turkey - my voice being one of the 
independents in the Turkish parliament - I can 
say that there would be deep dissension within 
my country, which has a privileged and 
important place within the alliance and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. After the 
United States, Turkey contributes the second 
largest force at the disposal ofNATO defences. It 
makes a tremendous defence effort that demands 
about 5% of its GNP. Turkey shows by this 
approach that it would be happy to join Western 
European Union, which includes important and 
distinguished countries. However, we are told 
that there are juridical or political difficulties. 
Such views are too much to stomach. 
I shall conclude my remarks by referring to the 
illustrious French writer, Voltaire. It is clear that 
one of his famous anecdotes is clearly apposite: 
" Il faut parfois supporter un petit mal pour un 
grand bien. " 
(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, 
resumed the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Elmquist. 
Mr. ELMQUIST (Observer from Denmark) 
(Translation). - I am at this meeting as an 
observer of the Danish Parliament which has 
been closely following the work of your organ-
isation for many years, sending two of its 
members as observers to each of your plenary 
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sessions. This is my second visit but since I find 
myself among many parliamentarians from the 
Council of Europe I feel I am among friends. 
Officially, Denmark is not on the list of appli-
cants for membership of WEU as the Chairman-
in-Office of the Council has pointed out but the 
Danes follow the work of your organisation with 
close attention. 
Fifteen days ago, the Danish Parliament held a 
full day's debate on the problems of security and 
defence. Our verdict, with a large consensus, on 
the negotiations under way between the United 
States and the Soviet Union was positive and 
optimistic - too much so for some people. In our 
view this is the beginning of a move in the right 
direction, a start not to be missed. 
At the debate, the spokesmen of the political 
parties and the ·minister responsible discussed 
the role of Europe, in other words, the question 
of how the European countries could find the 
platform they need to reach agreement, express 
themselves and exert an influence on their own 
destiny especially in the field of defence and 
security. 
Several of us proposed WEU as a possibility to 
be considered but it has to be said that the 
majority consider WEU to be too narrow and, 
with all the respect due to you, Mr. President, 
still too weak. After following your proceedings 
yesterday and today I am a little surprised at the 
relatively sparse attendance of members of the 
Assembly and the fact that the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council of Ministers is not taking 
part in the discussions. 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe has managed to organise what are called 
" sandwich debates " during which the 
spokesmen for the political groups address the 
Assembly and not only the Chairmen-in-Office 
but also any other ministers present in Stras-
bourg take part. 
I am here as an observer and I must let the 
Assembly manage its own affairs but I must 
confess my surprise at seeing the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg leaving the 
chamber immediately after answering the last 
question. 
So WEU wants to enlarge and reactivate itself 
- but by what procedures? Do the Assembly and 
perhaps the Council intend to keep strictly to the 
formal procedures or is a more pragmatic 
approach in mind? In the second paragraph of 
the draft recommendation Mr. Ahrens puts 
forward a more pragmatic formula. 
The Danes attach great importance to the 
Atlantic Alliance. European co-ordination 
among the Eurogroup within NATO should help 
to strengthen the European pillar in the alliance. 
The same structures do not exist; there is for 
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example no parliamentary assembly like this 
one. The decision-making procedures are dif-
ferent and, in WEU, the discussion is about 
European union which is not the case in NATO. 
But the Eurogroup comprises an increasing 
number of European countries and, in the 
framework of NATO as a whole, it is possible to 
draw direct inspiration from our most important 
partner from the security standpoint, namely the 
United States which, what is more, is one of the 
two superpowers. 
In Denmark, we also wonder whether EPC -
European political co-operation - could one day 
be the framework for co-operation on security 
and even defence in Europe. This European 
political co-operation is separate from the Treaty 
of Rome and, if the need arose, provision would 
have to be made for other administrative struc-
tures because the European Commission in 
Brussels cannot act as the mainspring. The new 
secretariat for which the single act provides 
might perhaps serve to consolidate the structures 
of this European political co-operation. 
To conclude, I would like to thank the 
Assembly for having invited us here as 
observers. We have not yet reached our final 
conclusion in our country on these highly 
complex and extremely important questions but 
you may be sure that we shall continue to follow 
your work with the closest attention. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is closed. 
I call the Rapporteur. 
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, I should first like 
to thank the many members who have given 
their views on the report. I shall confine myself 
to these comments and say very little about the 
various remarks on other subjects. 
I can begin by saying that relations between 
the Council and the Assembly of WEU generally 
came in for criticism and that some members 
also felt the efficiency of WEU as a whole was 
suffering as a result of the lack of contact 
between the Council and the Assembly. 
Mr. Elmquist, who is here as an observer, has 
just made what I consider to be some pertinent 
observations. He referred to ways of improving 
contacts between the organs that we have long 
found successful at the Council of Europe. Think 
of the Joint Committee, think of the partici-
pation of parliamentarians in the ministerial 
conferences. So it is not just a question of 
accepting a formal report: we must also develop 
other procedures for talking to each other and 
asking critical questions. 
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I can sympathise with the Council's unwill-
ingness to publish everything it discusses in 
printed form, but we cannot, I believe, have any 
sympathy at all for the fact that we are virtually 
deprived of information. It was claimed in this 
connection that the Federal German Gov-
ernment should have first discussed in the 
Council the decision it took yesterday con-
cerning an agreement between the parties 
forming the Federal German Government. I do 
not agree with the Chairman of the Council that 
it was only lack of time that prevented this dis-
cussion from taking place in the WEU Council. 
That problem could have been surmounted. But, 
ladies and gentlemen, does not a claim of this 
kind in fact presuppose a different WEU? Is 
there any point at all at the moment in putting 
problems of such import before the WEU 
Council for discussion? Do we not need a WEU 
in which the activities of all the member states in 
the area of security policy are really concen-
trated? That is a critical question that we must 
surely ask ourselves when we voice such 
demands. 
The second point I should like to take up is the 
relationship between the Communities and 
WEU. One member said that we needed a 
European union with comprehensive powers 
even in the area of security policy, and that this 
would undoubtedly be the outcome of the imple-
mentation of the single Europ~n act. This union 
with comprehensive powers may, God willing, 
become reality one day, but at the moment it is 
still a long way off. 
I believe Mr. De Decker was right when he 
said that, given the present composition of the 
Communities, they could not discuss security 
matters. Mr. Muller also voiced the criticism that 
the European Parliament - and the same is 
undoubtedly true of the Commission - was 
already hard put to it to cope with its present 
workload. 
It was proposed that this Assembly should be 
composed of members of the European Par-
liament. I do not think that would be a good 
idea. The strength of this Assembly and of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe is that we are all members of our national 
parliaments as well and exercise control over our 
governments. The members of the European 
Parliament are unable to do this. 
In any case, we must realise one thing - and 
this again brings me back to what I said on the 
first point: unless WEU is restructured and 
strengthened, defence policy will also be grad-
ually transferred to the Communities. Mr. Caro 
said he sympathised with the President of the 
Commission, Mr. Delors. I too sympathise with 
him. I welcome his remarks, to the extent that 
they roused us, and perhaps our governments, a 
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little from the lethargy that had begun to spread 
again since the lofty declarations of Rome. 
Several members referred to the role of the 
mass media and stressed its importance. I am 
sure we shall be talking about this again 
tomorrow, when we come to discuss the report 
which you, Mr. President, have submitted. 
Ladies and gentlemen, a new generation has 
now grown up in Europe which has not had to 
experience the sad times that we had to live 
through in our youth. I am referring here to 
experiences and memories which are still fresh in 
the minds of many of us. But we must tell this 
new generation over and over again that 
freedom, peace and democracy are not God-
given, but must be aspired to, won and safe-
guarded all the time. We must not only work for 
peace, freedom and democracy: we must also tell 
the public, and especially the young people, in 
our countries about this work. 
On the proposals contained in the report 
before you I have this to say: in general the pro-
posal for a summit conference on European 
security has been well received. Some members 
- Mr. van der Sanden and Mr. Valleix for 
instance - asked if it was not too late. Others 
warned against haste, pointing out that a con-
ference of this kind needed to be carefully pre-
pared. 
I share the view that we have not much time 
left, and that this conference must achieve a 
great deal more than was said in Rome. Perhaps 
the twelve points submitted to us by the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council today form a 
suitable basis for further discussion at this 
summit conference. 
On the subject of the enlargement of WEU 
opinions differ. Some members - Mr. du 
Monceau and Mr. van der Sanden - said we 
should think first of the reactivation of WEU 
and only later; when the work of reactivation was 
more or less completed, of its enlargement. 
Others said that, on the contrary, we should 
begin by enlarging WEU, because the resulting 
broader base was essential to the establishment 
and formulation of European security policy. 
I personally believe that the two - reactivation 
and enlargement - are linked. I believe the 
critical comments Mr. Elmquist has just made 
and the evaluation of his observations should 
make us stop and think very carefully. At a 
meeting of the General Affairs Committee in 
Copenhagen I asked if WEU in its present form 
was at all attractive to other countries and if we 
should not begin by doing rather more to put our 
own house in order. 
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I can also understand the urgings of our Greek 
and Turkish counterparts in this connection. But 
I would ask them to appreciate that, legitimate 
though their requests may be, more must be 
done about bilateral relations between their two 
countries. As for the settlement of territorial dis-
putes, or the Cyprus question - this does not 
concern us here, but we are all members of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe too - it seems to me that not all the 
opportunities for bilateral solutions have yet 
been exhausted. I believe that a serious attempt 
by these two countries to settle their disputes is a 
precondition for a favourable decision on their 
applications. 
The proposal for a colloquy made in the report 
found general approval. I can tell you in this 
context that at its meeting this morning the 
General Affairs Committee began thinking about 
the practical business of holding this colloquy. 
The names of some of the politicians who might 
attend were mentioned. We shall continue our 
discussions when the committee next meets. 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, a new 
chapter is most certainly beginning in the history 
of European security policy. A new, reactivated 
WEU must participate in the formulation of a 
new policy. I am convinced- as I believe we all 
are - that what is known as the double-zero 
option: the abolition of medium- and shorter-
range missiles, will come. Opinions on this 
option differ in the Assembly. While some 
members see it as the first step in the direction of 
safeguarding peace with a smaller arsenal of 
lethal weapons, others see it as a threat to the 
West's security and credibility and even to its 
solidarity. We shall be discussing this further in 
our Assembly. 
I believe we agree in two respects. What is 
needed first is the greatest possible degree of 
security for all the countries of Western and 
Eastern Europe, with a minimum of troops and 
weapons of all kinds. Secondly, solidarity must 
be maintained. Solidarity must not suffer either 
in Western Europe or in the alliance. But this 
presupposes that every country continues to 
enjoy the same degree of security in the future. In 
maintaining this solidarity too, Europe will be 
unable to do without a new Western European 
Union. 
I thank you, Mr. President, ladies and gen-
tlemen, and ask you on behalf of the General 
Affairs Committee to approve the report. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- Thank you, 
Rapporteur. 
The Assembly now has to vote on the draft 
recommendation contained in Document 1099. 
Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the 
Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless 
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five representatives or substitutes present in the 
chamber request a vote by roll-call. 
Does any member request a vote by roll-
call? ... 
That is not the case. 
We shall therefore vote by sitting and 
standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The draft recommendation is adopted 
unanimously 1• 
We shall now vote on the draft order con-
tained in the same document. 
Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the 
Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless 
five representatives or substitutes present in the 
chamber request a vote by roll-call. 
Does any member request a vote by roll-
call? ... 
That is not the case. 
We shall therefore vote by sitting and 
standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The draft order is agreed to unanimously 2• 
I. See page 20. 
2. See page 21. 
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8. Date, time and order$ of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting 
tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 3rd June, at 
10 a.m. with the following orders of the day: 
1. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial 
organs of Western European Union for the 
financial years 1986 (revised) and 1987 
(Presentation of and debate on the reports 
of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration and vote on the draft rec-
ommendation, Documents 1088 and 
1105). 
2. European space policy until 2000 (Presen-
tation of and debate on the report of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions, Document 1 098). 
3. Address by Mr. Fischbach, Minister of 
Defence of Luxembourg. 
Are there any objections? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 5.35 p.m.) 
FOURTH SITTING 
Wednesday, 3rd June 1987 
SUMMARY 
1. Attendance register. 
2. Adoption of the minutes. 
3. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of 
Western European Union for the financial years 1986 
(revised) and 1987 (Presentation of and debate on the 
reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admin-
istration and vote on the draft recommendation, Does. 
1088 and 11 05). 
Speakers; The President, Mr. Linster (Rapporteur), Mr. 
Giust, Mr. Linster (Rapporteur). 
4. European space policy until 2000 (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Tech-
nological and Aerospace Questions, Doe. 1098). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Valleix (Rapporteur), Sir 
John Osborn, Mr. Fourre, Sir Paul Hawkins, Mr. Valleix 
(Rapporteur). 
5. Address by Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of Luxem-
bourg. 
Replies by Mr. Fischbach to questions put by: Sir John 
Osborn, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Bayulken (Observer from 
Turkey), Mr. Elmquist (Observer from Denmark), Mr. 
Valleix. 
6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. 
The sitting was opened at 10 a. m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
1. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended 
to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). In 
accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, the minutes of proceedings of the pre-
vious sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
3. Opinion on the budgets 
of the ministerial organs 
of Western European Union 
for the financial years 1986 (revised) 
and 1987 
(Presentation of and debate on the reports of the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote 
on the draft recommendation, Does. 1088 and 1105) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The orders 
of the day call for the presentation of and debate 
I. See page 23. 
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on the reports of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration on the opinion on 
the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western 
European Union for the financial years 1986 
(revised) and 1987 and vote on the draft recom-
mendation, Documents 1088 and 1105. 
I call Mr. Linster, Rapporteur. 
Mr. LINSTER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
Mr. President, please allow a Luxembourg parlia-
mentarian to congratulate you on your election, 
in an accent as distinctive emotionally as it is lin-
guistically. In Luxembourg, despite the political 
differences that may sometimes divide us, we 
know you as a man who is not only able, 
dynamic and fair-minded but also capable of all 
the necessary frankness and honesty on a day-
to-day basis. 
Mr. President, you will certainly need all these 
qualities and all the political weight conferred on 
you by your election by the parliamentarians of 
our seven countries in order to continue Pres-
ident Caro's work of increasingly involving the 
Assembly in the decisions which must make 
WEU the spearhead of European security policy 
and the leading advocate of this policy where the 
public is concerned. 
Mr. President, if our parliamentary Assembly, 
which has all the necessary moral and intel-
lectual resources, does not very soon receive all 
the funds, technical resources and staff needed 
for this essential and urgent mission, that 
mission will not be achieved. That is why I said 
in Luxembourg and repeat here this morning 
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that discussion of the Assembly's finances and 
budget is essential to the political debate. 
Under a Luxembourg· Chairman of the 
Council, Mr. Jacques Poos, whose devotion to 
duty and efficiency have repeatedly been 
acknowledged by the Assembly, considerable 
and significant progress has been made towards 
the financial independence of our Assembly and 
a distinct improvement in its,financial base. But 
the progress reported by Mr. Poos in Luxem-
bourg still needs to be consolidated and trans-
lated into hard, tangible and above all, Mr. Pres-
ident, ladies and gentlemen, irreversible facts. It 
has, moreover, to be rounded off by a final 
breakthrough as regards growth rate, which I do 
not need to tell you is absolutely essential to the 
viability, not to say the financial survival of our 
Assembly and the effectiveness of its work. Let 
us hope, Mr. President, that under another Lux-
embourg presidency - your own - this consoli-
dation can be achieved and the further necessary 
progress made without too much delay. 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I see that 
at the end of my statement to the elected Pres-
ident I went straight into the report, or the con-
clusions, which I have to present to you this 
morning. 
Article VIII (c) of the charter requires our 
Assembly to express its views on the annual 
budget of the ministerial organs. In this instance, 
we are conceFned with the revised budgets for the 
financial years 1986 (revised) and 1987. Since 
time is short, and pursuant to an old custom, I 
have considered only the financial aspects of 
these budgets in my report, while adding a few 
comments of a general nature. 
I would therefore refer you to Document 
A/WEU/BA (87)1, because I wish to pass on a 
number of ideas on the Assembly's finances 
which came to me when I was studying the 
budgets of the ministerial organs. 
I should not, however, wish to go any further 
without paying tribute to Sir Dudley Smith, who 
has shown his skill, fighting spirit and tenacity in 
seeking to improve the Assembly's finances in 
the four years he has been Chairman of the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
His qualities have certainly made a major contri-
bution to the initial success we can now record. I 
would therefore ask the British members who are 
still here to convey to him our committee's 
thanks for his chairmanship, which was fair 
effective and, to use an English phrase, very 
much up to the mark. 
Mr. President, if a logical link is to be forged 
between the budgets of the ministerial organs 
and of our Assembly, several clearly established 
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facts in the financial practices of the ministerial 
organs should be emphasised. 
Firstly, the budget of these ministerial organs 
for 1986 was revised upwards before the annual 
growth rate for 1987 was applied. This is prefer-
ential treatment on the part of the Permanent 
Council and the Council of Ministers which can 
only make us, the elected representatives of the 
people, green with envy. 
Then, the growth rate has in no sense been 
zero for the ministerial organsi not even in real 
terms. It must be remembered that vacant posts 
have resulted in the generation of financial 
reserves for the ministerial organs. They have 
enabled appropriations to be transferred from 
the head for expenditure on personnel to oper-
ating expenditure. I do not for the moment want 
to comment on the fact that, while our staff 
needs remain unsatisfied, those posts, although 
already agreed, have been left vacant for a very 
long time. Judging from the staff policy of the 
ministerial organs and from the transfers of 
appropriations from one head to another by the 
ministerial organs, I conclude that these organs 
have assumed their freedom to determine their 
staff policy and their financial independence 
within the limits of their appropriations for 
which we have constantly been asking in vai~ for 
many years. 
This observation leads me logically to the 
budgetary and financial problems of our 
Assembly. When consulting the relevant docu-
ments - A/WEU/BA (87) 1 and 6 - you will 
have noted that at the beginning of May, imme-
diat~ly after our Assembly's extraordinary 
sessiOn, I presented a supplementary report on 
the budgets of the ministerial organs and a 
revised draft recommendation. After the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
had adopted my report in Palermo on 27th Feb-
ruary 1987, some new facts emerged which we 
were able to take into account in Luxembourg, 
and this led me to modify the original draft rec-
ommendation. In the draft recommendation and 
my report I had placed the emphasis chiefly on 
four essential demands, which I will summarise 
as follows: 
First, the abandonment of the zero growth rate 
criterion applied to all the Assembly's budgets, 
including pensions, a principle that does the via-
bility of our Assembly no good at all, as you all 
know. Second, its replacement with a more real-
istic criterion allowing a growth rate equal to that 
adopted for the institutions of the European 
Communities and especially for the Parlia-
mentary Assembly in Strasbourg to be applied to 
the operating budget. Third, the separation of the 
pensions budget from the operating budget, 
where the growth rate is concerned. Fourth, the 
Assembly's budgetary independence within the 
limits of the growth agreed annually. 
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Well, you heard what the Chairman-in-Office 
of the Council had to say in Luxembourg and 
you know that the Council has recognised the 
principles of establishing a separate budget for 
pensions, irrespective of the growth rate, and of 
independence. 
In conclusion, I should like to make four com-
ments which I consider to be essential: 
If, as some people claim, the Luxembourg 
decisions still need to be formalised, everyone 
must realise, as the committee does, that this is a 
formality and will not be the subject of a secret 
renegotiation at which the members of the Per-
manent Council, hiding behind their govern-
ments, arrive at solutions which do not match up 
to the Luxembourg decisions. I would add that 
we shall not put up with the butler watering the 
wine that our host offered us in Luxembourg, 
nor with his cheating us of the bottles or substi-
tuting them. We must make it absolutely clear 
that we intend to take the coin offered us by Mr. 
Poos in Luxembourg at face value, in the true 
sense of the words. 
Budgetary independence implies that, among 
other things, we shall be able, like the ministerial 
organs, to make transfers from one expenditure 
head to another; otherwise, independence will be 
meaningless; immediately to begin applying the 
growth rate fixed at 2. 79%; to turn to account 
without delay the appropriations released as a 
result of the exclusion of the pensions from the 
growth rate from now on, so that in particular 
the Office of the Clerk may be restructured and 
certain members of the staff may be given the 
promotion that is very long, not to say too long 
overdue. 
My third comment concerns the time-limits 
for the implementation of the decisions which 
Mr. Poos announced in Luxembourg. In answer 
to a clearly worded question from Sir Dudley 
Smith, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
said that these decisions took immediate effect. 
So there should be no beating about the bush: 
action must be taken, as the old saying goes: 
" Hie Rhodus, hie salta ". That is the clear and 
unmistakable message addressed to you, Mr. 
Chairman, and to the Council by our committee 
and with it, I hope, the Assembly. Be bold and 
resolute, Mr. Chairman, and do not be deceived 
by those who would take refuge behind formal-
ities of which we have more than enough. 
My final comment concerns the revised rec-
ommendation. The committee has retained quite 
a number of paragraphs in the preamble, which 
are still topical, and three recommendations, 
which remain essential: uniting the WEU minis-
terial organs in a single seat with one table of 
establishment, if only for reasons of economy 
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and financial efficiency; establishing the dual 
grading that has long been requested, to improve 
the career prospects of staff everywhere, and par-
ticularly of our own; last but not least, replacing 
the zero growth rate with the growth rate applied 
to the various institutions of the European Com-
munities. Until the zero growth rate has been 
abandoned, our final battle will not have been 
won. This last demand is still essential, because 
even if the zero growth rate is applied in real 
terms and in the context of the Luxembourg 
decisions, there will still be no revival of the 
Assembly's political activities and consequently, 
in our opinion, no reactivation of WEU. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - My thanks 
to the Rapporteur. I should like to congratulate 
you, in my turn, on your election to this 
important post. 
I would ask the Assembly to note that this 
afternoon's sitting will be followed by a meeting 
of the Presidential Committee for the discussion 
of the budgetary problems to which you have 
referred. 
The debate is open and I call Mr. Giust. 
Mr. GIUST (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. Pres-
ident, ladies and gentlemen, I would first of all 
like to congratulate Mr. Linster most sincerely 
on his accurate and full report and, at the same 
time, on his election as Chairman of the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
If he performs that office - as he certainly will -
with the same energy and clearsightedness he has 
shown this morning in dealing with the report he 
will definitely add stature and authority to his 
committee. 
As I have already had several occasions to say, 
Mr. President, we are part of an organisation in 
which the situation is not the same as in national 
parliaments. In them the Budget Committee is 
one of the most authoritative organs in decisions 
on expenditure. In WEU, however, the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
strives to be so but it has neither the legal nor the 
operative capacity to influence the policies of 
WEU itself. For that reason, although I shall be 
voting for the draft recommendation and con-
gratulate the Rapporteur on what he has said, the 
amendments he has proposed and the final 
understanding reached, I feel it is my duty to 
draw everyone's attention - and I do so, Mr. 
President, having in mind your statement a 
moment ago regarding the important meeting to 
take place this evening in order to discuss budg-
etary matters in the Presidential Committee- to 
the hope that this meeting will strengthen the 
determination to get across the points which 
must be made with regard to the budget. In fact, 
and this is the first . point I want to make, 
whatever view we have of the authority and 
scope for action of our Assembly and the Corn-
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mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, 
we have to acknowledge that in fact our power of 
decision is limited to 10%, possibly even less, of 
WEU's total expenditure. 
Mr. Linster has endeavoured to voice a 
judgement - and he has done so very well - on 
the relative positions of the three agencies and, 
by implication, that of the Secretariat-General 
and the ministerial organs. There is no doubt 
that, in the present case, the Assembly expresses 
no more than a theoretical vote, a vote of confi-
dence, and certainly not an analysis of the 
spending and activities of those organs over 
which it has no authority. It is only in a position' 
to formulate very limited and general observa-
tions about expenditure and therefore on the 
general policy of WEU. 
The position taken by Mr. Poos both at the 
Luxembourg meeting and in his statements yes-
terday is certainly to be appreciated. What he 
said on behalf of the Council of Ministers is cer-
tainly evidence of good will supported by his 
own and much appreciated personal conviction. 
Unfortunately that improves things only slightly. 
In fact the limited result in the way of exceeding 
so-called zero growth raises for all of us the 
problem of the central nature of the Assembly in 
appraising the Council of Ministers and giving it 
the right, as was said in yesterday's debate, to 
become the European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
Let me, again very briefly, recall a number of 
views expressed by the Rapporteur. We cannot 
go on with the ambiguous situation of having 
two centres. It is right that this subject, a 
problem of expenditure and logic in the func-
tioning of an organisation like ours, should be 
raised in this chamber, Mr. President. 
On this point I must draw your attention to 
the strange situations that are caused by the exis-
tence of two headquarters. Mr. Zierer was quite 
right, some time ago, to put his question on the 
geographical split, taking the example of WEU 
officials in London and Paris. To me it does not 
seem fair or right that 80% of WEU officials 
should be British or French. This does not seem 
fair on the other five national delegations that 
share, with equal rights and contributions, in our 
work, alongside the two I have just mentioned. 
I believe this example of the number of offi-
cials is typical of the imbalance there is, also 
illustrated by the affair of the two head-
quarters. 
I would like to conclude, Mr. President and 
ladies and gentlemen, with a still more relevant 
point about the functional efficiency of our 
Assembly. We should not, so to speak, be only 
receivers of inputs, that is, decisions of the 
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Council of Ministers and the other ministerial 
organs. Mr. Linster was again right to make a 
case for independence in the general judgment 
on the budget and our Assembly's right to make 
decisions upon it both as regards the distribution 
of spending within the budget and as regards the 
general expenditure of the Assembly and the 
WEU ministerial organs. 
Once again, Mr. President, we need to recall 
everything that has been said in the past inside 
and outside this chamber on the importance of 
the Rome declaration regarding the need for the 
reactivation of WEU as a European defence 
organisation. We should repeat it in order to 
confirm once again in this chamber that the right 
of budgetary independence is primarily a 
political statement on the reactivation of 
Western European Union. As long as that does 
not happen and as long as we are called to meet 
in this chamber simply to ratify and applaud the 
favour done us in raising above zero growth, 
Western European Union cannot be the political 
expression of the national delegations of the 
seven countries that took the political decision to 
set it up for the military security of our 
Europe. 
It is with this principle and this prospect in 
mind that once again I thank Mr. Linster the 
Rapporteur and the committee as a whole, in the 
hope, Mr. President, that you too will press the 
same views vigorously at this evening's meeting. 
I am sure that the document that we shall soon 
be approving will not remain simply a theo-
retical - if necessary and formal - assertion but 
above all a hope, I would almost say an outcry, 
from this Assembly that WEU should really 
become the European pillar of defence, ensuring 
greater security for the seven member coun-
tries. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is closed. 
I call the Rapporteur. 
Mr. LINSTER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
Mr. President, I shall simply say how glad I am 
that Mr. Giust, who, I believe, was speaking on 
behalf of many other members of the committee, 
stressed the extent to which claiming and 
obtaining financial independence for the 
Assembly is a political decision linked to its reac-
tivation. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - We shall 
now vote on the draft recommendation con-
tained in Document 1105. 
Under Rule 33, the Assembly will vote by 
sitting and standing unless five representatives or 
substitutes present in the chamber request a vote 
by roll-call. 
Does anyone request a vote by roll-call? ... 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
The President (continued) 
As this is not the case, the Assembly will vote 
by sitting and standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The draft recommendation is adopted 
unanimously 1• 
4. European space policy until 2000 
(Presentation of and debate on the report 
of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doe. 1098) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The orders 
of the day now provide for the presentation of 
and debate on the report of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Ques-
tions on European space policy until 2000, Doc-
ument 1098. 
I call Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). -
Ladies and gentlemen, we come now to a topic 
quite different from those we have been dis-
cussing since the start of the part-session. The 
debate which follows - and I hope some of my 
fellow delegates will be able to take part - con-
cerns Europe's future in space until the year 
2000, or perhaps 2005, as that is the theoretical 
timetable for the completion of the Hermes pro-
gramme. 
The topic continues to be a thoroughly live 
issue and the space debate in Europe is at present 
very lively and practical. But the debate is not 
confined to Europe; it is also going on in the 
United States and there are problems elsewhere, 
too, for example with the Proton launcher in the 
Soviet Union. 
It might be said that the space issue was cur-
rently at a standstill, as the intensive efforts and 
development of recent years have been marking 
time, both in the United States and in Europe, 
partly because of the Challenger shuttle tragedy-
and our sympathy still goes out to our American 
friends on that subject - and partly because of 
the admitted failure of Ariane, just a year ago. 
If things are at a standstill, then the standstill 
has never been more mobile. If we go to the 
United States, as the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions did at 
the end of March, we find that the Americans, 
like the Europeans, have exceptionally full pro-
grammes for the future. 
In short, the situation is paradoxical, and that 
is why your committee and the Bureau agreed to 
l. See page 24. 
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discuss this aspect of space, which we have 
already considered in the past. The present situ-
ation is in fact notable for the considerable 
advances already made, the current stagnation 
affecting the western world in particular, and the 
exhilarating prospects for the future, which will 
undoubtedly leave their mark on our civili-
sation. 
The committee which went to the United 
States was represented by a large number of per-
sistent and outstandingly studious members. In 
the absence of its Chairman, Mr. Wilkinson, 
whom I must excuse in view of his obligations 
associated with the electoral campaign in his 
country, it is up to me to stress that the commit-
tee's United States mission owes its success not 
only to the work of the Chairman but also, I am 
pleased to say, to the quality and commitment of 
the committee's new Secretary, Mr. de Gou. 
We observed in the United States - and here 
already is a political comment - how greatly the 
Americans had been shaken by the Challenger 
disaster and how intolerant, and impatient, they 
are at the period of reorganisation which will not 
now be concluded before the end of 1988, with 
the launching of a new shuttle, which had been 
hoped for earlier. 
From these findings and impressions I draw a 
conclusion which seems to me to carry a political 
message: it appears that in the situation that 
affects them now, our American friends are more 
inclined to engage in dialogue with Europe. 
For instance, here is one, highly personal 
impression. At Martin Marietta, a young 
engineer of forty spoke to us in terms which 
would have been out of place two or three years 
ago, when no such ideas would have been enter-
tained. He said, more or less: "We have to 
reckon with you Europeans. In aviation you 
have the Airbus Industrie, and Americans of our 
generation cannot afford to disregard that. On 
space questions it will certainly be necessary for 
us to work together at times. " 
This kind of comment reflects a change of 
attitude which must be taken into acdount and 
which I hasten to pass on to you. 1 
Ladies and gentlemen, my other subjtct is par-
ticularly topical in terms of the f. metable, 
regardless of the circumstances I have ust men-
tioned. 
Very soon, in November 1987, a Jinisterial 
meeting will announce the new ;~~ce pro-
gramme, involving costs much higher tlan those 
approved in Rome in January 1985. I efer here 
to the European space programme, a d to the 
meeting of representatives of the I thirteen 
member countries of the recently enlarged 
European Space Agency. ' 
I 
I 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. Valleix (continued) 
The matter is also topical because the negotia-
tions between Europe and the United States on 
the space station are reaching a critical phase. 
The subject is topical not only because of the 
timetable but also because of the particular char-
acter of the space environment. This was what I 
meant when I referred to the upsets experienced 
with shuttles, launchers and vehicles capable of 
putting satellites into orbit. On any assumption 
we must expect some ground to be lost where 
Europe is concerned and the more open attitude 
in the United States that I mentioned just now. 
Account must also be taken of another factor 
which should encourage us, not into a precipitate 
response but into action and commitment. It is 
clear that the Soviets, notwithstanding some set-
backs, have scored some major successes in 
space, which to me provide confirmation of their 
lead over the West. 
This statement is supported by two observa-
tions. When visiting the United States Space 
Command in Colorado Springs, which monitors 
all world satellite movements including those of 
the Soviet Mir satellite on behalf of NATO and 
therefore for the United States and Canada as 
well, we were struck by the announcement that 
the West had no anti-satellite weapon, though 
the Soviet Union already had such a system. 
When I asked him about this, the general in 
command of the base simply replied: " Congress 
did not agree to allocate the necessary funds". I 
repeat here what I said yesterday during the 
debate on disarmament: when it comes to 
defence and the major issues, the totalitarian 
systems have far greater room for manreuvre 
than the democracies, because they have only to 
give orders, whereas we have to reach our deci-
sions democratically, and therefore sometimes 
fail to reach them at all. 
I will conclude my remarks on the space envi-
ronment by saying something about the need to 
make the public and our governments more con-
scious of space issues. 
Public opinion in our countries is well-
disposed towards the space effort, as landing a 
man on the moon is a media event which our 
fellow citizens greatly relish. Apart from the 
purely scientific interest of these experiments, 
manned flights are consequently supported by 
this public enthusiasm. In years to come, public 
support in our countries will be essential to the 
effort we shall inevitably have to make in 
space. 
The awareness of our governments must also 
be increased. The current European programme 
will be drawn up in detail next November, and, 
as the budget estimates are not approximate but 
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real in the sense that they allow for increasing 
cost levels, we must expect government alloca-
tions to the space budget to double between now 
and the year 2000. 
It is in these circumstances that I venture to 
say to you: " Let us get to work. " This is an obli-
gation that we parliamentarians, who are the link 
between the public and governments, are bound 
to shoulder. 
These are the general observations I wanted to 
make. 
I turn now to a very substantial report, to 
which our secretariat and the committee sec-
retary made a major contribution. Without 
inflicting a detailed reading on you, I will point 
out that the report provides the most up-to-date 
summary of space matters as they now stand. It 
contains references to virtually all aspects of 
space. 
It is, however, important that I revert to a few 
topics in the report which provide the basis for 
the six-point draft recommendation on which 
you will be voting. You will doubtless have 
noticed that this recommendation is fairly short 
compared with previous documents on these 
subjects. I wanted it to be more political than 
scientific or technical, and that is why it deals 
with certain agreements in preparation and 
sounds a warning with regard to certain practices 
that are developing among our European 
partners. 
This recommendation, based on existing con-
ditions, will provide easy means of verification 
in coming months, and, Mr. Secretary-General, 
will enable us, in conjunction with the Council of 
Ministers, to take stock on the basis of this 
political schedule. One of the purposes of the rec-
ommendation is to initiate dialogue and create 
productivity in our European space efforts. 
I shall refer to a further two points: the compe-
tition between the various countries and the 
European Space Agency, and the choices to be 
made between the civil and military pro-
grammes. We must also take note of the current 
upsurge of projects in Europe and the world, and 
must establish priorities so that Europe can be 
independent by the end of the twentieth 
century. 
Another major debate springs from the acci-
dents to the American shuttle and the Ariane 
rocket, and I refer here to launcher policy and 
the definition of expenditure and real production 
costs. 
It is equally obvious that we cannot dissociate 
ourselves from co-operation between Europe and 
the United States, particularly as far as the 
western space station is concerned. Following the 
meeting of our committee this morning and in 
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the light of the debates which have taken place in 
this forum since the beginning of the week, it 
seems that an armaments control agency will 
become an increasingly essential tool for Europe. 
WEU is certain to have something to say about 
that. 
"Distinction between civilian and military 
programmes " is the title of Chapter Ill of my 
report. You will certainly have noted - the 
figures are striking - that in 1983, the year for 
which the most recent statistics are available, 
62% of the world space budget, or some $35 
billion, were invested in military space pro-
grammes, compared with 38% in civilian space 
programmes. It is interesting to observe that, for 
the same year, the Soviet space budget was 
$13.5 billion, compared with $8 billion for the 
United States. It is hardly necessary to add that 
the figures for Europe, Japan and India were neg-
ligible. 
Those are the facts, and the question whether 
or not the military use of space should be con-
trolled or prohibited has been overtaken by 
events. The United States is well aware of this, 
but the fact that it has been outstripped by the 
Soviet Union obliges it to force the pace of its 
military development efforts, not without diffi-
culty and not without arguments in Congress, as 
you know. 
When we visited the United States we learnt 
that Congress's efforts were common knowledge 
and the talk we had with our American col-
leagues confirmed the Americans' determination 
in this area. Hence the possible development of 
the strategic defence initiative. 
There is another difficulty which should be 
mentioned under the heading of civilian and mil-
itary programmes. Together with the European 
effort at co-operation in the civilian domain, we 
are witnessing a fairly rapid development in the 
work of national organisations, in a form of com-
petition with the European Space Agency, which 
is itself expanding not only as regards its pro-
grammes but also in the growing number of 
member countries. France, Italy, the United 
Kingdom and Germany now have their own 
space agencies, and this must in essence be seen 
as a favourable development, because the deeper 
our countries' commitment, the more active 
their partnership will become. 
Ladies and gentlemen, it seems to me to be 
crucial that our Assembly and each one of us 
should welcome a constructive sharing of pos-
itive national efforts, though they must not be 
detrimental to the vital European co-operation. 
Do I need to remind you that Europe is the third 
space power after the United States and the 
Soviet Union? We must remember that we have 
no right to jeopardise that position. 
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I would now like to say a quick ord on 
launcher policy. Following the shuttl disaster 
and the Ariane 5 failures, we are now faced with 
a resurgence of traditional launcher te hnology, 
and there is a revival of non-recovera le com-
mercial launchers in the market. Ariane accounts 
for 50% of the world launcher market and this 
position is perhaps easier to achieve than to 
sustain, although we must make every e ort, dif-
ficult as it may be, to keep this market by the 
deployment of all the European resources nec-
essary - provided they are honest, of !urse. 
Our campaign must be systematic: ur com-
petitors are not asleep. The United tates is 
deprived of its shuttle for another ye r and a 
half. President Reagan himself made a s atement 
in August 1986 which simultaneously prohibited 
shuttle flights for a number of years and initiated 
the Delta ll programme carried ~ut by 
McDonnell Douglas. This is covered in para-
graphs 89 and 90 of my report, an I shall 
therefore not labour the point, but it must be 
recognised that the contracts awarded ar already 
considerable, and the launcher program es have 
development dates of 1988, 1989 and 1990. 
Delta ll has a standard launch capa~·lity into 
geostationary or low orbit of 1.4 tonn s to 1.8 
tonnes. Also in the United States, Ma in Mar-
ietta is developing the Titan Ill pr gramme 
which can put 4 500 kg into geos ationary 
transfer orbit. Contracts have also been awarded 
for the Titan ll and Titan IV programmes. 
General Dynamics is working on Atla and the 
Atlas G-Centaur, which will be a odified 
model, launched from the V andenb rg base, 
which we visited. So the Americans ar moving 
towards very substantial cost reductio s, espe-
cially with the so-called heavy-lift 1 unchers 
which have a payload capability of 5 to 68 
tonnes, in accordance with SDI programme 
requirements. Boeing and Hughes Aircraft 
Company are also involved in th se pro-
grammes, as is Rockwell International and we 
are now working on payload capabilitie of some 
tens of tonnes. 
But the United States is not alone, 1 dies and 
gentlemen. The Soviet Union is working on 
payload capabilities which should en le it to 
manufacture equipment suitable for ounting 
on its Mir space platform to provide a commo-
dation for up to 200 astronauts. In a ord, we 
can see behind the launcher techno ogy the 
development of highly intricate pro rammes 
which have nothing in common with what we 
are familiar with at present. Attention is drawn 
to this point in paragraph 2 of the dralt recom-
mendation. 
Developments within Europe at nati nallevel 
are dealt with in paragraphs 128 to 1 1 of the 
report. I hope that our German and It lian col-
leagues will not mind my making no special 
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mention of their problems, for the simple reason 
that they are being redefined at the moment. 
Italy and France are making quite considerable 
efforts. France is involved in the field of 
European military space programmes with its 
Helios and Syracuse 11 satellites, and the United 
Kingdom with its Skynet system. 
Co-operation is taking place in military 
matters, and this is therefore the moment for us 
to remember that the Soviet proposals on arms 
control advanced at Reykjavik and the debates 
now in progress are equally good reasons for 
Europe not to fall behind, if we are to embark on 
disarmament. Disarmament can be genuine only 
if it is verifiable and actually verified, capable of 
being monitored and actually monitored. In 
future months and years we must therefore con-
template the prospect of a European space pro-
gramme. The Council must seriously consider 
this question, which is touched on in paragraph 5 
of the draft recommendation. 
International co-operation at multilateral or 
bilateral level is dealt with in other paragraphs. 
So much is happening that I shall not go into it 
point by point, but will simply remind you that 
there are some elements in the international 
space effort which we fail to appreciate. Japan 
was late in starting to compete with Europe, but 
it has moved ahead quite fast with its H-1 
launchers, etc. A perhaps less well-known fact is 
that the Chinese have made great strides in this 
competition, to which they have allocated the 
considerable sum of nearly 20 billion francs a 
year over the last twenty years or so. They are 
endeavouring to secure a foothold on a world 
market, particularly for their launchers, and will 
shortly be putting satellites of Chinese manu-
facture into orbit. 
I have not so far mentioned India. The space 
budget of that enormous third world country is 
already large and has the very specific purpose of 
providing telecommunications relays, as ground-
based links are a rarity. India's space programme 
aims at fighting illiteracy, improving meteoro-
logical data and indirectly combating famine. In 
short, India is a typical example of a country 
where space is used for specific purposes appro-
priate to developing countries. This experiment 
is all the more attractive because it benefits other 
disadvantaged countries. Europe could well 
support this programme. 
I have a special comment to make on the 
Soviet Union where bilateral co-operation is 
concerned. In the United States we were ques-
tioned, not aggressively but closely, about our 
European partnerships. Jealousy is not the issue 
here, as we are in good company. Several 
European countries have collaborated in space 
programmes with the Soviet Union concerning 
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astronauts, laboratories and the use of Soviet 
launchers. I mention this problem because it is of 
some importance, not merely because the Amer-
icans alluded to it, but quite simply because they 
themselves are to some extent involved in the 
matter. The subject is consequently referred to in 
paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation. 
There are advantages in trying to civilise space 
and circumscribe the areas of threat, but it is not 
a good idea to do so unsystematically, for one 
simple reason: there is no reciprocity with the 
Soviet Union. We place orders with them, but 
the reverse procedure is unknown. 
In the second place, they have no respect for 
commercial principles - a concept which is, of 
course, lost on them. This means among other 
things that services can be supplied without any 
regard for the real cost, and that may cause diffi-
culties for the western market. Our recommen-
dation therefore refers to this point and suggests 
that such arrrangements be avoided in future if 
we do not have an assurance of reciprocity and 
respect for commercial principles. 
I would add, as an unwritten axiom, that reci-
procity also means reciprocity in matters of con-
fidentiality, as guaranteed by the Chinese. It is 
not enough to tell us that customers can convey 
their own satellites to the launch site and thereby 
monitor proceedings until the last moment. The 
Soviet Union does not go that far, and caution is 
therefore indicated. 
Ladies and gentlemen, to keep to essentials 
and conclude by dealing rapidly with the space 
station, I will confine myself to some general 
remarks, as all the details are contained in the 
report. 
The western space station is programmed for 
1995. You will have observed that, once again, 
we are very much behind the Soviet Union, 
which is in the process of creating the Mir space 
station which by 1995 will doubtless have a 
manning capability of dozens and dozens of 
space personnel, or astronauts. It is therefore 
important that we direct our efforts and allocate 
the resources necessary to the success of the 
western space station. As you know, Europe can 
take part in this project, and we hope that the 
normalisation of relations between the United 
States and Europe will enable agreement to be 
reached on co-operation in this field. 
You know that on the European side, apart 
from the programmed Ariane 3, 4 and 5 
launchers, the extended space participation 
scheme includes the Hermes and Columbus pro-
grammes and possibly the Pallas project for a 
European space station. When we talk of aiming 
at autonomy in space matters by the year 2000, 
that involves implementing a programme of this 
kind, and I have indicated the foreseeable budget 
implications. 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. Valleix (continued) 
With regard to co-operation with the United 
States, co-operation on the space station has 
already been virtually agreed, both by the 
European Space Agency and by Canada and 
Japan. Since the details of the various partici-
pation arrangements are mentioned in the 
report, I shall not go into them here. 
We have now reached the critical moment. 
Last April when we returned from the mission to 
the United States, the Americans had presented 
Europe with a draft agreement and we at once 
altered our draft recommendation. It transpired 
that the Americans wanted to insert a military 
clause, so to speak, into the space station project, 
but the fact that no reference is made to this in 
the present draft recommendation must make 
the text easier to adopt. 
Our European countries and the European 
Space Agency are preparing their reply. 
This project is of major importance, because 
in this worldwide competition we are left with no 
choice. The question as to whether or not the 
military should be given access to space has been 
superseded, and as far as the space stations are 
concerned there is every likelihood of a military 
presence. Mir, module upon module of it, will be 
the world's first major space station and it will be 
Soviet! 
As you can see, ladies and gentlemen, this 
subject could not be a more immediate or 
burning issue, since it has both military and 
civilian implications and the associated scientific 
and technological research and achievements are 
equally important to the most disadvantaged 
peoples and to our own modern world. 
Space, which offers us new raw materials, new 
energy sources, new superconductive systems 
and new laboratory techniques, signifies an 
enormous leap forward, which is bound to affect 
the environment of future generations. 
My last point concerns the space agency for 
monitoring satellites. You are aware that this 
idea was put forward by France and that the 
committee discussed it on two or three occa-
sions, with Mr. Fourre in particular. The issue is 
not raised in the draft recommendation because 
the time does not seem to be ripe politically. It 
represents the logical extension to space of the 
consequences of possible disarmament agree-
ments. I mention the subject openly on this 
platform - though it would be premature, politi-
cally speaking, to put it in writing, but apposite 
to stimulate WEU's thought processes- because 
I hope that, in the present stage of its reacti-
vation, WEU will confirm its determination to 
give Europe its chance, so that disarmament con-
tinues to be synonymous with peace in the 
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future, as it is today under the threat o terror. If 
not, it would be a confidence trick. 
That is the substance of what I want d to say, 
Mr. President. Please forgive me fo having 
spoken at some length, but space is an inex-
haustible topic and this report deals wit subjects 
of immediate concern. 
Competition is wide open. The link between 
Europe and the United States must also be rein-
forced in this area of prime importance. Never-
theless, Europe's ambition must be tl. prepare 
itself, as Japan is already doing and o hers will 
do in the near future, for an autonom us space 
capability by the year 2000. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - T ank you, 
Mr. V alleix. 
Before calling the first speaker in th general 
debate I wish to draw your attention, 1 dies and 
gentlemen, to the fact that this de ate will 
provide the last occasion for two memb rs of the 
British Delegation to address this As embly. I 
refer to Sir John Osborn and Sir Paul awkins, 
and I need not say how greatly we regret their 
departure. I pay special tribute to both n behalf 
of the Assembly. 
I now call Sir John Os born. 
Sir John OSBORN (United King, om). -
Thank you for those kind words, Mr. resident. 
When I made my maiden speech in the ouse of 
Commons, I asked for the indulgence of the 
House, and this morning I may reminf' see over 
forty years as well as looking to the uture. I 
hope, therefore, that I shall have yo r indul-
gence, Mr. President, and that of the 
Assembly. 
First, I congratulate Mr. Valleix on fuis wide-
ranging and comprehensive speech on European 
space policy until 2000 and on the repo itself. I 
hope that it receives the attention that it 
deserves. 
Nearly fifteen years ago, I joined the Western 
European Union Committee on Scienti c, Tech-
nological and Aerospace Questio s. The 
Chairman was Due Pierre de Montesquiou and 
the Secretary was Hugh Huigens, who left that 
office only a year ago. 
This debate is taking place before the Paris air 
show at Le Bourget, a time for the in ustry to 
show its military and civil achievem nts and 
concepts in aviation and aerospace. y first 
visits to Le Bourget were dominated by the 
Anglo-French concept, the Concorde, which I 
supported from the early 1960s, over tw rity-five 
years ago. Concorde has been a great techno-
logical advance, if not a eo mercial 
achievement. 
Before I entered the House of Comm ns I was 
a supplier to the aircraft industry anid I fre-
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quently attended the Farnborough air show. It 
was sponsored by the Society of British Aircraft 
Companies, but SBAC stands now for the 
Society of British Aerospace Companies. My first 
attendance was in the early 1950s as a personal 
guest of Lord Hives ofRolls-Royce, the company 
which was pioneering the commercial use of the 
jet engine. 
As you have suggested, Mr. President, this 
could be my last speech of many in the British 
Parliament, the European Parliament, the 
Council of Europe and this Assembly since I 
entered the House of Commons in 1959. Most of 
my speeches have been directed to industrial, sci-
entific or technological issues and their implica-
tions. I was one of the first British members of 
parliament to visit the European launcher site in 
Kourou in French Guiana in the early 1970s. In 
the early 1960s I backed the British space pro-
gramme, involving the De Havilland company, 
Blue Streak and Black Knight. It was decided to 
cancel those projects, but out of them grew the 
European space programme. 
To an increasing extent the programme has 
been monitored, assessed and encouraged by 
WEU through the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. WEU 
has been much more effective in this subject 
than any other assembly, including the European 
Parliament or the Council of Europe. The body 
that has sponsored this space programme in 
Europe has been the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. Mr. 
V alleix has referred in his report to the colloquy 
on the space challenge for Europe, which took 
place in Munich in September 1985. The subse-
quent report appeared under Mr. Lenzer's name, 
he being the chairman. It has been one of many 
useful colloquies that have brought together 
many of those who are interested in aerospace. 
The European Space Agency is restricted to the 
peaceful uses of space. That extends to space 
communications and the several separate 
organisations, some of which are based in 
Europe. The first such organisation was Intelsat, 
which came out of the NASA programme. 
Space and satellite communications are finan-
cially sound and profitable activities for which 
users pay. That has been a commercial outcome 
of the space programme. Yesterday the Assembly 
debated the role of a reactivated WEU and above 
all the work of the three agencies and the role of 
the Secretary-General. In aerospace there must 
be greater cohesion and dialogue among govern-
ments, their officials and the ministers respon-
sible for aerospace and technology. I have a 
feeling that until there is reactivation there will 
be a lack of co-ordination. That comment is 
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directed not so much to the present Secretary-
General as to his predecessors. 
But for the general election, in Great Britain, 
the Secretary-General would have had a visit to 
his London headquarters by British members of 
parliament who are interested in technology. I 
would have organised such a visit. Among the 
group of members of parliament visiting him 
would have been members of the committee of 
my country that addresses itself to scientific 
affairs. As I am a life member of that committee, 
although no longer a membet of parliament, I 
hope that I shall still be able to visit the Secre-
tary-General to examine with him the extent to 
which I am justified in making my assertion 
about co-ordination. 
It is suggested that the Assembly will be taken 
much more seriously in future and in a more 
business-like manner following a truly reacti-
vated WEU. In that context I find the fifth rec-
ommendation especially appealing. It deals with 
a European military programme of communica-
tions, navigation, observation and reconnais-
sance satellites. Mr. Valleix touched upon that 
subject at the meeting of the Committee on Sci-
entific, Technological and Aetospace Questions 
this morning. I raised the issue of verification, 
which I took up during the discussion in Luxem-
bourg and during the debate on Mr. Ahrens's 
report yesterday. Political will is one consider-
ation, but another is technical, involving seis-
mology, communications and surveillance, and 
particularly surveillance from satellites. I believe 
that WEU should have an appreciation of the 
problems. I welcome the fact that the Committee 
on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions will examine the technical aspects of 
verification as a practical means of achieving 
mutual and balanced force reductions. 
I was a member of the group that visited the 
United States during March and April. I also par-
ticipated in a tour of the United States three 
years ago. I have not had the opportunity, 
however, of bringing up to date my impressions 
of co-operation with the United States. 
Recommendations 4 and 6 refer to intergov-
ernmental agreements with the United States on 
the space station and on the need to encourage a 
space dialogue with the United States. I shall 
return to that point at the end of my contri-
bution. 
Partnership can, however, be based only on 
independence and strength on the European side. 
The information that Mr. Valleix has given us on 
Ariane 2 and 3 is interesting. Ariane 4 will be 
able to place 8 000 kg in low earth orbit, or 4 200 
kg in geostationary transfer orbit, and should be 
in service next year. Ariane 5 is scheduled to be 
ready by 1995 and is planned to have even 
greater reliability and to be able to lift two pay-
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loads of 2 500 kg in a geostationary orbit. When 
the aerospace sub-committee of the Science and 
Technology Committee of the Council of Europe 
visited Toulouse in March it was given a briefing 
on Hermes. That project will be based on Ariane 
5 and will be a manned mini-space plane. It is 
referred to in the report. Much international 
support has already been obtained for it. 
I note that Mr. Valleix has made little or no 
reference to Hotol, a project envisaged by British 
Aerospace. The protagonists of Hermes 
reminded me when I raised the subject of Hotol 
in Toulouse that Hermes is known technology 
based on Ariane 5, whereas the Hotol concept 
has to be proved. I hope, however, that the com-
mittee will encourage the Hotol concept. 
The members of the committee who visited 
the United States will have been brought up to 
date with the details of the Challenger disaster, 
which was referred to by Mr. Valleix, and on the 
setback to the shuttle programme. I first dis-
cussed that programme as a member ofthis com-
mittee when visiting the United States in 1975. I 
again enjoyed a private briefing in 1980. 
The shuttle programme, the space station pro-
gramme and the concept of Columbus are 
therefore very real to me as a member of par-
liament. It probably is equally real to many 
schoolboys, as it is to those who work in the 
industry, although the majority of the public and 
of the elected representatives in our national par-
liaments will remember only what they have 
seen on television or read in the press. The pro-
gramme is ambitious, however, and it must be 
the subject of international co-operation, and 
this committee is one of the few bodies aware of 
that fact. 
I congratulate Mr. Valleix on a lucid and 
ambitious report. Space is a challenge and there 
is a European dimension that must be grasped. 
This Assembly must ensure that the work of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aer-
ospace Questions is taken up and that the 
Council not only gives it the necessary attention 
but displays the leadership that it deserved. The 
Council must display that leadership, and we 
must monitor that aspect from the Assembly. 
My colleague and the Chairman of the com-
mittee, John Wilkinson, would have been 
present but for the general election. He would 
have wanted to be here to support Mr. Valleix in 
person. I shall do that in his place. There is work 
and there is challenge in this area. 
I mentioned earlier Columbus and the space 
station. This week in Paris I had a meeting with 
Mr. Frank Davidson, whom I first met last year. 
He presented me with a book - " Big is Beau-
tiful " - which is the outcome of a series of sem-
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inars on macro and conceptual engineering spon-
sored by the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. His initial work was on the Channel 
tunnel in 1956- a separate interest that involves 
Mr. Valleix and me in view of that project's 
Anglo-French implications. The Channel tunnel 
is too much regarded as a financial problem, but 
it is an exercise in human co-ordination, the 
management of engineering and industrial enter-
prise. 
The Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions visited Hydro Quebec 
in Canada eighteen months ago when we were 
given a presentation on the James Bay project. 
When completed it will have an electricity gene-
rating capacity equivalent to the normal elec-
tricity consumption of the United Kingdom -
50 000 to 60 000 megawatts. That is what we 
mean by the concept of macro engineering. 
Concorde is another example of that. Sir George 
Edwards, on the British side, had a remarkable 
ability to co-ordinate design and engineering to 
achieve the only example of commercial Mach 2 
flying. 
The space station is another example of con-
ceptual engineering, and the scale of what Pres-
ident Reagan and NASA, with backing from the 
western world, has embarked upon makes the 
mind boggle. In all this work there must be a 
strong dialogue between governments and scien-
tists and engineers. One inevitable catalyst must 
be the science and technology committees of 
national parliaments. 
The political will for a space programme cer-
tainly falls into this category. The Science and 
Technology Committee of the North Atlantic 
Assembly has an important role, but so has the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aer-
ospace Questions of WEU. That brings me back 
to the Secretary-General, whom I have come to 
know from his work in London, and the min-
isters. The Council of Ministers has an important 
role to play in this area. 
In conclusion, Mr. President, I thank you for 
your indulgence. It has been a pleasure to work 
in Western European Union, particularly on the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aer-
ospace Questions, on which I have served off 
and on for fifteen years. It is appropriate that my 
last contribution to the Assembly should have 
been on European space policy until 2000. This 
Assembly has work to do: I wish it well. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Fourre. 
Mr. FOURRE (France) (Translation). - I 
should like to begin by congratulating Mr. 
Valleix on a very informative report which 
focuses, as everyone will of course know, on the 
necessary link between the civil and military 
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spheres of the space sector. This leads me to my 
first comment. 
Such reports, presented here at WEU and cen-
tring on space problems, regularly come up 
against the major difficulty of obtaining infor-
mation on all military programmes worldwide. 
Moreover, in paragraph 18 of the report Mr. 
Valleix refers to the scale of the United States' 
and Soviet Union's military programmes. In par-
agraph 19 he points out that more than 62% of 
the total budget was spent on military pro-
grammes and that this share has increased con-
siderably since these figures were forwarded to us 
in 1983. 
What do we know of the United States' and 
Soviet Union's military programmes? Virtually 
nothing, as we ourselves observed in the United 
States during our committee's recent visit. The 
United States is clearly unwilling to divulge 
information on any military programme. 
Everyone knows that the same is true of the 
Soviet Union. This is rather a pity, since in this 
organisation military problems are our particular 
concern. Nevertheless, meeting points do of 
course exist, especially where European 
co-operation is concerned. This is what the 
Rapporteur was bringing to our attention when 
he referred to all those aspects of international 
co-operation. 
He also forced us to face the problems of com-
petition, in the civilian sector in particular, with 
the United States and the Soviet Union. He 
referred to the extremely important aspect of 
possible fruitful collaboration in the future espe-
cially as experience both with commercial prac-
tices and in the area of technical co-operation 
sometimes leaves us with a sense of frustration -
when we recall, for example, the unhappy expe-
rience with Spacelab. 
As regards commercial practices, the 
Rapporteur should provide us with the details, 
because they will have to be reassessed on the 
basis of their real value, considering the cost of 
each and having regard at all times to the need 
for reciprocity. This is particularly true of the 
Soviet Union, as the Rapporteur says in his draft 
recommendation. 
To talk of space today is, of course, to talk of 
current programmes, as the report makes abun-
dantly clear, but it also means thinking about 
preparing for the period following the year 2000. 
Some questions remain unanswered. At their 
forthcoming meetings the ministers of the coun-
tries involved in the European Space Agency will 
undoubtedly have some particularly important 
decisions to take. 
Sir John Osborn referred to one of the points 
that is essential to preparations for the future. 
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The choice that will have to be made between 
Hotol, Sanger and Hermes - not from a technical 
point of view, because it now seems to be 
generally accepted that there is little technical 
competition, in the true semse of the word, 
between them - but from the angle of financial 
competition. I am personally afraid, and almost 
convinced, that it will be particularly difficult for 
the European countries, in view of their budgets 
and the current world economic situation, to 
commit funds on any major scale to both 
national programmes and European pro-
grammes, or to international co-operation. Con-
sequently, at a given moment, very clear choices 
will undoubtedly have to be made. 
While I have no fears about the political will to 
join in this co-operation, I am afraid that at a 
given moment these financial difficulties will 
raise the problem in a different form. 
European co-operation is necessary, in fact 
indispensable. I personally feel we should begin 
by thinking about European co-operation before 
considering the possibility of international col-
laboration other than within our European 
sphere. 
The Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions has been working on 
this subject for years. I too should like to say how 
much we shall miss Sir John Osborn and all the 
skill he has always shown in this committee at 
making progress in the field of research in 
general and in the scientific world. Despite the 
importance of our activities, both in committee 
and in this chamber, there is no sign ofthe Coun-
cil's paying very effective attention to us, either 
in this field or, unfortunately, in various 
others. 
The Rapporteur says so, in fact, in paragraph 
148. He refers us to our Recommendation 410 
on the military use of space, adopted on 21st 
June 1984, and to the Council's reply of 27th 
November 1984- a speedy reply- which ran as 
follows: " The Council has taken note with 
interest of the Assembly's recommendation and 
the proposals therein. However it is not in a 
position, at this stage, to give precise and 
detailed replies. " 
More than two years later, we have received 
no further reply. I personally regret, like the 
Rapporteur, that the Council does not pay more 
attention to our work on a subject that will be 
decisive for our future and from the' military 
point of view. 
Mr. President, I want to say how happy I am 
that an old proposal which I personally have 
referred to on several occasions in this chamber 
and in the Council of Europe has been taken up 
both by our Rapporteur during this debate and 
by the European Parliament in a text adopted 
recently, in March 1987, on European space 
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policy. This proposal was submitted by France to 
the United Nations in 1978 and concerns the cre-
ation of an international satellite agency which 
would enable us to take very effective moni-
toring action vis-a-vis disarmament. 
As the Soviet Union and the United States 
were manifestly incapable of reaching agreement 
on the establishment of an agency of this kind, I 
had suggested considering the possibility of 
creating a European agency. The Council should, 
it seems to me, give this some thought. In com-
mittee, acting on a proposal from the 
Rapporteur, we have this morning called for 
more thought to be given to this subject. Sir John 
Osborn also referred to the need not only to 
establish an international satellite agency, but 
also to take into account all the technical 
resources that will enable us to assess any 
agreement of the type being widely discussed at 
the moment. It is a most interesting subject, and 
one about which we must think very seriously. 
Clearly, I fully endorse the draft recommen-
dation that has been submitted to us, and ifl had 
a choice to make as regards priorities, I would 
prefer to place the emphasis on paragraph 5, 
which recommends that the Council: " With the 
assistance of the WEU agencies for security ques-
tions, examine the repercussions of estab-
lishing a European military programme for com-
munications, navigation, observation and recon-
naissance satellites. " I would hope that the 
Council will examine this proposal very soon 
and send us the appropriate replies as quickly as 
possible. 
(Mr. van der Werff, Vice-President of the 
Assembly, took the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Paul Hawkins. 
Sir Paul HA WKINS (United Kingdom). -
Thank you very much, Mr. President. I had 
intended to open my speech by congratulating 
Mr. Goerens on becoming the President. I hope 
that as acting President you will pass my congra-
tulations to Mr. Goerens. Mr. Goerens is a man 
after my own heart. He was a valued contributor 
to the important colloquy held in Villars last 
year. Strangely enough, that conference was 
entitled "European agriculture until the year 
2000 ". That debate had almost the same title as 
today's debate. However, I shall not accuse my 
very good friend, Mr. Jean Valleix, of having 
pinched the title. I hope that my very best wishes 
will be passed on to Mr. Goerens. 
Mr. Goerens and the Assembly have many 
problems to solve and there are many battles to 
be won over the coming years. 
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I want to pay a sincere tribute to our outgoing 
President. Mr. Goerens and others have already 
paid such tributes to the strength of the outgoing 
President and the way in which he raised the 
status of Western European Union within 
Europe. That was an outstanding achievement. I 
agree with all the tributes and want to add one 
more: the retiring President had a wonderful, 
outgoing personality. He was very human and 
became a real friend to us all. 
As the President has already said - and I want 
to thank him for his kind words - my time with 
this Assembly will come to an end this week. I 
have thoroughly enjoyed it for the past twelve 
years and I believe that I have made many 
friends of different political beliefs and nationa-
lities. I shall miss that most. 
In passing, Mr. President, may I say that it 
might perhaps make the lives of members of a 
future Assembly a little easier if our French hosts 
could be pressed to introduce a better form of 
interpretation mechanics. I may be getting old, 
but my ears are drummed with the speaker in his 
own language, which overlays the interpretation 
in my language. If the volume is turned up, one's 
eardrums are damaged. Perhaps I may make a 
practical point that does not involve space tech-
nology but relates to something a little more 
mundane - it might make our Assembly's 
debates a little easier to understand and bear if 
action were taken about the interpretation 
system. 
I have thoroughly enjoyed every moment here. 
Our hosts, the French, have always made our 
stay in Paris delightful. I have also always 
enjoyed the meetings ofthe Committee on Scien-
tific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. I 
congratulate my very good friend, Jean Valleix, 
on his excellent report. I have enjoyed many 
happy times with him as Chairman and member 
of that committee. I particularly remember a 
visit that lasted the best part of a week when we 
travelled from Bordeaux down the west coast of 
France. The visit was absolutely spot on in terms 
of the arrangements. We experienced the delights 
of sampling the wines of Bordeaux in many 
charming chateaux. We visited Mr. Valleix's 
home and got to know his lovely wife. We visited 
many establishments on the west coast, which 
certainly opened my eyes. We visited the ballistic 
centre and met a remarkable man. I do not know 
what he was and I have forgotten his name but 
he was an outstanding man who spoke every lan-
guage under the sun. His grandparents came 
from Germany so he could speak German; he 
was also fluent in English and Japanese. He spent 
the day with us and introduced us to this great 
programme that France has begun. 
We met another remarkable man and cele-
brated his eightieth birthday. He was knighted by 
the Queen in Paris. He was head of Turbomeca 
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and had co-operated with Rolls-Royce in Great 
Britain. 
I was impressed by the co-operation in so 
many aspects of French and British life. We 
heard of a village called Les Horseguards. It was 
so named because the Horse Guards, having 
fought Napoleon, settled in that area and named 
it accordingly. We were also reminded of the 
many battles on the rugby field between people 
from the west of France and Great Britain. I am 
sad to say that the French beat us these days at 
that game. The co-operation among France, 
Britain and many other countries has been much 
improved by WEU. It is assisted by such visits 
during which we learn more about the national 
life of other countries. 
I have thoroughly enjoyed the meetings of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aer-
ospace Questions and I congratulate Jean on 
his excellent report. His resume presented in 
Luxembourg was remarkable. I understand more 
about space now that I have read the report and 
heard Jean's explanation of it in Luxembourg. I 
am too old to understand all the technical and 
intricate problems involved in space activity but 
I have no doubt that the subject will have a great 
impact on all our lives. 
As I said in Luxembourg, all who have the 
privilege of belonging to this Assembly are 
members of their national parliaments and have 
to fight elections. We must make clear to our col-
leagues in national parliaments and to our con-
stituents the great importance of the space pro-
gramme and how it will impact on our lives - I 
believe to the great benefit of the ordinary man 
and woman in the street. It is essential that we 
explain the benefits in simple language that the 
man and woman on the street and in the village 
will understand. As Mr. Fourre said, the pro-
gramme is extremely expensive and will take a 
lot of understanding if it is to be backed by all 
nations. We must co-operate with other nations; 
we cannot do it alone. 
I wish the Assembly the greatest possible good 
fortune for the future. May its strength and 
standing in Europe and in the world be greatly 
increased over the next few years. I shall watch 
its achievements with delight and hope one day 
to be in France when I shall sit in the public 
gallery. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Sir Paul. I 
shall convey your kind words about Mr. Goerens 
and Mr. Caro. I compliment you and Sir John 
Os born. You are both longstanding members of 
the Assembly. I remember Sir John in the early 
1970s. I thank you on behalf of us all for your 
magnificent and important contributions to our 
work. Of course your excellent contributions 
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were to be expected because you are both 
members of the mother of parliaments. 
We share some inconveniences in the hemi-
cycle but we do our best. 
The debate is closed. 
I invite Mr. Valleix, the Rapporteur, to give us 
his reaction to the debate. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, I shall reply briefly as basically our 
agreements outweigh our differences. I am again 
sorry that our Chairman, Mr. Wilkinson, is not 
here, as he would certainly have had a message 
to convey, but I do thank Mr. Wilkinson's 
stand-in, Sir John Osborn, for having given it. 
I wish to tell Sir John Osborn how greatly he 
will be missed by the committee, and in saying 
this I speak from the heart and on behalf of all 
the committee members. Our friendship has 
been sealed and confirmed during our excellent 
working relationship. Sir John, please do not 
forget us in your prayers and your counsels. I 
would like to add that our Chairman, Mr. 
Wilkinson, has contributed a great deal by his 
earlier reports, as has also Mr. Lenzer, my prede-
cessor. Both have worked hatd on these space 
matters, and, as you know, Mr. Lenzer was the 
moving spirit behind the Munich colloquy just 
two years ago. 
I would tell Sir John that we did indeed think 
of new techniques involving space aircraft and 
shuttles, but I did not refer to them expressly 
firstly because they have not yet been fully 
developed and engineered and secondly because 
a certain amount of confidentiality is maintained 
by the inventors and their countries. However, 
Sir John, I do direct your attention to paragraph 
193 where we refer to cost estimates in the 
European programmes: " This estimate takes 
into account operational costs of the launchers 
and other infrastructure mentioned in para-
graphs 201 to 211 of this chapter and even costs 
having regard to the autonomous space station 
and reusable launcher with advanced 
air-breathing engines which will be developed to 
ensure European independence in space in the 
beginning of the next century. " 
Reference is implied here to the British Hotol 
project and the German Sanger project. I am glad 
to confirm our interest in these projects. I direct 
the Assembly's attention to the fact that para-
graph 72 also refers to pioneering techniques 
now being developed. 
You will note that in 1986 the American 
National Commission on Space presented a 
development programme to the White House 
including proposals for high-performance electric 
propulsion systems such as ion engines and 
mass-drive reaction engines. There, ladies and 
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gentlemen, is something to stimulate our imagi-
nation and possibly our research. 
Thank you, Sir John, for your report and more 
especially for your always very positive and 
effective contributions to the work of the com-
mittee, which are reflected in the report. Our 
thanks also go to our colleague, Mr. Fourre, with 
his deep specialised knowledge of the subject. 
These two gentlemen are engineers and their 
expertise has been most useful to the Committee 
on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions. 
Our colleague, Mr. Fourre, mentioned the 
military aspect and we have each in turn quoted 
the same references. As in the field of aviation, it 
is unfortunately child's play to make the tran-
sition from civilian to military applications - a 
transition which may be costly and above all 
dangerous. I say " unfortunately " because the 
risk is also on our doorstep, not simply within 
our capacity. Tomorrow it will often be simple to 
switch from the civilian to the military uses of 
space, and that is another reason why WEU 
should continue to be vigilant with regard to this 
problem. Mr. Fourre has again mentioned the 
problems of competition which are, indeed, an 
aspect of capital importance and I am very ready 
to acknowledge the fact. I thank you, Mr. Fourre, 
for raising again the proposal for a monitoring 
agency, which you have often argued in com-
mittee. 
I hope that the presentation of this report and 
this morning's discussion will give the Assembly 
fresh impetus in the coming months in the light 
of the outcome ofthe disarmament negotiations. 
The further disarmament talks progress and the 
greater the distance covered, the more urgent will 
it become to establish this monitoring agency. 
Would you therefore look at paragraph 5 of the 
draft recommendation, which is one of its capital 
points. 
(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, 
resumed the Chair) 
Your predecessor in the chair, Mr. President, 
has no doubt taken note of the problems of 
spatial resonances raised by Sir Paul Hawkins. I 
point out here that the space concerned is that in 
the assembly hall. Echos there certainly are, Sir 
Paul, but if that has enabled you to lend a closer 
ear to the French, I can only welcome the fact. 
Thank you, Sir Paul, for what you said about a 
visit to south-west France which has left me with 
memories as fresh as your own. I appreciate Sir 
Paul's hint that the best wines on earth may 
easily be the best in space, and that is a point 
worth recalling in the present debate. It was Sir 
Joseph Szydklowski, chairman and managing 
director of Turbomeca at the time, who was so 
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very proud to have been made Sir Joseph by the 
Queen - a well merited honour, as in 1940 he 
managed to evacuate some prototype aircraft 
from the path of the advancing German army. 
Sir Paul's contributions to the work of the 
committee have always been full of good sense 
and realism, and one result was that in Luxem-
bourg recently we corrected the preamble to the 
recommendation to take greater account of the 
need to refer to public opinion in our countries, 
which he has just mentioned. We are democratic 
countries, and when we consider an effort to be 
essential - as we do in the case of space - no 
political or human solution is valid without 
public involvement. 
I also hope that we are not saying goodbye but 
only au revoir to our two friends Sir John 
Osborn and Sir Paul Hawkins. 
Finally, the increasingly heavy but inevitable 
costs mean that there has to be greater European 
co-operation in space matters, not just to make 
savings but also to prevent duplication either in 
scientific or technological investments or in 
intellectual input or the use of brain power. Our 
researchers need to complement, not duplicate, 
each other! 
If the course of disarmament negotiations 
brings us to a position in six months' or a year's 
time where we can say that we have arrived at 
the "post-disarmament stage", or are "pro-
ceeding to the achievement of disarmament", 
then I would remind you that the further we go 
in that direction, the greater will be the need for a 
European space monitoring agency. Mr. Fourre 
put the date some time after the year 2000. 
Please forgive the somewhat short-term cha-
racter of this morning's presentation. 
Is space a challenge or a matter of good 
fortune? It is my belief that Europe has in any 
case to pick up the challenge and seize its good 
fortune. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). In 
accordance with our orders of the day the vote 
on the draft recommendation will be taken this 
afternoon. 
·s. Address by Mr. Fischbach, 
Minister of Defence of Luxembourg 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the address by Mr. Fischbach, 
Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, to whom I 
extend a special welcome. 
Would you please come to the rostrum, 
Minister. 
Mr. FISCHBACH (Minister of Defence of 
Luxembourg) (Translation). - Mr. President, 
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ladies and gentlemen, my colleague Jacques Poos 
yesterday reviewed the main activities of the 
Council over the last few months. As I agree with 
his analysis and conclusions, I shall try to avoid 
repetition and shall refer to only a few aspects of 
WEU's activities under the Luxembourg presi-
dency and then comment in more general terms 
on the international situation and specifically the 
problems currently facing Europeans in the area 
of arms control. 
The questions concerning the future deve-
lopment of the organisation have not all been 
resolved. It is still not very clear what its general 
role should be. It should certainly be a forum for 
debate and consultation. But should it really 
confine itself to debate, which by nature is 
always somewhat academic? Does WEU really 
not have other potential to tap without 
encroaching on the Atlantic Alliance which 
remains the prime instrument of any western 
security policy? 
In recent months various new tasks for the 
organisation have been described, defined and 
adopted. The identification of European security 
interests is among the most important. In fact, it 
is probably one of the most important tasks that 
WEU has ever undertaken. The manner in which 
this task will be performed may help to define its 
general mission and so to give the organisation 
its identity. 
Working methods and procedures have con-
tinued to improve, thanks primarily to greater 
involvement of the seven governments in 
WEU's activities. The creation of a special 
working group has provided the foreign and 
defence ministries with a flexible structure for 
more vigorous and effective action. Experience 
since the beginning of the year has undoubtedly 
been encouraging. 
However, the structural reform is far from 
complete. The organisation still does not know if 
it will have to work at two different places or at 
one. The restructuring of the auxiliary technical 
organs, the agencies, has not really begun despite 
various declarations of intent and even various 
attempts. In this respect there is still a certain 
feeling of unease. 
One of the most positive aspects of the last 
ten months has been the more harmonious 
involvement of the defence ministries in WEU's 
procedures. The defence ministers are now 
making an active and equitable contribution at 
all levels of work. The foreign and defence 
ministers now form a well-established joint 
team. 
This has been noted on various occasions, 
most recently at the latest Council meeting in 
Luxembourg, which was also attended by the 
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defence ministers for a discussion of their role 
and tasks in WEU and for an in-depth exchange 
of views on European security problems. Their 
representatives first met in Luxembourg in 
January and then on two occasions, quite 
recently, in London to discuss co-operation in 
arms procurement and the management of 
defence resources. 
At all these meetings there was agreement on 
a number of issues. First, WEU should not 
duplicate work already being done elsewhere, as 
in the IEPG or the Conference of National 
Armaments Directors, for example. Then, the 
work should be directed to concepts rather than 
to operational matters. Finally, the defence 
ministries are concerned with political as well as 
technical matters. 
I wish to emphasise the political role which the 
defence ministers must play in WEU. They have 
their own responsibilities, particularly for the 
management of resources. Everyone realises that 
the establishment of a new balance at conven-
tional level will require a very major budgetary 
effort, which can be approved only by those who 
are responsible for the managerpent of resources, 
and they are the defence ministers. 
Some of the subjects of particular interest to 
the defence ministries have become more topical 
as a result of recent developments in arms 
control. 
The meetings of defence m1msters in the 
Nuclear Planning Group and the Defence 
Planning Committee have shown that both the 
military and the political authorities of the 
Atlantic Alliance are well aware that significant 
reductions in nuclear weapons deployed in 
Europe, or the complete elimination of certain 
categories of nuclear weapons, will necessitate 
urgent adjustments in the area of conventional 
weapons. Above all, the capacity to contain 
a prolonged conventional attack must be 
improved if Europe is to prevent nuclear reduc-
tions from worsening its overall strategic 
position. 
In pursuit of this objective the West must rely 
on its strong points, which may be found in the 
area of technological innovation. It must 
rationalise its defence effort, and this can be 
achieved through closer co-operation in arms 
procurement and particularly through a better 
distribution of roles and responsibilities in the 
alliance. 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should 
like to say a few words on the question which I 
feel lies at the heart of today's debate: what role 
must be played, in the future defence strategy of 
the western alliance, by conventional forces on 
the one hand and nuclear forces on the other? 
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Since they established a common security 
system and a common strategy, the western 
countries have always relied, more or less 
entirely, on nuclear weapons to safeguard their 
territory. They have also seen nuclear systems in 
their various forms - ranging from tactical to 
strategic weapons - as the best means of linking 
their security to that of their American ally. 
This nuclear dependence has always made 
some people feel uneasy. The Europeans 
believed that, because of the thousands of 
nuclear systems deployed in the form of totally 
destructive weapons, artillery shells, airborne 
bombs and so on, there was a danger of the early 
use of nuclear force transforming Europe into a 
nuclear battlefield. 
The United States saw in the early use of 
nuclear force the danger of a rapid escalation to 
an intercontinental exchange, thus involving 
American territory. On the other hand the Euro-
peans were forced to insist, as a means of deter-
rence, that the alliance should declare its firm 
intention to resort, if need be, to nuclear force if 
subjected to an attack which it could not contain 
by other, conventional means. 
In other words, the Europeans do not want 
their territory to become the theatre for a 
massive and prolonged conventional war which 
might ultimately be just as devastating as a 
nuclear war. This has been the dilemma of the 
alliance's security policy from the outset. There 
may be no truly satisfactory solution to this 
dilemma. In the nuclear age absolute security, if 
it existed, would not be far removed from 
absolute horror. And the relative security which 
can and must be the Europeans' goal cannot be 
achieved without certain risks. 
Maintaining and improving this relative 
security is a constant challenge to the Europeans. 
They must meet it, on the one hand, by conti-
nually adapting their defence systems to the 
changing requirements. They must also meet it 
by an unremitting effort to control armaments 
with the aim of increasing the stability of existing 
strategic relations. 
At the moment the main effect of the arms 
control proposals has been to throw the western 
allies into confusion. In their public declarations, 
of course, they are almost unanimous in wel-
coming the progress being made. But this 
optimism and calm conceal the serious concern 
that some of them feel. 
It is true that what is happening at the moment 
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the case of intermediate systems with a range of 
more than 1 000 km, they would be giving up 
three times more nuclear warheads than the 
Americans. And yet certain western countries are 
pulling long faces. Some people are therefore 
saying: " The Europeans do not know what they 
want. They are now rejecting what they proposed 
six years ago. " 
The same goes, these critics say, for the 
systems with a shorter range of between 500 and 
1 000 km. At first we insisted that an agreement 
on longer-range missiles must be followed by 
negotiations on the reduction of shorter-range 
systems. Now, despite their truly crushing supe-
riority in the shape oftheir SS-12s and SS-23s, as 
against a few tens of rather outmoded Pershing 
IAs on the European side, the Soviets have 
agreed. And yet certain Europeans will continue 
to express doubts. This is improper, the critics 
say, and they urge the sceptics to work out a con-
sistent line at last. 
However, should this apparent generosity on 
the part of the Soviet Union not give rise to 
some distrust or at least some caution in the 
West? In other fields the Soviet Union has not 
been as generous, this being true, for example, of 
the MBFR negotiations, where they have not yet 
agreed to the slightest reduction that would have 
taken account of their numerical superiority. 
Could the West Europeans have more to lose 
from reductions or the elimination of entire cate-
gories of nuclear weapons? 
Is the Soviet Union aware, perhaps more so 
than we are, of the value that nuclear systems 
have less in military terms than in political and 
psychological terms? Could it be that they 
believe the disappearance of these weapons from 
Europe would open the way to new political 
options to their advantage? 
Could it be that it is speculating that the gua-
rantee of American security, the link with the 
United States of America would be irreparably 
weakened, and that Western Europe would lose 
some of its will to maintain its own identity? 
The discussions among the western countries 
at the Atlantic Council in Reykjavik in just over 
a week's time will, for example, be very 
important. The Europeans must work out with 
the Americans, a joint position that takes 
account of Western Europe's long-term interests. 
They must together ensure that the negotiations 
on the reduction of nuclear forces reduce the risk 
of war and, above all, increase general sta-
bility. 
in the area of arms control is rather surprising. WEU has a major role to play in this context. 
The Soviet Union says it is prepared to abandon It brings together countries which are all sen-
its SS-20s, forming a system which it started sitive and also vulnerable on a number of points. 
deploying barely ten years ago and which is very If they want to avoid being left on the fringes of 
accurate and very effective in military terms. In the current debate on a global strategy, the Euro-
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peans must ensure that note is taken in future 
discussions of the aspects on which they are par-
ticularly sensitive and vulnerable. WEU can play 
a vital role working out a common European 
position. 
In the weeks and months to come Western 
European Union must prove its genuine right to 
exist. 
Ladies and gentlemen, I should not like to 
leave this rostrum without joining my colleague, 
Foreign Minister Jacques Poos, in congratulating 
my friend Charles Goerens very sincerely and 
cordially on his election as President of your 
Assembly. Having known Mr. Goerens for a long 
time, I should like to congratulate the Assembly 
on having finally chosen a man whose human 
and intellectual qualities, whose political 
awareness and parliamentary experience will be 
of great value in this post. I wish him a great deal 
of courage and above all a great deal of success 
while he continues in this high office and the per-
sonal satisfaction that is essential to anyone who 
assumes political responsibility at a high level. 
I should also like to congratulate President 
Caro on the personal commitment he has shown 
throughout the Luxembourg presidency. If 
Western European Union now has a younger 
and, I would say, more dynamic image than ever 
before, it is basically his achievement. His ideas 
and his many initiatives have certainly helped to 
revitalise WEU. I am convinced that, even 
though he has now left the presidential chair, Mr. 
Caro will continue to work for the greater good 
of Western European Union and for its reacti-
vation, a goal so dear to his heart. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Speaking 
for the Assembly, I wish to thank you, Mr. 
Fischbach, for your message to us. I specially 
appreciate the congratulations and kind words to 
myself. 
I believe you are prepared to answer questions, 
Minister? 
I call Sir John Os born. 
Sir John OSBORN (United Kingdom).- I con-
gratulate Mr. Fischbach as Minister of Defence 
of Luxembourg on his address and most inform-
ative presentation. Members of the public 
through the work of the Assembly and especially 
by the comments made by Mr. Fischbach must 
be informed about Western European Union in 
an administrative sense. They must be aware of 
the impact of the Council in strengthening the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Mr. 
Fischbach has opened that hidden book to this 
Assembly and to the public. 
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to achieve an agreed reduction in intermediate 
nuclear forces and short-range nuclear weapons. 
He also spoke about the difficulty of achieving a 
Western European consensus. 
My question is more of an administrative 
nature. In many countries the same ministers 
who attend the NATO Council will attend the 
Western European Union Council. I assume that 
Mr. Fischbach will be in Reykjavik next week. 
Will the Council of Western European Union 
be able effectively to represent the Western 
European pillar to the alliance, bearing in mind 
the reactivation that has taken place? 
We have in this Assembly referred to two 
aspects - defence procurement and research for 
defence. The Committee on SC~:ientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions can consider 
those aspects and make a recommendation 
through the Assembly. In your view, Mr. 
Fischbach, are the ministers prepared to work on 
that as well? 
I want to consider the dialogue between the 
United States of America primarily and the 
Soviet Union. Verification of any agreement is 
paramount. I have referred in this Assembly to 
the need for the Western European pillar of the 
Atlantic Alliance to have some say in that verifi-
cation. Are the committees of Western European 
Union and representatives of member countries 
looking into that subject? That subject will be 
considered by the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Pandora's box has been opened by you, Mr. 
Fischbach. This Assembly and the public 
welcome that. Would you now give us a little 
more information? 
Mr. PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. FISCHBACH (Minister of Defence of Lux-
embourg) (Translation). - I thank the delegate 
for his intervention and am flattered by his 
words of appreciation. 
The North Atlantic Council will be meeting 
next week in Reykjavik for its spring session but 
will be attended by the ministers for foreign 
affairs. At the last NATO meetings, both Mr. 
Poos and I had an opportunity to brief our col-
leagues about the course of WED's work, and on 
the deliberations and positions adopted at the 
Luxembourg meeting of the WEU Council. 
The questions you raise concern the defence 
ministers rather than the ministers for foreign 
affairs. You have stressed the need for 
co-operation in arms procurement, and this is, in 
fact, one of the main concerns of the defence 
ministers, who meet regularly in the Independent 
Today Mr. Fischbach referred to the dialogue European Programme Group for the essential 
between the western allies and the Soviet Union purpose of discussing the harmonisation and 
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standardisation of military equipment for the 
exact purpose of improving the transatlantic dia-
logue, which operates in one direction only - in 
favour of the United States and to the detriment 
of Europe. However, following Congress's 
decision to table a number of amendments, I 
think the Americans are ready to improve the 
transatlantic dialogue and to co-operate more 
closely with European industries. 
As regards verification measures, any dis-
mantling of tactical or strategic nuclear weapons 
obviously requires watertight checks. You also 
know the Americans and Russians are still a long 
way from agreement on verification measures, 
and a great effort is still needed, particularly 
from the Russians, to meet the legitimate worries 
of us Europeans and our American allies. So, 
even if the negotiations seem to be progressing, 
and there is every reason to hope they will reach 
fruition very shortly, it must be realised that 
agreement on verification is a prior condition for 
any nuclear disarmament. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Valleix and request that he confine himself to 
asking a question and does not make another 
speech. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - I will 
put my remarks in the form of a question if you 
wish, Mr. President. 
Minister, I have heard and read various state-
ments about duplication. In the case of meetings 
of defence ministers it has been asked whether 
there is any point in WEU's addressing topics 
already dealt with by the IEPG. I do not neces-
sarily take this view and I should be grateful, 
Minister, if you would let us have your thoughts 
on this, seeing that WEU's work is one thing 
whereas IEPG's action creates a bridge with the 
Atlantic Alliance and enables the debate to be 
widened. 
I personally would like to see WEU expressing 
European positions before the Europeans state 
any views in NATO. Could you reassure me on 
this point? 
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determination to defend ourselves with or 
without disarmament? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. FISCHBACH (Minister of Defence of 
Luxembourg) (Translation). - It does not seem 
to me there need be any duplication between the 
work of WEU and IEPG. On the contrary, it is 
WEU's business to provide the necessary 
political stimulus for the partners in the IEPG 
- which was specially created for co-operation on 
armaments - to discuss concrete projects on the 
table of the Council of Ministers. This view is 
shared by my colleagues. 
The second question is about disarmament, 
and this is certainly vital, though you are quite 
right to say it must not be secured at any price. 
As most of our countries have only limited scope 
for expanding defence budgets, other ways of 
increasing our efforts must be found. As I said in 
my address, the essential requirement is to 
manage our resources more rationally. We must 
then intensify co-operation in weapons pro-
curement and encourage joint projects. 
As far as the redistribution of the defence 
burden is concerned, we must clearly consider a 
more rational allocation of roles and costs. The 
special WEU working group has already started 
studying all these problems. 
Lastly, not only the military authorities but 
also responsible politicians now accept that 
nuclear disarmament means we must think 
about modernising our conventional forces. You 
are aware of General Rogers's favourite concept 
of FOFA, or follow-on forces attack, which pos-
tulates a state of highly dependable conventional 
stability in which, by exploiting the capabilities 
of modern technology, it would be possible to 
handle any enemy surprise attack by giving our 
forces at least the means to halt it at the second 
line. This is the prime concern not only of the 
military authorities but also of defence ministers, 
and this fact was restated at their last Council 
meeting in Brussels. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Bayillken, observer from Turkey. 
My second question concerns disarmament, Mr. BA YULKEN (Observer from Turkey). - I 
towards which we seem to be moving. You have thank Minister Fischbach sincerely for his lucid 
very properly pointed out the need for verifi- and realistic statement. He said that on conven-
cation measures, and these are indeed highly tional weapons the Warsaw Pact countries and 
important, but disarmament does not mean the Soviet Union did not seem to be ready to 
peace at any price ! Everybody knows that con- make any substantial concessions in the MBFR 
ventional weapons are expensive. At present, our negotiations. They have over 60 000 tanks and 
defence effort is insufficient, and it will have to powerful artillery - at least twice as large as 
be sustained or increased even after a disar- NATO's artillery. They have conventional, not 
mament yet to become fact. Do you consider, nuclear, missiles that could be used in the battle-
Minister, that our governments and public fields and a navy that goes beyond the concept of 
opinion will have the "strength of character" defence of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact 
needed to sustain this political resolve and the countries. On the Caucasian front Turkey pins 
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down at least twenty divisions of the Soviet 
Union, more that 4 000 tanks and many other 
military weapons and, on the Balkan front, 
together with Greece, pins down about thirty 
divisions, more than 40 000 tanks and many 
other important conventional weapons. 
Turkey has applied to become a member of 
WEU. How does Mr. Fischbach evaluate 
Turkey's request to become a member, and how 
would he like that request to be answered by 
WEU? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. FISCHBACH (Minister of Defence of 
Luxembourg) (Translation). - In reply to the 
observer I would say the credibility of the 
member states of both the Warsaw Pact and 
NATO depends on future progress with the 
reduction of conventional forces. 
Mr. President, your Assembly knows very well 
that in December last year the NATO partners 
suggested to the member states of the Warsaw 
Pact that direct negotiations be opened between 
the blocs without intermediaries. Unfortunately, 
we have occasionally to acknowledge that 
problems emerge not only in the East, but some-
times in the West also. We have to admit to the 
difficulties now being experienced by the Euro-
peans in arriving at a common position to be 
argued in negotiations with the Warsaw Pact 
countries. 
I shall say no more, and can only hope that 
present difficulties will be overcome as quickly 
as possible to the maximum benefit of our 
member states. We have to make some very 
quick and significant progress on conventional 
weapons if we wish to retain credibility, as it is 
the member states which have demanded the res-
toration of a balance in the conventional field. 
Everything must therefore be done to see that 
this is achieved as soon as possible. 
You also mention the problem of enlargement 
and ask specifically whether Turkey, which is 
effectively an applicant, would be welcome 
within WEU. You have practically answered this 
question yoursel£ There are, of course, a number 
of countries wishing to join Western European 
Union, and some have already met prior condi-
tions for entry. We know the Council decided in 
Luxembourg recently that WEU should first be 
strengthened and only then enlarged. 
You also know that Spain and Portugal, which 
are members of NATO and the EEC, are cer-
tainly the first countries which will make their 
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raises rather more important - or should I say 
sensitive - questions, which must be settled 
before it is proposed that that country formally 
applies to join WEU. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Elmquist, observer from Denmark. 
Mr. ELMQUIST (Observer from Denmark) 
(Translation). - Minister, as observer from the 
Danish Parliament I have listened with great 
interest to your statements concerning the 
presence of nuclear weapons in Europe. Speaking 
of WEU member countries you said that WEU 
member states remained convinced that the exis-
tence of nuclear weapons on European territory 
- nuclear weapons capable of reaching the ter-
ritory not only of the Soviet Union's allies but of 
the Soviet Union itself - was essential to the 
deterrence of any kind of aggression. Only thus 
could the doctrine of flexible response be main-
tained and the United States' commitment to 
Europe be assured. 
Could you please enlighten me on the fol-
lowing three points ? 
Firstly, are your words to be understood not to 
refer to European nuclear weapons, that is to the 
French and British nuclear forces ? Do they refer 
directly to the American nuclear weapons which 
must remain on European territory? 
Secondly, does that not imply some distrust of 
the American guarantees? On the European side 
and within WEU there is some lack of confi-
dence in the American political guarantee to 
maintain the flexible response in the absence of 
some form of American " hostage " in the shape 
of nuclear weapons. There is no faith in the 
broad umbrella if the nuclear weapons are 
located, say, in the United Sta~es or the Atlantic. 
They have to be here in Europe. 
Thirdly, do your words mean that you rule out 
completely the idea of a European zone free from 
nuclear weapons ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. FISCHBACH (Minister of Defence of 
Luxembourg) (Translation). - I shall reply 
briefly to the three questions which are obviously 
very important. 
As eo-Chairman of the Council I can speak on 
behalf of my colleagues and, in principle, I rule 
out a denuclearised zone in Europe - which I 
think is equivalent to the expression you used -
because it would be too dang~rous, as we know, 
and could well give rise to misunderstandings 
which would be unacceptable at the present time. 
voices heard as applicants to join WEU. It is You know very well that the question also 
clearly still too soon to reply to this question, but arises regarding the withdrawal of the SS-20s 
it is a fact that the admission of Turkey to WEU from the Asian part ofthe Soviet Union and that 
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nuclear weapons as flexible as the SS-20, which 
are stationed in Asia, could be very quickly 
moved to the European part of the Soviet Union. 
These are some of the verification problems 
we would be faced with, making it impossible for 
us to accept a denuclearised zone in Europe 
without further thought. In any case it is impos-
sible because all intercontinental systems and all 
strategic weapons are capable of reaching 
European territory. So we should not refer to a 
denuclearised zone in Europe but to a world 
denuclearised zone in a situation without stra-
tegic or nuclear weapons capable of reaching 
European territory. In such circumstances every 
country could advocate a global denuclearised 
zone encompassing all countries and all member 
states with nuclear weapons. 
In your first question you asked whether the 
phrase, nuclear presence in Europe, was meant to 
include the French and British weapons systems. 
No weapons system could be excluded as both 
are, of course, member states located in Europe. 
There is no way of excluding or disregarding 
these member states which belong, what is more, 
to the Atlantic Alliance, although it is easier to 
give an answer to the question on British nuclear 
weapons since they, in an emergency, would be 
integrated in the alliance and under the 
command of SACEUR. This would not be the 
case for French nuclear weapons which, in the 
event of war, would remain under French 
command. 
You asked whether the fact of wanting to 
maintain nuclear weapons in Europe did not 
signify a certain mistrust of our American 
partner. On the contrary, insofar as we shall be 
asking the Americans to maintain both a conven-
tional and a nuclear presence in Europe, it is an 
expression of confidence in our American 
friends. That is why we insist on the nuclear 
presence because we want it to be known, - and I 
believe this to be very important - that deter-
rence is only valid by virtue of its two compo-
nents: the conventional and nuclear compo-
nents. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Valleix. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - I 
would like to quote Mr. Poos again who, when 
he listed yesterday the twelve essential principles 
that should be adopted at the present stage ofthe 
work - I am talking about the European security 
charter - said: " Five, the nuclear forces of 
France and the United Kingdom make a major 
contribution to European security". 
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I think that this is the correct viewpoint rather 
than the interpretation I think I just heard. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. FISCHBACH (Minister of Defence of Lux-
embourg) (Translation). - You heard yesterday 
the conclusions drawn by the Chairman-in-
Office which I wholly support. I simply wanted 
to reply to the very specific question that was put 
to me. 
There are, ultimately, several options. The 
French option is not to be ruled out. I said that, 
qualitatively, a distinction has to be drawn 
between French and British nuclear weapons as 
the former would remain French in the event of 
a crisis whereas the latter would be integrated in 
the Atlantic Alliance. 
I did not wish to say more than that; on the 
contrary I wished to stress the fact that you 
cannot leave the strategic forces belonging to 
these two countries out of the nuclear capa-
bility. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - That brings 
us to the end of the debate. My special thanks to 
you, Mr. Fischbach, for having replied to the 
many questions put to you. 
6. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this 
afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of 
the day: 
1. European space policy until 2000 (Vote on 
draft recommendation, Document 1 098). 
2. The voice of Europe after Reykjavik -
Debates in national parliaments (Presen-
tation of and debate on the report of the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public 
Relations and vote on draft resolution, 
Document 1 097). 
This report will be presented by Mr. Burger 
who has been kind enough to take my place as 
Rapporteur. 
Are there any objections ? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 12. 55 p.m.) 
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SUMMARY 
1. Attendance register. 
2. Adoption of the minutes. 
3. European space policy until 2000 (Vote on the draft recom-
mendatiOn, Doe. 1098). 
4. The voice of Europe after Reykjavik- debates in national 
parliaments (Presentation of and debate on the report of the 
Commlltee for Parliamentary and Public Relatwns and 
vote on the draft resolution, Doe. 1097). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Burger (Rapporteur), Mr. 
Bordu, Mr. Burger (Rapporteur), Mr. Tummers (Vice-
Chairman of the Committee). 
5. Adjournment of the sesswn. 
The sitting was opened at 3.10 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -The sitting 
is open. 
1. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended 
to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). In 
accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, the minutes of proceedings of the pre-
vious sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
3. European space policy until 2000 
(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doe. 1098) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The orders 
of the day call for the vote on the draft recom-
mendation contained in Document 1098. 
In accordance with Rule 33 of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and 
standing unless five representatives or substi-
tutes present in the chamber request a vote by 
roll-call. 
Does anyone request a vote by roll-call? ... 
That is not the case. 
1. See page 26. 
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We shall therefore vote by sitting and 
standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The draft recommendation is adopted 
unanimously 2• 
4. The voice of Europe after Reykjavik -
debates in national parliaments 
(Presentation of and debate on the report 
of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations 
and vote on the draft resolution, Doe. 1097) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and debate 
on the report of the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations on the voice of 
Europe after Reykjavik - debates in national 
parliaments and vote on the draft resolution, 
Document 1097. 
I call Mr. Burger, to whom I owe my sincere 
thanks for taking my place because, as President 
of the Assembly I am not allowed to present the 
report myself. 
I call Mr. Burger, Rapporteur of the Com-
mittee for Parliamentary andl Public Relations. 
Mr. BURGER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, after the 
election of my worthy compatriot Charles 
Goerens to be President of our Assembly I shall 
now be a full member of the Committee for Par-
liamentary and Public Relations. It is therefore 
my honour, ladies and gentlemen, to present my 
oral report on Document 1097, at the close of 
our session. 
2. See page 27. 
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Mr. Burger (continued) 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, pre-
senting a report on debates in national parlia-
ments is perhaps a hazardous enterprise. In the 
post-Reykjavik situation, there is no question 
that, among all the subjects discussed at the 
summit of the superpowers, the problem of 
nuclear disarmament in Europe has had the 
greatest repercussions in the debates in Western 
Europe. Unfortunately, it is precisely in this field 
that our Assembly has so far been unable to 
adopt a common position on which members of 
parliament could have based themselves in 
national debates. 
However, the results of Reykjavik did have a 
major impact on a number of documents 
adopted last December. There was Mr. Bianco's 
report on the political activities of the Council -
Recommendation 438 - and Mr. Close's report 
on developments in the Soviet Union and 
East-West relations - Recommendation 441. 
These two reports stressed the importance of 
arriving at common European positions on dis-
armament and arms limitation and of bringing 
them home to our American allies within the 
Atlantic Alliance. 
The purpose of the report that I have the 
honour to present to you, therefore, is not an 
in-depth analysis of the positions taken with 
regard to the concrete problems dealt with in 
Reykjavik but to highlight the thinking and state-
ments of those who have to consider the impact 
of that summit on transatlantic cohesion and on 
the efforts needed to establish closer European 
co-operation. 
Let me say that the analysis relates solely to 
the seven European countries and that the docu-
mentation made available to the Rapporteur was 
not complete. Even so, I feel that the reports of 
parliamentary debates provide sufficient infor-
mation for certain conclusions to be drawn. 
These are summarised in Chapter IV and the 
main points are set out in the draft resolution. 
Chapter II gives summaries of debates, where 
they concern subjects directly related to the Rey-
kjavik meeting. For simplicity, the debates in 
member country parliaments are considered in 
alphabetical order, with a summary in each case 
followed by a timetable. 
It is worth nothing that, in the debates, several 
governments linked the consequences of Rey-
kjavik directly to the reactivation of WEU. 
Among the many voices urging that Western 
Europe should unite its interests in the matter of 
security policy, the governments of several 
member countries publicly stated that they 
would regard WEU as a suitable framework for 
implementing such an objective. 
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On the parliamentary side, there was more 
diversity in the suggestions for achieving the 
same result. The great number of encouraging 
proposals shows, nevertheless, that Europeans 
are still far from sharing the same concepts. Our 
main task, which is to broadcast those ideas rec-
ommended by our Assembly and to get them 
better known, therefore remains crucial. 
Chapter III analyses specific action undertaken 
to follow up the work of our Assembly in the 
various fields covered by its recommendations. 
A matter for satisfaction is the fact that many 
representatives and, among them, several 
members of the Committee for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations have been very active 
recently and have made it their business to ask 
questions and to speak on the various aspects of 
the work of WEU on the basis of the recommen-
dations adopted. Perhaps this may also be seen 
as an indirect effect of the post-Reykjavik situ-
ation. 
In some national parliaments a real dialogue 
has developed with the respective governments. 
To encourage this kind of development, the draft 
resolution invites all member " parliaments " 
and governments to maintain and deepen a 
fruitful, continuing dialogue on the basis of our 
recommendations. 
There is one more specific subject I would like 
to deal with in conclusion. I would like to draw 
your attention to the answers that governments 
have given about their activities in informing the 
public about " Europe's defence problems " and 
far more particularly "the role of WEU ". The 
replies under this heading are not always very 
concrete and, apart from the press conferences 
given after ministerial meetings and the consid-
erable personal activity of the Secretary-General 
of WEU, it does not seem that the " Council and 
governments " are making any serious effort to 
implement a real "information policy". NATO, 
for example, has an " information service " in 
each member country with a "large budget". 
Should we not consider having a similar service 
for the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, 
namely WEU? I think our committee ought to 
look at this question in one of its future 
reports. 
That decision was, moreover, taken at the 
committee's meeting this morning. I would add 
that it is, indeed, both regrettable and dangerous 
that Mr. Gorbachev should have such perfect 
mastery of media management, in most cases to 
the detriment of the views of Western Europe 
and WEU on disarmament and detente. 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, we have 
to act quickly and effectively with regard to 
information about Western Europe otherwise the 
younger generations, in particular, will be lost for 
good to WEU and the causes it defends. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Burger. 
The debate is open. 
I call Mr. Bordu. 
Mr. BORDU (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, ladies and gentlemen, it has to be 
recognised that this session raises considerations 
today that were not foreseeable only a few days 
ago. 
Indeed, everyone agrees that the Reykjavik 
summit was a major event bringing, of course, 
other equally major events in its train. It is rea-
sonable to say that the shock did not produce the 
same impact everywhere. Responses vary greatly 
from country to country, depending on national 
political attitudes. That, incidentally, explains 
Bonn's position in this regard. The idea of the 
possible elimination of certain nuclear weapons 
in Europe and sharp cuts in the others as a step 
towards the total elimination of nuclear arms 
from the planet, a total ban on chemical weapons 
and the destruction of present stocks of such 
weapons and a massive, balanced, simultaneous 
and controlled reduction of conventional 
weapons and forces seems to have thrown most 
of our countries' governments into disarray. 
Could it be that the idea put forward so many 
times by WEU itself since 1981, namely the need 
to reduce all armaments to the lowest possible 
level, was only a propaganda ploy and not a con-
crete wish for disarmament based on the cer-
tainty that the Soviet Union would not be a party 
to effective disarmament - a certainty that has 
visibly collapsed today? The gauntlet thrown 
down by the West has been picked up. 
All the political forces holding power in 
Europe seem to believe that security is impos-
sible without the certainty of military superiority 
over the potential adversary. And yet it is that 
philosophy of military superiority that has led 
the world from balances to imbalances and to 
efforts to catch up with the other side, finally 
reaching the present overkill situation with all its 
terrible dangers for peace in terms not of the 
security of our countries but of the threat of a 
nuclear conflict which would destroy mankind 
and the militarisation of space accompanied by 
even worse devices if nothing happens to change 
the course set by Mr. Reagan. 
The idea is often put about that the only 
reason the Soviet Union has for its present pro-
posals is that it needs the money it is spending 
on keeping its place in the arms race to meet the 
requirements of the nation. We agree. Reducing 
expenditure on armaments would certainly 
mean, within a certain time, the end of a burden 
that is too heavy for all countries. I specifically 
said all countries and not just one. And you have 
to be Mr. Baumel - as the press noticed this 
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morning - to claim we need to double or even 
treble our current spending on armaments: that 
would make it really unbearable. But it is wrong 
to see only that aspect of things. In reality, the 
Soviet Union has not, to my mind, wanted to 
hide its head in the sand; it has realised that if we 
do not embark very quickly on a process of dis-
armament, if we do not - to start with - get rid 
of the threat of nuclear weapons, mankind will 
continue to slide towards self-destruction. 
It is that which we basically have to realise. It 
is that which has to be recognised in political and 
government circles in Western Europe. 
The question is not whether we go on with the 
arms race to try to bring the Soviet Union to its 
knees and get rid of the socialist regimes in 
Europe, for these nations would find the strength 
to face up to new escalations particularly as aus-
terity, with all the troubles it brings, would 
intensify for the people in our own western coun-
tries. The question is whether' we are prepared to 
admit that it is high time to call a halt to this race 
towards mutual destruction and the elimination 
of life on earth. 
The commitment to not only nuclear but also 
chemical and conventional disarmament would 
not, of course, obviate the need for national 
defence and even co-operation in the framework 
of our existing alliances for a long time to come. 
As far as we French communists are concerned, 
as we have said unambiguously, we are not in 
favour of unilateral disarmament by France; on 
the contrary we are, as we have said no less 
clearly, in favour of maintaining an effective 
national defence at all the stages of any disarm-
ament programme. 
Gradual disarmament certainly poses ques-
tions as regards the reorganisation of military 
capabilities. But the basic question to our mind 
is this: do we or do we not believe that real 
security can only be guaranteed by a balanced 
reduction in armaments and an effective verifi-
cation of the measures agreed at all stages and 
the search for and definition of collective and 
common security measures guaranteeing the 
security of each and every one of us. 
So instead of thinking dynamically and posi-
tively about how to advance in the proposed 
direction we cling to all the reasons I have heard 
again here whose only object is to hold on to the 
philosophy of military superiority we have been 
following for forty years. 
We cannot accept, I am told, lhe 
denuclearisation of Europe. But who is pro-
posing to denuclearise Europe? Only the two 
superpowers would have their strategic intercon-
tinental arsenals and Europe would be a hostage, 
added to which Europe and the United States 
would decouple. Who proposed that? We are reg-
ularly hearing such things said. 
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Mr. Bordu (continued) 
The proposal to get rid of medium-range 
nuclear missiles, 1 000-5 000 km, and shorter-
range missiles, 500-1 000 km, will not on its own 
denuclearise Europe. To begin with, American 
ships and submarines carrying nuclear weapons 
which could wipe out the USSR on their own 
will still be there in the seas around Europe. 
Next, at least at this stage, nobody is questioning 
the existence of the British and French strategic 
forces. It is worth noting, in this connection, that 
about 40 megatonnes would be necessary for the 
almost complete destruction of a country like the 
United States or the USSR and that France, 
alone for example, will have about 100 
megatonnes once its nuclear submarines are 
equipped with the new medium-range M-4 and 
M-5. We must be serious in approaching this 
question of the balance of power. 
But what is more, Mr. Gorbachev's proposals 
are not confined to nuclear weapons stationed in 
Europe. Another proposed objective is to halve 
over the next five years the arsenals of strategic 
intercontinental missiles, presently totalling 
about 10 000 nuclear warheads on either side -
Mr. Baumel and Mr. Close please note, these are 
the correct figures - and to aim at the total elimi-
nation of these weapons by the year 2000, in 
other words in the short space of thirteen 
years. 
That leaves the question of very-short-range 
tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviets propose 
that negotiations on reducing and eliminating 
these take place in the EDC or, in other words, 
the CSCE, coupled with conventional weapons 
and forces. The debate would naturally be an 
open one and the object should not be to find 
ways of keeping them and adding to them in 
order to make up for supposed differences but 
how to get rid of them. 
Here, the superiority of the Warsaw Pact in 
conventional weapons is immediately brought 
up. First of all, does the Warsaw Pact really have 
overall superiority? Its superiority in numbers of 
tanks, guns, and aircraft is agreed but the western 
countries are claimed - and no one denies it - to 
have superiority in anti-tank weapons and others 
like the " Exocet " and also in ships and subma-
rines which could be responsible for conven-
tional imbalance. 
In any case, if there really is an imbalance, 
would it not be wiser and more responsible, and 
a better contribution to security, to negotiate a 
balanced reduction, in other words, the removal 
of existing differences, rather than to propose, as 
some of us in this chamber do, measures to catch 
up in fields where we are supposed to be behind 
and to resume study of the deployment of the 
neutron bomb. The only thing the other side 
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could do then would be to catch up again or to 
offset believed leeway in other sectors. 
There is no way out, this is arms escalation. It 
is another lap in the race to insecurity implicit in 
these suicidal suggestions. Particularly since at 
their Budapest session the countries of the 
Warsaw Pact proposed, as a basis for negoti-
ation, a reduction on each side of 100 000 to 
150 000 troops with the related arms over a 
period of one or two years as a first stage with the 
ultimate target of the demobilisation of 500 000 
men on either side or in other words 1 000 000 
men complete with equipment, over a period of 
four to six years. This is a basis of discussion, so 
we have to discuss it, not turn it down. 
Yes. It is a process of negotiation, in many 
forms no doubt, that will be necessary to arrive 
at the elimination of nuclear weapons, the bal-
anced and progressive reduction of conventional 
weapons and forces and the banning of chemical 
weapons and the destruction of existing stocks. 
Regarding chemical weapons, the Soviets, after 
stopping production, have made constructive 
proposals supplementing the proposals made 
elsewhere. Here again it is evident that an 
agreement could be quickly reached. 
Some of us need to give up our warlike atti-
tudes and the urge to bid ever higher. The basic 
choice is simple: either we continue to prefer the 
retrograde spirit of nuclear escalation until the 
world is destroyed - and no one says this is not 
possible - or we set Europe on the path of dis-
armament which can lead to real security. At the 
same time this would make it possible to meet 
urgent needs for which nothing is left because of 
the bottomless pits of military spending whose 
further increase has again been proposed in this 
chamber. 
The truth is that it is high time to stop having 
defence budgets compete with those for edu-
cation, health, training and culture particularly 
when millions of people throughout the world 
today are living - if that is the word - in a state 
of chronic poverty and undernourishment. 
As far as we are concerned, we are doing and 
shall continue to do everything we can to ensure 
that an end is put to the threat of nuclear war, in 
accordance with the wishes of the public at large 
among whom polls show high percentages to be 
disturbed and concerned about the arms race. 
"Vox populi" is the voice of reason; it must be 
heeded. That is why, incidentally, we shall be 
making our contribution to see that in response 
to the appeal from thousands of personalities of 
different persuasions centred on the " Appel des 
Cent", the biggest demonstration France has 
known in recent years is held in Paris on 14th 
June next. There will be hundreds of thousands 
of French men and women marching in a chain 
through the heart of Paris and assembling in the 
afternoon at the Issy-les-Moulineaux heliport. 
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Mr. Bordu (continued) 
The expression and pressure of public opinion 
are crucial, as has just been shown by the 
decision taken by the Bonn Government. This is 
not, as has been said here, another step towards 
the defeat of Europe but a contribution to the 
birth of hope for a peaceful Europe in which 
peaceful co-operation will thrive between all its 
states to the benefit of the whole of Europe from 
the Atlantic to the Urals. 
The present deafness to each other's argu-
ments on the capital question of disarmament 
has to stop. Mutual understanding is needed and 
this is the right time to tackle the problem. The 
political will to succeed is essential and that is 
what our Assembly's delegation to Moscow led 
by Mr. Caro, ex-President of this Assembly, 
seems to have understood. Mr. Gorbachev's 
message to the WEU delegation was roughly this: 
" True we have our differences, let us solve them 
by discussion. If you, the West, have any reserva-
tions tell us what they are and we will look at 
them". The report of the Presidential Com-
mittee presented to us this session duly records 
the constructive attitude of the Soviets because 
we read that in Prague, on 9th April, Mr. 
Gorbachev responded to remarks on the zero 
option made by our delegation during the 
Moscow talks. 
Rather than continuing along the road of a 
constant and continuing increase in the level of 
armaments let us seek the path of security and 
peace - this is our proposal - in a process of dis-
armament opening the way to life rather than 
death. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is closed. 
I call Mr. Burger, Rapporteur for the Com-
mittee for Parliamentary and Public Relations. 
Mr. BURGER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
I shall be very brief. We are in a democratic 
assembly and I thank Mr. Bordu for having 
expressed his opinion on Western European 
Union and his possible disagreement with the 
lowest possible level. My last word is that WEU 
considers that security is not solely a problem of 
disarmament but also a problem of detente and 
that questions like human rights, free circulation 
etc. have to be taken into account. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman of the Committee for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations. 
Mr. TUMMERS (Netherlands) (Translation). 
- Mr. President, I should like to take this oppor-
tunity to say something about this report. I am 
speaking as Lady Knight's replacement. The 
report has been submitted on behalfofthe Com-
mittee for Parliamentary and Public Relations. 
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I find it sad that so few of the people chosen by 
the public to work in this place for peace and 
security are in the chamber when a report on 
relations with the public comes up for dis-
cussion. Clearly, it is particularly difficult for 
parliamentarians in this place to realise that they 
themselves must do something to rebut the com-
plaint that so little interest is taken in WEU; it 
cannot simply be refuted by gestures from the 
Council of Ministers and others. 
We had one parliamentarian speaking so 
egocentrically here this morning that I felt 
obliged to leave the chamber and go for a walk in 
the market. As I was doing so, I wondered 
whether the people who were busy in the market 
knew what was going on in this building. Would 
they know which European institution was 
meeting at the end of the market today? I do not 
think anyone could have told me that this was 
Western European Union, with a Mr. Goerens as 
its President. That is a great pity. I feel that when 
people travel through Paris by bus and point to 
institutions which have something to do with the 
representation of the people, those with any 
sense of national pride will say, " That is our 
assembly". That is not true of WEU. I do not 
need to dwell on this or emphasise it, but I hope 
members will read it in the official report of 
debates for this sitting. 
However, we should not only point the finger 
at others. I feel our committee must consider 
how we can make our relations with the public 
more effective. We must not put all our trust in 
the media. We must not simply say that we shall 
make sure we are doing something that will get 
into the newspapers but, aside from the media, 
we must find through our committee an addi-
tional channel responsible for ensuring that the 
public knows how we intend to promote peace 
and security. After all, the public elected us for 
this task. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - We now 
come to the vote on the draft resolution con-
tained in Document 1097. 
In accordance with Rule 33 of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and 
standing unless five representatives present in 
the chamber request a vote by roll-call. 
Does any member wish to request a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
That is not the case. 
We shall therefore vote by sitting and 
standing. 
(A vote was taken by sitting and standing) 
The draft resolution is adopted 1• 
I. See page 28. 
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5. Adjournment of the session 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - We have 
now come to the end of this past of the session. 
Before we break up, I would like to thank all of 
you, the members ofthe Permanent Council, the 
Secretary-General and the representatives of the 
country holding the chair who have been kind 
enough to take part in our proceedings. 
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My thanks, also, to the permanent and tem-
porary staff and in particular to the interpreters 
who enable us to understand each other. 
I declare the first part of the thirty-third 
ordinary session of the Assembly of Western 
European Union adjourned. 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 3.40 p.m.) 
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